




COMITÉ  
ORIENTADOR 25

JUVENTUDE E LUTA, A ESPERANÇA DO Povo

# REVISTA HISTÓRIA DA RESISTÊNCIA



EDISAUN III  
Abril 2022

# **REVISTA HISTÓRIA REZISTÉNSIA**

**EDISAUN III ABRIL 2022**

COMITÉ ORIENTADOR 25 (CO25)

# EKIPA REDASAUN

## REVISTA HISTÓRIA REZISTÉNSIA

EDISAUN III ABRIL 2022

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“História hanesan marxa ida konstante no irreversvel. Ne’ e katak, lao ba oin de’it no forma identidade no karater nia-povu-ninian”.

**Jacinto Alves**

Vise Prezidente | CO25



eralmente iha de’it dalan ida ba teritóriu-sira ne’ebé kolonizadu maka independénsia nasionál. Maibé Rezolusaun husi Organizasaun Nasoens Unidas(ONU) Nú. 1514 (XV) propoen opsaun 3, independénsia, livre assiasaun ka integrasaun ba Estadu independenti ida ho kondisaun-sira ne’ebé defini ona iha rezolusaun ne’e nia laran. Direitu povu Timor-Leste ba auto-determinasaun hetan rekoñesimentu iha 15 Dezembru 1960 bainhira Asembleia Jerál ONU inklui nominalmente Timor iha lista husi teritóriu non-autónomu, hamutuk ho kolónia Portugéz sira seluk. Primeira vez maka Timor oan espresamente rekoñesidu husi Asembleia Jerál hanesan povu ho direitu ba auto-determinasaun.

Ezersísiu direitu auto-determinasaun ne’e atu hala’o liuhusi forma ida demokráтика, ordeira no pasífika ho naran Referendu. Portugál hanesan poténsia administrante hatúr iha Lei Nú. 7/1974 no 7/1975 ne’ebé define mekanizmu no modalidade sira oinsá atu hala’o Referendu iha Timor Portugéz, tuir espíritu no letra Portugál nia Konstituisaun katak Timor Portugéz hanesan teritóriu ne’ebé iha responsabilidade Portugál ninian ho direitu ba auto-determinasaun no independénsia nasionál.

Kompetisaun entre partidu político ho konviksaun política la hanesan, sai manas no hamosu guerra fratecida ka funu sivíl. Funu ne’e loke odamatan ba intervensaun paíz viziñu Indonézia ne’ebé iha hela ambisaun teritoriál atu

halo aneksasaun teritóriu Timor-Portugéz sai nia provínsia ida. Hanesan ita hatene, Repúblika Indonézia hari'i husi illa-sira ne'ebé forma arkipelagu kolónia antiga sira husi Índia Olanda. Timor-Leste ne'ebé jeografikamente situa iha illa-sira ne'e nia leet, bainhira independente karik, bele sai ameasa ba Repúblika Unitária Indonézia ne'ebé iha nia provínsia barak, ativu hela movimento separatista sira. Hanesan membru ONU no membru ba *paizes não-alinhados*, no tuir direitu internasional, Indonézia iha obrigasaun atu defende no promove direitu povu kolonizadu-sira nian ba auto-determinasaun. Tamba ambisaun teritórial tuir nia interesse jeo-estratégika no jeo-política, Indonézia invade Timor-Leste no obriga povu buibere-maubere simu hasoru funu ida kontra povu nia vontade, nia preparasaun no nia eskolla.

Ho nune'e, prosesu Referendu ne'ebé, tuirplanu, atu sai demokrátika, ordeira no pasífika, hakfilak ba funu ida violentu, duru no dolorozu ba povu Timor-Leste. Ho kbi'it militár ne'ebé menus, milísia FALINTIL ne'ebé seidauk hetan treinamento militár, eis-tropas Portugeza sira ne'ebé la simu treinamento ho especialidade ba funu tumba kolonializmu Portugéz nia política atu husik Timor oan moris iha ignoránsia laran,

Timor oan tenki hamri'ik duni hodi funu hasoru poténsia rejonál hanesan Indonézia ne'ebé ataka Timor-Leste husi lalehan, tasi no rai, atu nune'e, bele defende nia direitu ba auto-determinasaun no independénsia nasional.

Ho nia superioridade bélka, forsa Indonézia konsege duni domina teritóriu tomak iha tinan tolu nia laran de'it. Sulan Timor oan iha kampo tranzisaun (campo concentrado), la autoriza organizaun internasional sira tama mai fó ajuda umanitária no husik ema kua-ze rihun-atus-ida mate hamlaha iha kampo tranzisaun. Timor oan balun kaer ba dadur, tortura no oho; halo masakre ba sira barak; halo violasaun no eskravatura sexual ba feto-maluk-sira; destera sira seluk ba Atauro ka distritu seluk no, iha sinteze, hakfilak teritóriu Timor-Leste sai kalváriu dolorozu ba Timor oan hotu durante tinan 24 okupasaun militár Indonézia. Maske nune'e, povu Timor-Leste reziste nafatin. Buibere-maubere nia oan ne'ebé regime Indonézia hanorin Pancasila no UUD-45 iha eskola, hakfilak no hamri'ik kaer aitonka estafeta luta povu nian, atu buka moris livre husi opresaun no hari'i estadu ida independente no soberanu. Investimentu boot

governu Indonézia kuda iha rai Timor Loro-Sa'e hodi halo nia "pembangunan", maibé loriku rai na'in la-husik nia fuan monu ba alisiamenti oioin hodi luta nafatin ba ukun rasik an.

Mundo mós hahú muda. Movimentu independentista sira hanesan Swapo iha Namibia, Frente Polisario iha Sahara Ocidental, Palistin Liberation Organization ne'ebé funu ba independénsia Palestina hahú muda estratejia luta hodi abandona luta armada atu buka dalan ba diálogu ka negosiasaun ho sira-nia inimigu. Depois morru Berlin ruhan, política hejemonia ne'ebé fahe mundo ba Leste no Oeste lakon mós nia intensidade. Klima guerra fria lakon nia espasu no loke odamatan ba mundo ida globál ne'ebé iha interdependénsia entre nasaun ida ho nasaun seluk. Nasaun boot sira mós buka estuda no adapta sira-nia política esterna ho konjuntura ne'ebé muda-an ba bebeik. Iha vakum ne'e nia laran, sosiedade sivil mós avansa ho sira-nia ajenda rasik hodi promove Direitu Umanu no demokratizasaun.

Luta rezisténsia iha Timor-Leste mós atentu hela ba mundo nia evolu-saun no halo mudansa substansiál sira hodi adapta nia luta ba konjuntura foun. Ho lideransa Xanana Gusmão iha CNRM, rezisténsia husik nia política liña dura, husik mós kontestasaun hanesan úniku no lejitimidade reprezentante povu maubere, hodi loke dalan luan ba partisipasaun Timor oan hotu ne'ebé anseia ba ukun rasik an. Ho CNRM, Polítika Unidade Nasional hetan promosaun boot no luan no, konsekuentemente, despartidariza FALINTIL, líder másimu Xanana Gusmão rezigna husi FRETILIN, ho nune'e, kria ambiente konduzível atu manan konfiansa ba neutralidade husi rezisténsia, CNRM bele hetan lejitimidade ba reprezentasaun Timor oan tomak, tantu hasoru malu ho organizasaun internasional sira nune'e mós ho Portugal hanesan poténsia administrante. Reprezentante líder CNRM iha diáspora, Ramos Horta mós rezigna an husi FRETILIN atu bele koalia nakloke no livre ho forsa nasionalista sira seluk ne'ebé namkari iha diáspora. Hanesan efeitu husi mudansa-sira ne'e, organizasaun masa iha Frente Klandestina hahú mosu barak no oioin, forma fileira sólida ho baze iha unidade nasional ba ukun rasik an. Ho nune'e, Movimentu 12 Novembru 1991 bele halibur FRETILIN nia oan ne'ebé kaer liman hamutuk ho UDT, APODETI, KOTA no Trabalhista nia oan, hamri'ik iha fileira oin, hasan Líder Karismátiku



Xanana Gusmão nia foto no hakilar ho aten brani “*Patria ou morte, a luta continua!*”.

Lisaun boot ida ba ita katak, bainhira hakarak sai Líder Nasional tenki hatúr an no hamri’ik iha organizaun ida hanesan supra-partidáriu. Líder nasional labele sai líder partidu nian mesak maka hakarak hotu-hotu tenki tuir tamba de’it prinsípiu ukun-an. Saudozu Nicolau Lobato hanorin katak prinsípiu ne’ebé justu, tenki hala’o ho forma ne’ebé loos. Iha prinsípiu justu maibé hala’o ho forma ne’ebé laloos, ema sei la simu no barak sei la tuir.

Husi ne’e, líder nasional tenki sai inspirativu, hametin ema nia fiar no loke fali esperansa ba ema hotu bainhira ita monu ba situasaun ida kuaze totalmente destruidu. Ho nune’e maka líder nasional ne’e, bele motiva, influensia no mobiliza ema barak atu tuir nia. No la’os ne’e de’it. Nia tenki hamri’ik metin iha diferença mundu ninian no liu tan ne’e, iha mós kapasidade boot atu lori diferença-sira lao hamutuk ba hetan interesse hamutuk.

História hanesan marxa ida konstante no irreversvel. Ne’e katak, lao ba oin de’it no

forma identidade no karater nia-povu-ninian. Timor-Leste restaura ninia independénsia iha 20 Maiu 2002 maibé la halo Timor-Leste livre husi problema. Moris diak ne’ebé sai esperansa ba Timor oan hotu iha ukun an hetan dezafiu boot depois infra-estrutura ka rekursu nasional ai-han mutuk hotu. Soberania teritorial hetan nafatin impedimentu husi Austrália ne’ebé hakarak esplora riku-soin Timor-Leste ninian iha tasi laran. Dezenvolvimentu mós labele lao diak bainhira la garantia ba estabilidade no moris ho dame iha rai laran. Konflitu tempu naruk hakanek mós ita-nia sosiedade tomak no sai rai bokur ba haburas ódio no vingansa. Krime kontra umanidade no violasaun ba direitu umanu ne’ebé akontese iha tinan naruk, kesi an ho ema nia sentimento no lori implikasaun política no étika. Iha hanoin katak justisa formál bele hakotu lia sira ne’e maibé iha ka lae kbi’it atu halo kobertura ba nasaun tomak ho kazu rihun ba rihun? Esperiensia husi tribunal internasional hanesan Rwanda no Jugoslavia hatudu tiha ona katak ikan ki’ik sira tama iha kadeia maibé ikan boot sira livre nafatin bainhira Unidade Krime Sériu la konsege prova aspetu kontestual husi violasaun-sira ne’e. Tribunál-sira ne’e mós gasta osan barak maibé laiha doit ida monu ba vítima nia liman. Tenki buka dalan ida efetivu no eficiente atu bele rezolve problema-sira ne’ebé aas hanesan foho Ramelau.

Ho Influensia husi nia tradisaun ne’ebé hadomi paz, lao hamutuk ho ensinamentu igreja ne’ebé kuda domin, bele sai kapitál boot ba Timor oan hasoru nia pasadu ida violentu, duru no dolorozu. Liuhusi mekanizmu justisa tranzisional fó esperansa katak Timor oan bele ultrapasa potênsialmente situasaun ne’ebé kesi nia ba pasadu. Rekonsiliaun ne’ebé hatúr iha lia-loos nia leten bele lori Timor oan ba simu-malu depois konflito naruk. La’os atu haluha pasadu ne’ebé sai importante atu halo adverténsia permanenti ba Timor oan atu labele repete tan, maibé, bele halo Timor oan fahe nia vida sosiál hamutuk ba futuru ida diak liu.

Miske independenti ona maibé la halo Timor-Leste sai nasaun forte. Ho esperiensia pasadu resente ne’ebé hetan blokeiu husi potênsia rejonal rua, Indonézia no Austrália, hasusar tebes Timor-Leste atu dezenvolve nia luta. Halo amizade ho Indonézia sai nesesidade premente ba Timor-



Leste hodi kria política de boa vizinhança, garante estabilidade iha fronteira no loke koperasaun ba dezenvolvimentu iha tempu futuru. Bele mós dehan ho lian seluk karik, ita nia jerasaun ne'ebé iha konflitu ho Indonézia labele husik ita nia pasadu sai obstáculo ba jerasaun foun nasaun rua atu dezenvolve hamutuk sira nia futuru. De facto, halao amizade ho Indonézia kontribui indireitamente ba Timor-Leste hasoru Austrália iha prosesu konsiliatóriu konaba fixa demarkasaun fronteira marítima ne'ebé Austrália hakarak esplora nafatin nia riku-soin. Ho nune'e, Timor-Leste la iha preokupasaun ho fronteira ho Indonézia ne'ebé lao hakmatek hela no Indonézia sai nafatin nasaun ne'ebé apoia Timor-Leste iha agrupamentu rejionál hanesan ASEAN.

Sertamente katak, tamba pasadu, iha pro no kontra konaba Estadu Timor-Leste hari'i hamutuk ho Indonézia Komisaun Lia-Loos no Amizade hodi hare'e ba problema reziduál sira konaba violasaun direitu umanu, inkluzivamente husi ONU rasik ne'ebé ezize atu hari'i tribunal internasional ida hodi julga perpetradór kreme kontra umanidade. Maske Komisaun ne'e nia mandatu hateten katak Komisaun labele prejudika prosesu seluk ne'ebé lao hela (hanesan Painél ba Serius Crime iha Timor-Leste no Ad Hoc Tribunal iha Indonézia), ONU hasai nafatin sirkulár hodi proibe nia funsionáriu-sira partisipa iha prosesu CTF no hari'i Comission of Experts hodi avalia Ad Hoc Tribunal iha Jakarta. Relatório Komisaun ne'e ho naran "Per Memorian ad Spen" fó sai depois tinan rua-resin halao nia knar, mai hametin liután konstatasaun no konkluzaun relatório "CHEGA" husi CAVR. Karik relatório "CHEGA" governu Indonézia labele simu tamba Komisaun ho karáter nasional no hari'i de'it husi Timor-Leste, iha "Per Memorian ad Spen" governu no Estadu Indonézia simu duni liuhusi nia Prezidente Repúblika tamba relatório ne'e mai husi Komisaun bilaterál ida hari'i husi Estadu rua Indonézia – Timor-Leste.

Dili, 30 Marsu 2022

**Jacinto Alves**

Vise Presidente I Comité Orientador 25

# KAMPO KONSENTRASAUN NO VILA-FOUN: KAZU UATU-CARBAU

Comité Orientador 25

## Objetivu no Evolusaun ba harii Kampo Konsentrasaun no Vila-Foun

**K**ampo konsentrasaun nu'udar fatin dadur ne'ebé dala-ua'in uza hodi detein no konsentra dadur funu, dadur Polítiku, refuijadu, no populasaun ne'ebé rende no kaptura iha funu laran. Ne'e nu'udar estratéjia política no militár ne'ebé klásika ona bainhira akontese funu ruma. Kampo konsentrasaun kuñesidu iha mundu mak hanesan Nazi iha Alemaña, nomós Japaun nian durante funu mundiál daruak.

Iha kazu Timor, harii kampo konsentrasaun husi Indonézia nia militár nu'udar mós parte ba estratéjia ba impoen dominasaun no kontrolu no oinsá bele halo izolamentu ba populasaun-sira. Kampo konsentrasaun mós ho motivu estratéjiku hodi halakon ligasaun ho área ne'ebé kontrola ka ka'er husi ema rezisténsia FRETILIN nian.

Tan ne'e, iha jerál, kampo konsentrasaun harii ho nesesidade *seguransa* nomós *polítika*. Seguransa, tan haree ba grau emergénsia umanitáriu, no nível ameasa Polítiku miltár husi ema rezisténsia ba prezensa Indonézia nian iha área espesíku ruma, tantu suku ho postu-administrativu. Polítika tanba Indonézia, liu husi militár ezekuta no organiza política 'Indoneziasaun' ba ema Timor, hodi reintegra hikas Timor ba zona kontrola teritoriál, poder ukun soberanu Indonézia nian. Indoneziasaun, tanba ho meiu koersivu hodi forsa Timoroan sira bele simu no hola parte ba iha integrasaun koletivu ba Indonézia nian.

Polítikamente no estruturalmente, militár Indonézia organiza tebes prosesu kontrolu, surveleñsia no oinsá halo populasaun submete ba autoridade, hodi atinji objetivu rua temi iha leten. Objetivu política hodi hala'o 'Indonézia-saun' nu'udar prosesu sentrál ida mós iha kampo konsentrasaun. Hanesan esplikasaun tuir mai:

The first step was the forcible removal of the population from their traditional homes and relocation to newly-created Indonesian 'strategic hamlets'. These are virtual concentration camps, from which people can only move in a highly restricted . This not only allows close Indonesian supervision but makes it much more difficult for the guerillas to obtain support from the people (...) and the effects of this are disastrous for the ordinary people and their way of life (Mark Aarons, 1922)

(Faze dahuluk mak hasai forsadu populasaun husi sira nia uma tradisionál-sira no realoka hikas ba vila estratéjiku Indonézia nian ne'ebé foin halo. Kampo konsentrasaun virtuál sira ne'e, ema so bele halo movimentu de'it iha área restritivu nia laran. Ne'e la'os de'it halo sira tama besik ba supervizaun Indonézia nian maibé ne'e mós halo gerilleiru sira atu hetan suporta husi povu (...) no nia efeitu sira ne'e dizastre tebes ba ema ordináriu-sira no sira nia estilu moris).



Maske tuir estudu ne'e, kampo konsentrasaun balun persisti ba tempu naruk, sosiedade balun fila hikas ba hela fatin orijinal, maibé balun nafatin hela iha realokasaun maske hela iha entre kondisaun rua temi liu ba ne'e. Bainhira realoka forsadu ba hela iha hela-fatin foun, iha konsekuensia masivu tebes, entre aspetu sósiu ekonómiku no kulturál povu Timor nian, barak mak husik sira nia toos ka natar nu'udar fonte ba nesesidade no sobrevivénsia, maibé mós, afiliasaun povu nian ba sira nia lisan sosiál.

Tan ne'e, kampo konsentrasaun nia metas ikus ida mós mak atu transforma estilu moris sosiedade Timor, no introduús forma kontrolu oinsá atu Timor oan mós bele integra kulturálmente no políticamente ba Indonézia. Ida ne'e nu'udar violénsia modernu ne'ebé impoen husi poder militarístiku ne'ebé ho forma mekániku tebes hodi integra Timor ba espasu modernidade, maibé ho estadu militarístiku nia liman-laran. Maibé hafoin rezisténsia populár no baze apoio ba funu dismantela iha tinan 1978, no kapturasaun ho rendisaun Timoroan nian ba Indonézia nia militár hahú husi 1977 to'o ba 1979, ho konsekuensia operasaun militár iha 1980 ba leten, maka la signifika ne'e nu'udar aktu simu integrasaun ba maioria povu Timor.

Iha Timor, durante invazaun no okupasaun Indonézia nian, konsege harii kampo konsentrasaun iha fatin barak iha Timor laran tomak. Kampo konsentrasaun barak liu harii entre ikus husi tinan 1978 to'o ba 1979, no ikus liu taká iha tinan 1987. Maske nune'e, iha reportajen ua'in mak nota ona ezisténsia kampo konsentrasaun iha inísiu invazaun Indonézia mai Timor. Iha Marsu 1976, Ministru Informasaun RDTL I, Alarico Fernandes, informa sai dehan, FALINTIL liberta ema kuaze rihun-rua iha kampo konsentrasaun – maske nune'e, fatin iha ne'ebé, la informa klaru. Iha tinan 1977, liu husi nia servisu intelijénsia, Fernandes hato'o faktu ofisiál nune'e:

In the Indonesian concentration camps, massacres, tortures and executions are continuing and due to the shortage, of medicaments and food, the defenceless captured of population are continuously dying (CIET, 1976).

*(Iha Indonézia nia kampo konsentrasaun-sira, masakre, tortura, no ezekusaun-sira kontinua, no tan menus ba aimoruk-sira no hahan, populasaun kbiit-laek ne'ebé hetan kaptura kontinua mate).*

Reportajen Fernandes nian ne'e, hato'o husi zona libertada – iha ne'ebé zona okupada, área tetuk no administrativu sira ne'ebé Indonézia kaptura hahú husi invazaun ofisiál iha 1975, transforma nu'udar espasu kampo konsentrasaun ne'ebé ho kontrolu, terror no kastigu hasoru Timoroan sira ua'in no sistemátiku tebebes.

Sorin seluk, kampo konsentrasaun iha Timor, daudaun ne'e ho konkluzaun katak, harii ba dala-uluk iha rai Nubadak, lokáliza iha Batugade (Bobonaro) no besik ho fronteira Timor Loromonu. Maske nune'e, seidauk iha fonte istóriku ua'in hodi konfirma lolos, tanba dalaruma mós, fatin ne'e sai nu'udar sentru refuijadu durante funu sivil 1975. Maske nune'e, kampo ne'e harii iha tinan 1976, hodi konsentra uluk populasaun iha área tetuk no tasi-ninin Bobonaro (TAPOL, 1980). Batugade monu ba Indonézia nia liman-laran molok invazaun ofisiál iha 7 Dezembru 1975.

Tan ne'e, asume katak, kampo konsentrasaun iha Timor, hahú harii barak akompaña ho estensaun ba prezensa no okupasaun militár Indonézia iha rai Timor – iha zona litoral Norte ho Súl. Nia lójika tuir duni oinsá Indonézia nia ‘kampaña pasifikasiun’ hala'o iha Timor entre 1975-1979 nia laran (Aditjondro, 2000). Ne'e katak, Indonézia penetra no haluan nia aneksasaun no dominasaun ba rai Timor - hahú husi área ne'ebé Indonézia marka nia avansu militár hanesan parte Norte Loromonu iha Timor hanesan Bobonaro mai Norte Loro-Sa'e hanesan Baucau no parte Súl rai-klaran hanesan Ainaro, Suai ho Vikeke.

Iha tinan 1976, identifika ona kampo konsentrasaun rua mak hanesan iha Buruma husi Baucau no Hatudo iha Ainaro. Buruma nia populasaun la konsege evakua ba ai-laran desde kedes invazaun Indonézia tama ba Baucau iha loron 9 Dezembru 1975. Hatudo, la konsege rezisti superioridade Indonézia no monu ba militár nia liman-laran, no iha tinan 1976, militár Indonézia forsa populasaun hodi konsentra iha fatin ida de'it. Harii iha inísiu invazaun, kondisaun kontrolu espasu-sira



Kareta militar Indonézia ho rудal iha aldeia balun iha Uatu-Karbau, Viqueque, Outubru 1985.

nune'e akontese hanesan mós ne'ebé mak hala'o ba populasaun Timor ne'ebé rende mai vila iha ikus 1978 ho 1979 mai leten.

Tan ne'e, kampo konsentrasaun nu'udar parte natureza husi funu, kontrolu ba sirkulasaun husi populasaun ne'ebé rende no ne'ebé mak kaptura sai atensaun seguransa ne'ebé sentrál ba autoridade militár Indonézia nian. Ne'e nu'udar movimentu emerjénsia ne'ebé presiza hatan lalais husi autoridade militár. Hodi hatan ba ne'e, militár Indonézia harii pontu rua hanesan kampo tránzitu no kampo konsentrasaun hodi jere sirkulasaun husi populasaun sira maibé mós impoen kontrolu no dominasaun militár ba ema Timor.

Prosesu tun husi ailaran mai vila-laran, iha ‘campo tránzitu’ hamutuk sanulu-resin-haat (14), no instalasaun kampo konsentrasaun iha postu administrativu kada distritu nian. Iha tinan 1979, bele hetan kampo konsentrasaun hamutuk 150 ne'ebé espalla iha Timor-Laran tomak (Departementu Estadu, 2014).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Edward Masters nu'udar Ambaxadór Klibur Estadu Amérika ba Indonézia iha tinan 1977-1981.

Estudu ne'e nota katak, kampo tránzitu ho konsentrasaun harii relasiona ho movimentu husi populasaun sira ne'ebé rende no kaptura bazeia ba organizasaun teritoriál Timor nian ne'ebé fahe ba setór neen (6), hanesan setór Fronteira Norte, Fronteira Súl, Sentru Norte, Sentru Súl, Sentru Leste no Ponta Leste. Kampo konsentrasaun ezisti iha munisípiu hotu iha Timor laran, eseptu iha Oecusse, tanba kondisaun estratéjiku ne'ebé ladun favorável ba hala'o funu populár ho nune'e, Indonézia impoen nia dominasaun nanis iha inísiu invazaun. Organizasaun teritoriál Timor nian ne'e naksobu bainhira Indonézia hahú lansa operasaun militár ne'ebé deskreve husi FRETILIN nu'udar ‘serku no anikilamentu’, iha tinan 1977 to'o ikus tinan 1978.

Tan nune'e, iha ponta Leste, kampo konsentrasaun harii iha Quelicai, Baguia ho Laga nu'udar parte ba Baucau; Lospalos, Iliomar, Luro, Tutuala ho Laivai hola parte ba munisípiu Lautem; no Uatulari, Uatu-Karbau, Viqueque no Ossu nu'udar parte ba munisípiu Viqueque. Maioria populasaun husi setór ne'e nian rezisti no evakua hotu ba foho Matebian. Iha fali Sentru Leste nian, kampo konsentrasaun harii iha Fatuberliu, Alas, Turiscai, Laleia nomós Barique; Sentru Norte iha Aileu, Remexio, Maubisse, Ainaro ho Dili hanesan Tasi-Tolu, Tibar, Raihenek-Mutin; Fronteira Norte iha Bobonaro, Fatubessi, Likisa nst.

Kampo konsentrasaun barak harii iha distritu no postu sira iha rejiaun ponta Leste ho sorin balun Sentru Leste, área ne'ebá mak sai baze apoiu ikus ne'ebé naksobu iha Timor laran. Populasaun, tantu kuadru militár ho sivil sira la'os de'it husi área ponta Leste ho sorin-balun Sentru Leste nian, maibé mós husi parte Sentru Súl ho Sentru Norte mós evakua no hala'o luta iha rejiaun Ponta Leste ho Sentru Leste, liuliu evakua ba foho Matebian.

Ilustrasaun badak ne'e ho objetivu hodi fó introdusaun ba oinsá kampo konsentrasaun harii no evolui iha Timor. Iha parte tuir mai mak sei diskuti oinsá ligasaun entre harii kampo konsentrasaun ho vila-foun, liuliu atu identifika no deskreve oinsá prosesu violensia iha fatin rua ne'e nia laran, iha kazu Uatu-Carbau.

## Kampo Konsentrasaun Uatu-Karbau

Uatu-Karbau, postu-administrativu ida ninin ba parte Lorosa'e husi munisípiu Viqueque nian ida ne'ebé hamriik ho suku neen (6) hanesan Uani-Uma, Loiulo, Irabin-Kraik, Irabin-Leten, Bahatata no Afaloicai. Husi ne'e, ezisti aldeia hamutuk 5 iha Loiulo, 4 husi Bahatata, 7 iha Irabin-Kraik, 5 husi Irabin-Leten, 4 husi Afaloicai no 5 husi Uane-uma. Lian ne'ebé ko'alia iha postu ne'e mak Naueti ho Makasae, ne'ebé mak moris kahur malu de'it entre sira iha suku hotu nia laran. Uatu-Karbau nia área kobre foho, tetuk no tasi, nu'udar mós espasu ne'ebé rabat ba foho Matebian nia lolon sira. Iha mota boot ida kuñesidu husi Uatu-Karbau mak, mota Irabere.

Uatu-Karbau, nia ema iha relasaun lisan no toman ho Uatu-Lari, Baguia, Quelicai, ho Iliomar. Husi ne'e, sira hola parte ba komunidade lubun ne'ebé moris iha foho Matebian lolon – maibé la'os ne'e de'it, sira nia lisan, narasaun ba orijen, istória luta hela no belit metin iha foho Matebian.

Uatu-Karbau fó nia panorama istória ne'ebé kle'an, kro'at nomós krítika ba oinsá atu hatene estadu Indonézia ezekuta no mantein nia orden no kontrolu populasionál durante períodu okupasaun. Katak, Uatu-Karbau sei serve nu'udar referénsia istorikál ba ita hodi komprende oinsá violensia moderna husi estadu funsiona, oinsá orden no dezenvolvimentu la'o iha saran, susar no mukit nia leten.

Ensaiu ne'e esplika oinsá moris iha inísiu rende mai iha vila, hafoin Indonézia hakotu nia operasaun serku ho anikilamentu ne'ebé fó moru ikus ba baze apoiu nia rahun. Partikularmente, artigu ne'e koko hodi analiza forma kastigu ne'ebé mosu iha vila no oinsá estadu Indonézia operasionaliza nia ‘poder’ no soberania husi máquina represivu hanesan militár.

Rona no analiza iha sasin liu rua-nulu, artigu ne'e konklui katak, Indonézia uza nia kontrolu iha kampo konsentrasaun ho vila-foun ho forma represivu, brutál ho total tebes. Ne'e la'os estudu forénsiku ruma ka dokumentáriu ruma, ne'e depende tomak ba estudu istória orál –

memória povu nian ne'ebé la grava no dokumentu molok ne'e husi orden no rejime barbarian.

## Kampo Konsentrasaun Afaloicai, Uatu-Karbau

Hafoin invazaun Indonézia, populaun husi suku neen (6) iha Uatu-Karbau la submetidu no hili evakua no moris iha ai-laran, área ne'ebé FRETILIN kontrola no rekonstrui hikas sosiedade Timor. Indonézia nia forsa avansa no aneksa Uatu-Karbau iha tinan 1976 – maske nune'e, área kontrolu ba Indonézia sei frajil no iha mudansa beibeik, depende ba tiru-malu entre forsa FRETILIN ho forsa Indonézia rasik.

Durante hamutuk ho FRETILIN iha ai-laran, populaun husi Uatu-Karbau integra iha estrutura tomak, tantu sivil no militár iha governasaun estadu Repúblika Demokrática Timor-Leste (RDTL) dahuluk nia okos. Populaun Uatu-Karbau bainhira evakua, fahe ba diresaun tolu. No durante iha ai-laran, hela iha zona 11 Setembru, Zona 1912 nomós Zona Boaventura. Zona ekivalente ho postu-administrativu iha estrutura administrativa ai-laran nian.

Hafoin baze apoiu rahun, kuadru sivil ho militár, inklui populaun jerál Uatu-Karbau rende hodi fila hikas mai vila, área ne'ebé Indonézia sira kontrola nanis – fila maibé susar atu integra ba moris iha kontrolu poder liur nia okos. Ema Uatu-Karbau mai rende no militár Indonézia aloka kellas sira ba hela iha Suku Bahatata. Suku, ne'ebé rabat kellas ba Foho Matebian lolon, sai tiha nu'udar kampo tránzitu ba populaun sira ne'ebé rende no kapturadu. Lokáliza iha kampo tránzitu ne'e la'os de'it ema husi Uatu-Karbau maibé mós ema husi Iliomar, Baguia, Lospalos no seluk tan mak aloka ba hamutuk iha Bahatata. Tuir sasin oioin, dehan balun hela durante loron badak, dalaruma loron tolu de'it, maibé balun fó sasin katak to'o fulan ida ka rua mak foins transfere hikas ba fatin seluk. Tan nune'e, esperénsia ema ida-idak la hanesan relasionala ho durasaun ba konsentra iha kampo tránzitu suku Bahatata.

Prosesu kontrolu no organiza movimentasaun ba populasun-sira iha Bahatata ne'e, mak hahú daudaun oinsá hodi hafahe, identifika no kastigu populasaun ne'ebé konsidera nu'udar kuadru militár ka sivíl iha ai-laran. Dala-ua'in mos, ódiu malu durante funu sivíl iha tinan 1975 nia laran mós, uza husi Uatu-Karbau oan ne'ebé kolabora ho Indonézia hodi kastigu no oho sira ne'ebé mai husi ai-laran. Hanesan mós iha fatin seluk, Indonézia nia autoridade mós oho ema tarjetu ba ema-matenek sira.

Hafoin iha Suku Bahatata, populasaun husi área orijen ida-idak fila ba nia fatin, no Uatu-Karbau sira muda hotu mai hela iha kampo konsentrasaun, iha suku Afaloicai, ne'ebé sei serve nu'udar postu-antigu Uatu-Karbau nian. Espasu naturál iha postu-administrativu Uatu-Karbau, área atuál Afaloicai, transforma ba iha espasu koersaun nian. Rai hakmatek, rai-lisan nakonu ho moras, oho-malu, tauk, hafuhu, nst. kampo konsentrasaun iha Uatu-Karbau harii iha área la-ho moru, la-ho besi-tarak, maibé kontrolu totál no represaun forti tebtebes. Naran FRETILIN ho liafuan sira hanesan 'kamarada' proibidu tebes. Fuk tenki tesi badak.

Moris iha baraka, no komunidade husi suku lima seluk tenki hela iha rai ema seluk nian. Molok asisténsia kruz vermella nian to'o, moris la simu asisténsia médica, nesesidade moris la aseguradu. Kartaun guia de marcha mak nu'udar pasaporte interna ne'ebé bele tulun sira la'o ba ai-laran buka hahan fuik sira. Kesar malu entre sira, no ódiu malu familiar falun ho razaun política hodi Indonézia nia militár ka forsa defeza sivíl (Hansip) sira kastigu no oho mate.

Militár Indonézia mantein ema Uatu-Karbau sira ne'e iha Afaloicai laran husi ikus tinan 1978 too 1983, hafoin muda ba vila foun. Iha inísiu, konsentra populasaun sira iha Afaloicai, no neneik nakfilak tiha nu'udar hela-fatin de'it to'o fali muda ba hela-fatin foun iha tinan 1983. Populasaun husi suku neen (6) ne'e dook, no kontaktu ba sira nia área pre-invazaun limiti tebes.

## Hahan, Moras no Mate

Hahan laiha, tratamentu saúde laiha no moris la ijieni, nu'udar kauza sentral ida mós ne'ebé halo Uatu-Karbau oan sira mate barak ba hamlaha no moras iha kampo konsentrasaun. Moris iha kampo konsentrasaun, la'os di'ak hanesan sira imajina, maibéaat liu tan duke sira moris iha ai-laran. Problema kona-ba hahan no saúde sai kroniku tebes. Ba populasaun ne'ebé foin rende, hahan ba sira menus ka tenki luta makas foin bele hetan hahan rumá hanesan maek, kumbili nst – hahan fuik ne'ebé moris iha ai-laran. Hanesan Miguel da Rosa Pinto 'Resi-Mau'hateten:

*Indonézia dehan "ohh, kami punya banyak makanan?" – mas povu tun fofoun ne'e mate hotu ba hamlaha. Han de'it aitahan mamuk ne'e, hodi saida mak bele moris? – uluk matebian rahun fofoun ne'e, loron ida lori (mate) ema nain-sanulu, nain-ruanulu dala ida. Tanba falta aihan. Aihan laiha (...) mate ho mate mak lori malu ba hakoi.*

Buka hahan ba satan moris lorloron mós tenki lori kartaun hodi permite la'o nian. Karik lalori, bainhira autoridade militár inklui para-militár hanesan Hansip bele deskonfia nu'udar saida mak Indonézia dezigna GPK (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan). Ho konsekuensia, bele hetan ameasa, kastigu, detein ka bele mós ba oho mate. Hahan nia menus, moris dezorganizadu, foer, iha tauk no ameasa totál, ho konsekuensia, ema mate barak iha kampo konsentrasaun laran. Hanesan Manuel Monteiro, eis lideransa aldeia Lai-Na'a, Zona 11 Setembru, haktuir katak:

*"ami iha ai-laran ne'e hahan la falta. Bainhira hahan falta, mate tan hahan, ami tun ona mai vila-laran. Tun ona mai vila-laran mak mate barak, tanba hahan laiha".*

Iha 1979, tinan dahuluk rende no moris iha vila mak todan liu. Nu'udar periódus temporáriu, tranzissaun maibé turbulente no rungu-ranga tebtebes. Sira moris iha inísiu fulan 6 nia laran ho tauk no trauma ne'ebé konstante. Poder Indonézia nian absoluta tebtebes.

Naran Sira bele Indoneziu sae oho Povavalo-carbau iha tinan 1979-1989 sih lokau					
Nomé	Pósto	Suku	Vila/Aldeia	Ano	Ema be sho sira
1. Tulusius Sora-legui	Uatu-Carbau	Baha-tato	Uai-Nare	16-10-1979	Jose fernandes (sor)
2. Jose Luth	-	-	-	-	-
3. Seumas Lintu	-	-	Tato-Desa	1984	Bononar 23 (88)
4. Hermenegildo Lintu	-	-	-	1984	-
5. Francisco Lintu	-	-	Batu-Lakau	-6-	-
6. Matias Mu-Nave	-	Fatima de Lima	Uatu-Uahu	1979	Lynne J. (197)
7. Carlos Lobo legui	-	-	Uatu-Bito	29-07-1979	-
8. Jose lego-lalo bau	-	Uatu-Uau	-	1979	(1989) (L.66)
9. Belarmino Rumi gane	-	-	Uatu-Aldeia	1979	(1991) (f)
10. Manuel Bina gane	-	-	-	1979	(-7) (f)
11. Carlos Atela Nulu	-	-	-	1984	(1991) (f)
12. Acacio	-	-	-	1984	-
13. Henrique de Souza	-	Loiulo	Asafadea	1984	(LSH) (201)
14. Gonçalves Laihau	-	-	-	1979	(Gra) (f)
15. Sora man chefe	-	-	-	1984	(L89)
16. Sua bora	-	-	Asafadea	-	(LSH)
17. Bato nahau	-	-	-	1984	-
18. Jambarro Boro Lava	-	Afaloicai	-	1979	(1991)
19. Gonçalves de Souza	-	-	-	1984	(LSH) (23)
20. Lai-Boro	-	-	Taralaga	29-09	(f)

Produzido por RETA

Naran Timoroan husi Uatu-Carbau balun ne'ebe mate durante 1979-1989. Dokumentu ne'e iha 1990 nian. Dalaruma nudar dokumentu klandestina nian manda sai ba liur hodifo sai naran neebe rejistru ema mate lakon tamba Indoneziu nia represaun no atrosidade sira.

Iha tinan 1979, konsidera nu'udar tempu hamlaha ba ema Timoroan sira moris iha kampo konsentrasaun no vila kontrolu husi militár Indonézia. Iha fulan Setembru ba leten iha tinan 1979 mak foin Kruz Vermella, servisu ho igreja hodi organiza procesu asisténsia no tulun umanitária hodi fahe hahan no sasan relevu hodi fó tulun provizóriu atu ema Uatu-Karbau bele satan no reorganiza-an hodi bele buka moris rasik ho di'ak. Uatu-Karbau nu'udar mós parte ba área estremu ne'ebé Kruz Vermelha Internasional konsidera, iha ne'ebé mak marka ho populasaun ua'in no nia situasaun moris, hahan, saúde sira nu'udar prioridade urjénsia ba Komisaun Kruz Vermella Internasional.

Tan nune'e, rende no moris iha vila-laran hanesan mehi aat ida. Oho, tortura, mate ba hamlaha, moras, hafuhu malu, kesar-malu, nonok no kiak mak falun populasaun maioria Uatu-Karbau sira nia moris.

## Vila Lokál no Hela-fatin Foun

Vila lokál no hela-fatin foun nu'udar destinu jerál iha populasaun Timor ne'ebé tun husi ai-laran mai vila-laran. Sira tenki aloka no hela iha kampo konsentrasaun ba tempu naruk no hafoin ne'e mak bele realoka ka muda ba iha hela-fatin foun. Populasaun Uatu-Karbau, hela iha kampo konsentrasaun husi tinan 1979 to'o 1983.

Iha tinan 1983, koinsidente ho eleitu Xefi Suku sira iha Uatu-Karbau laran, maka hahú prosesu realokasaun no harii-hikas vila-foun. Suku orijinal Bahatata muda mai vila-foun naran Daragata; Loiulo muda tun ba iha Darekilau; Irebin-Kraik muda ba Hae-Oli; Irabin-Leten muda ba Irabere; Uani-Uma muda ba Kaidi-Lale; no Afaloicai mak hela nafatin iha nia área orijen. Realokasaun sira ne'e, hala'o ho distansia dook tebes, entre 10 kilometru to'o 20 kilometru husi área knua antigua ka pre-invazaun nian.

Iha tinan 1993 ba leten, hahú tan realokasaun ba populasaun sira ne'e. Loiulo ne'ebé muda ba Darekilau, muda sae fali ba área atuál Bubu-Nai-Laki (Aibubur kabuk). Realokasaun husi tinan 1993 la orientadu ba área tetuk, maibé ba dalan-ninin ona. Ne'e tan akompaña ho projetu loke dalan ne'ebé hahú tama to'o iha Uatu-Karbau dezde tinan 1984 mai leten. Área balun mantein de'it hanesan Irabin-Leten.

Koinsidente ho reorganizaun espasu administrativu iha tinan 1983, sentru administrasaun Uatu-Karbau muda husi Afaloicai ba iha Irabin-Kraik, ka Ringit Baruh, tuir Indonézia nia bolu, no tuir ema Uatu-Karbau, rai ne'e bolu Lesirubi. Reorganiza no muda sentru administrativu Uatu-Karbau husi Afaloicai ba Irabin-Kraik, katak muda husi rai-leten aas, tun ba rai-tetuk rabat tasi.

Hela-fatin foun sira ne'e, nafatin tama iha zona orijen Uatu-Karbau nian. Haree husi kondisaun topografia, área foun sira ne'e iha laletek no tetuk, duke iha foho-aas. No kondisaun nune'e, hafasil tebes ba kontrolu militár Indonézia nian, tanba área sira ne'ebé haleu foho Matebian, nu'udar dalan ba sirkulasaun, movimentu no subar-fatin forsa FRETILIN nian. Ba ema

Uatu-Karbau, área sira ne'e konsidera nu'udar rai-fuik, no fatin ba ema kasa animal fuik sira. Maibé durante okupasaun Indonézia, área sira ne'e nu'udar dalan ne'ebé FRETILIN nia forsa sirkula ba mai hodi hala'o hala'o rezisténsia. Instalasaun vila iha área nune'e, serve ba kondisaun estratéjiku no seguransa ba militár Indonézia nian, liuliu prevene ligasaun entre ai-laran ho vila-laran, maibé mós entre funu-nain sira.

Sorin seluk, realokasaun serve mós interesse centrál Indonézia nian hodi bele lalais integra Timoroan ba Indonézia maibé mós atu halo Timoroan sira bele imajina-an nu'udar ema Indonézia, liu husi projeto ekonomia, lei nst. Hela fatin foun sira ne'e, ezisti to'o de'it Timor hetan nia independénsia, mak foin muda fali ona ba knua iha suku orijen ida-idak nian. Durante okupasaun Indonézia, populasaun sira halo vizita ka halo to'os, no hala'o lisan iha área pre-aneksasaun, limite tebes.

Realokasaun ba mai, iha konsekuensia fundamentál hakait ba prosesu reorganiza moris foun, afeta ba lisan, solidáriu família no komunidade rasik. Dala-barak, atu organiza-an ba buka moris sei presiza tempu no kbiit másimu hodi bele rekupera no hadi'ak moris. Orden sosiál sai lametin.

## Kampo Konsentrasaun no Hela-Fatin Foun: Taballadór Forsadu mak Fundasaun

Militár inklui autoridade lokál hanesan xefi postu, xefi suku sira, ho mós Timoroan sira ne'ebé servisu hodi kolabora ba Indonézia, aproveita populasaun sira ne'ebé rende nu'udar fonte traballadór, maibé servisu ho gratuitu. Sira uza populasaun, liuliu klosan no katuas sira hodi asegura fornesimentu bee, material prima ba harii uma, edifisiu, no oinsá bele loke dalan ba koneksaun transporte rai.

Saran (sakrifisiu) no atan nu'udar sistema ne'ebé harii mós sosiedade modernu. Hanesan mós ho vila foun ne'ebé ezisti no harii hafoin populasaun Timor sira tun husi ai-laran. Sistema ukun iha vila-laran, liuliu kampo konsentrasaun mesak koruptu, esploitativu no represivu tebtebes. Servisu forsadu hanesan instrumentu koersaun maibé mós oinsá sira bele 'hadau moris' husi mate – bele satan atu labele hetan

oho, nu'udar forma kastigu ikus nian. Maske komunidade Uatu-Karbau, iha tinan 1979-83 la-ho konsiensia hatene katak iha kampo konsentrasaun Afaloicai, sira moris nu'udar dadur iha prizaun nakloke ida - sira nia kontribuisaun gratuito ba hamoris fali vila no moris foun ne'e ua'in, kle'an maibé mós moruk tebtebes.

Populasaun ne'ebé rende, hela iha Afaloicai enfrenta kastigu oioin. Servisu forsadu no servisu gratuito iha forma espoitasaun no represaun nu'udar rezultadu komún ba populasaun sira, liuliu ba sira ne'ebé autoridade militár Indonézia identifika nu'udar kuadru ki'ik no médiu iha estrutura sivil ho militár durante tinan tolu iha ai-laran. Konsekuensia kastigu penetra tebes – la hare'e ba feto ho mane, ferik, katuas ou labarik.

## Kampo Konsentrasaun: Husi Uatu-Karbau ba Atauro

Kampo konsentrasaun ne'ebé estabelese iha Uatu-Karbau durante tinan lima, husi 1978 to'o de'it 1983, hafoin transfere ba hela-fatin foun. Hanesan babain katak, relasaun populasaun sira ne'ebé iha zona ne'e ho gerrilleiru sira iha ai-laran bandu no susar tebes. Populasaun, ne'ebé neon metin no tuba ba princípio ne'ebé sai liafuan ikus molok populasaun sira mai zona okupada katak, 'liman-rohan ho ain-rohan servisu ba inimigu, maibé fuan no ulun-fatuk hanoin nafatin mai ailaran'. Ho liafuan sira ne'e sunu beibeik neon populasaun sira balun.

Ho konsenkuensia, populasaun Uatu-Karbau balun ne'ebé iha zona okupada, nafatin mantein hodi hala'o relasaun ho gerrilleiru sira husi ailaran. Relasaun sira ne'e sira estabelese ho forma espontáneu de'it bainhira sira la'o ba buka hahan hanesan Kumbili sira iha ailaran ka rai-fuik sira.

Relasaun entre sira to'o de'it ba troka informasaun hanesan atividade militár Indonézia, fó hanoin ba malu, apoiu sasan inklui hahan, no buat selseluk tan. Bainhira kontaktu sira nune'e amenta, konsidera nu'udar ameasa ba prezensa militár Indonézia sira. Ho konsekuensia, levantamentu sira hanesan 10 Juñu 1980 iha Dili, nu'udar rezultadu entre

populasaun sira ne'ebé moris iha vila okupa husi militár ho restu husi gerrilleiru FRETILIN nian iha ai-laran.

Pelumenus, durante tinan lima (5) iha kampo konsentrasaun, nafatin Uatu-Karbau oan balun mantein nafatin relasaun, komunikasaun no apoiu ba ailaran. To'o iha tinan 1982, Indonézia nia forsa konsege kaptura estafeta ida husi ai-laran. Estafeta FALINTIL ne'e naran João Bere<sup>2</sup>, ema husi Baguia.

Estafeta ne'e mak nu'udar manu-talin hodi liga populasaun sira ne'ebé konsentradu iha postu Uatu-Karbau. Ema hirak responsável iha vila Uatu-Karbau mak hanesan Cosme Walihare, Alín ho Miguel. Bainhira Indonézia kaer João Bere, no lori ba interogasaun no torturasaun, maka obriga hodi nia hateten sai ema hirak responsável husi Uatu-Karbau rasik. Bainhira ema dader ba konsentra iha kampo laran, mak militár sira obriga Kainahak hodi hatudu Cosme ho nia kamarada sira. Cosme ho nia belun sira, militár sira lori kedas ba deten iha Koramil Uatu-Karbau, hafoin ne'e transfere ba Kotis, Saelari.

Ema nain-lima ne'e detein de'it iha Kotis Saelari durante fulan ida, loron sanulu-resin-lima (loron 45). Kastigu, tortura, la fó hahan, halo servisu forsadu, no kalan toba de'it iha rai liur, no haleu husi kontrolu militár ne'ebé metin tebes.

Hafoin konklui prosesu detensaun no identifika sira nia relasaun ho FALINTIL iha ailaran, sira nain-lima lori mai detein loron sanulu-resin-ida iha Korem Dili, no destera hikas kedas ba Atauro. Husi bailoron entre Marsu ho Abril 1982, sira ba iha Atauro no moris iha espasu marjinál ne'e durante tinan lima (5). Iha 5 Fevereiro 1987 mak autoriza fila hikas ba rai Uatu-Karbau. Destera ba Atauro nu'udar solusaun ida ba Indonézia hodi bele izola rezisténsia sira, liu-liu hakotu ligasaun entre ai-laran ho vila-laran.

<sup>2</sup> Hirak ne'e naran pseudo ne'ebé CO25 uza hodi proteje privasidade individu

## Bibi-metan: Entre Lalehan no Infernu iha Loiulo

Iha Uatu-Karbau, esperiênsia beibeik oinsá FALINTIL tun mai área okupada sira, liu-liu zona konsentrasaun ho hela-fatin temporáriu sira hodi buka aihan husi populasaun. Hafoin vizita FALINTIL, populasaun barak mak sofre liu tan ameasa, teror no kastigu, liu-liu ho hirak ne'ebé konsidera halo ligasaun

no kolaborasaun ho FALINTIL. relatóriu ida indika katak tinan 1982, iha Ringit Baruh, lokáliza hela-fatin foun iha tetuk, besik tasi, no vila foun ne'e, nakonu ho terorizasaun totál bainhira FALINTIL vizita no foti karau sanulu-resin-rua ne'ebé husik besik kuaze metru atus-rua husi Koramil nia Kuartél Jerál iha postu Uatu-Karbau (Timor Information System, 1982).

Tan ne'e, hela iha kampo konsentrasaun no vila okupada-sira, halo populasaun moris iha dilema extremo tebtebes. Ba leten, katak ba ailaran mós ladi'ak, no ba kraik ka iha vila laran ne'ebé domina, kontrola no ukun husi Indonézia mós ladi'ak. Situasaun limita tebes liberdade ema nian, liu-liu penetra no harahun tebes kbi'it rezisténsia ema Timoroan nian.

Hela iha zona okupada-sira, maibé ailaran bele sai fali fatin subar, fatin protejido duke hela iha saida mak Timor persebe nu'udar 'hela iha inimigu nia ibun-laran'. Ho konsekuansia, populasaun barak hela iha vila laran, konsidera nu'udar bibi-metan. Katak simu todan, culpa ne'ebé la'os sira mak komete direita – vítima inosénsia tebes ba violénsia brutál ne'ebé komete husi forsa militár Indonézia.

Uatu-Karbau, partikulár liu ho suku Loiulo enfrenta lala'ok brutal ida ne'ebé sira konsidera iha tempu ne'ebá nu'udar momentu ba Kraras kedua (segundu). Iha tinan 1984, hafoin rezisténsia no relasaun ho forsa FRETILIN nian iha ailaran ki'ik-oan, bele dehan raru tebes tanba kontrolu no konsekuansia represivu ne'ebé halo povu Uatu-Karbau tauk no luta ho nonok – FRETILIN nia forsa liman karuk FALINTIL, ho sububar penetra tama ba vila, ho objetivu hodi konsiensaliza povu iha Uatu-Karbau, atu estabelese/hametin redi ligasaun no fiar-malu entre povu iha vila laran no forsa iha

ai-laran maibé oinsá atu hala'o propaganda iha populasaun – ho konsekuénsia, FALINTIL ho misaun sentrál ida mak tenki sunu uma-tali, ho razaun bele fó apoiu umanitáriu ruma, husi ne'e, uma la'os tali ona, maibé hahú daudaun harii uma ho blok. La'os de'it komunidade nia uma balun, edifísiu servisu administrasaun lokál nian mós. Sasin balun hato'o katak, prezensa FALINTIL sira ne'e, nu'udar forma hodi hatudu katak, forsa ba rezisti sei iha.

Vizita subar ne'e rezulta ho sunu sede suku Loiulo, ho uma tolu husi komunidade sira-nia-uma – ho konsekuénsia, populasaun iha vila, simu todan tomak. Komunidade Loi-Ulo iha dilema rua tan, ida sira simu kulpa husi Indonézia katak, sira kolabora hodi lori FALINTIL sira tama ba vila, liu-liu ho akontesimentu sunu uma ho edifísiu sira ne'e. Hafoin akontesimentu Kraras, iklima tauk ho nonok sei falun populasaun sira, liu-liu iha área Vikeke, inklui Uatu-Karbau. Ho akontesimentu nune'e, halo sira moris iha tauk-laran, no kbi'it-la'ek liu tan.

Husi akontesimentu ne'e, militár Indonézia lori no halibur hotu populasaun Loiulo iha rai-mamuk lulik no luan ida nia laran bolu Wesiuk-Wehali, aldeia Asafadae nian, hodi halo investigasaun no julgamentu masál – militár halo intimida-saun, baku no ameasa hodi oho ema se de'it ne'ebé deskonfia involve iha kazu ne'e. Ho kondisaun ne'e, Loiulo oan sira tauk no hanoin katak masakre Kraras iha tinan 1983 bele repete fali hikas ba sira.

Ho konsekuénsia, no hetan katak, FALINTIL mak direta involve, maka forsa Indonézia hatan ho harii no instala postu kontrolu ho vijilánsia iha suku Loiulo.

Forma kontrolu seguransa suku Loiulo instala hanesan kedes ho esperiénsia suku seluk nian hanesan Lalerek-Mutin iha Viqueque vila hafoin akontesimentu Kraras 1983 no fatin seluk sira iha Timor laran ka suku Caimauc, Fatuberliu. Sistema siguransa nível suku ne'e, kuaze implementa hotu iha área ne'ebé konsidera sai fatin ba atividade rezisténsia nian.

Hatan ba ne'e, militár Indonézia responde ho uza fali populasaun mak

halo siguransa ba an. Katak tau populasaun mak hodi tau-matan, hafuhu, no hasoru/kontra fali FALINTIL. Militar Indonézia mobiliza populasaun mak halo siguransa - servisu ho autoridade suku, sira harii tan saida mak kuñesidu ho populasaun Loiulo nu'udar forsa 'Siluman' ho Siguransa.

*Suku Loiulo, eseptu katuas ne'ebé la'o labele, moras, fen isin-rua, maibé restu husi ne'e, tantu ferik ho katuas, joven ho labarik, inan-aman to'o membru familia tomak iha servisu obrigatóriu hodi halo vijilánsia no hein iha postu-siguransa. Postu siguransa, instala halo ronda ka kabuar hodi hale'u suku.*

Postu sira ne'e instala ho kamada tolu. Kamada ninin liu ka konsidera nu'udar postu prinsipál no tuir fali postu rua seluk mak bolu postu noturno - kada postu iha ema nain-ha'at. No postu dahuluk dala-ua'in prenxe ho ema mane klosan, inklui ho rama, dima, no arma tradisionál selseluk. Postu noturno babain involve feto ho mane hotu, ka lae feto de'it.

Autoridade polisiál uza rasik duni ema Loiulo hodi hafuhu nia maluk seluk nia servisu no moris. Tékniku militár uza hotu hodi halo kontrolu ba populasaun. Autoridade polisiál kalan nian hanesan Siluman ho Siguransa servisu direta ba militár, hodi halo kontrolu maibé mós teror ba populasaun sira. Bainhira ema ruma dukur iha kalan, ka hetan la halo servisu, maka kastigu sira nian mak hoban iha bee laran durante kalan tomak, se lae iha loron, ba tesí ai-dak, no kee to'o fokit sai ai-dak nia abut. Hanesan Tita da Cruz<sup>3</sup> hato'o nia sasin:

*Feto sira ne'e jaga netik liurai nia uma. Ami jaga hamutuk ne'e ema nain-haat. Ami nia xefi mak Ceo Lelak, Joana Buikana, Antonia Bilelo, no ida mak Marta Bere<sup>4</sup>(..) Ami toba de'it, sira bolu malae tun ba halo at ami. Tur mak dukur hanesan ne'e mós duni ami tama ba bee lihun laran. Bainhira mak fila fali ba uma troka? – hanesan ne'e mak toba de'it iha jaga.*

<sup>3</sup> Naran pseudo.

<sup>4</sup> Naran pseudo.

Ronda ne'e, iha konsekuensia luan no kle'an. Siguransa ne'e hahú husi tuku 6 lokraik no termina ho tuku 6 dadersan. La iha hahan, la iha mós asisténsia médiku, populasaun rasik mak sustenta-an hodi hader kalan tomak. Dala-ua'in mós, labarik ho estudante labele kontinua eskola ka to'os-nain/natar-nain sira mós tenki servisu ekstra iha loron la iha deskansa.

Kondisaun nune'e, lori populasaun mak hafuhu malu, funu-balun ba malu, no kria atmosfera konstante ba tauk, deskonfia malu, no pior mak sala totál ne'ebé hatúr ba populasaun. Hakarak ka lakohi, autoridade militár Indonézia nia kastigu nune'e bele baku-fila kbiit no neon populasaun Loiulo hodi hasoru fali de'it forsa FRETILIN nian.

Kastigu ne'e hatodan beibeik populasaun, maka iha tinan 1987, ronda hahú redús no taka, bainhira ema Loiulo hamutuk 87, hili hodi halai husik hela suku Loiulo, no desidi halai ba hela no subar iha Baguia, Baucau. Ronda ne'e termina ho durasaun tempu tinan tolu.

Forma kastigu, surveleñsia no kontrolu totál nune'e, bele assume katak, tékniku kampo konsentrasaun ne'ebé instala iha zona okupada, ka vila-laran sira husi inísiu populasaun nia rende iha tinan 1978 sira, la'os termina iha tinan 1983 hanesan haktuir husi Indonézia nia deklaraçsaun sira.

Uza populasaun nu'udar seguransa no halo vijilânsia ba ida-idak nia suku, parte mós ba militár Indonézia nia autoridade hodi kria polisiamentu konstante ba populasaun – ne'e nu'udar estratégia militár kontra-insurjénsia hodi hatan ba área ne'ebé konsidera nu'udar ahi-matan husi atividade guerrilleiru no ameasa siguransa ba ukun no prezensa militár Indonézia.

## Teror no Surveleñsia: Fiar Malu

Indonézia nia autoridade impoen poder terror konstante no surveleñsia ne'ebé penetradu tebtebes. Iklima lafiar malu, deskonfia malu, hafuhu

malu, tauk ba malu, tantu entre família rasik, oan hafuhu inan ho aman, lain tauk fen nst. Iklima hafuhu malu ne'e, kria konfuzau n no iha poténsia hodi haketa relasaun famíiliar iha luta laran. Atividade balun ne'ebé involve tática clandestinidade, dala-ua'in hala'o husi lasu relasaun família, ka relasaun lisan hanesan feton-san umane. Maibé iha sasin balun ne'ebé indika katak, relasaun família iha inísiu moris iha kampo konsentrasaun, ka zona okupada iha Uatu-Karbau laran mós, hetan dezafiu tebtebes liu-liu husi família rasik. Poder represivu ne'e konsegue sobu no soke tebes lasu relasaun família nian.

## Ukun Lokál

Xefi suku barak kuaze mai husi ema APODETI, ka ema hirak ne'ebé rende uluk, no kolabora ho bapa<sup>5</sup> durante tinan tolu dahuluk invazaun Indonézia ba Timor. Autoridade suku sira mós involve iha programa surveleñsia no restruturaun sosiedade Timor iha vila sira, maibé mós aproveita kbiit-laek populasaun nian hodi exploita forsa no kbiit populasaun ninian. Nu'udar feto klosan ne'ebé halai no moris iha ai-laran, hafoin rende mai moris iha vila, Eva Soares hato'o nia sasin katak:

*Liurai kastigu ami ba hili kamí – hili kamí, fakar hamutuk, liurai mak tetu, osan ninian, ami povu ne'e laiha [...] haruka ami ba natar hamoos nia du'ut, no hamoos nia haree-du'ut, hamoos nia to'os. [...] Ami ba tesí tali-tahan sira mai halo liurai nia uma, no halo liurai nia fahi luhan.*

Uatu-Karbau, fahe mós kondisaun ho área seluk, katak, autoridade suku to'o ba postu nian, dalabarak eleitu ho konfiansa husi militár Indonézia. Xefi suku sira husi kada suku, sempre fahe koneksaun ba liña política no relasaun servisu di'ak ho militár Indonézia. Asume katak, dalabarak autoridade lokál sai liman-ain no hahii liu objetivu no interesse Indonézia nian.

5

Naran komum ne'ebé ema Timor dezigna ba ema Indonézia sira.

## Konklusaun

Analiza istóriku ba Uatu-Karbau hatudu ona, oinsá violénsia no represaun la'o konstante no totál tebtbes – violénsia sistemátiku ne'ebé organiza husi instrumentu político-militár estadu Indonézia nian. Kastigu, terror, abuzu seksuál, oho, moras no hamlaha nu'udar forma husi violénsia totál ne'ebé populasaun sira hasoru. Violénsia ne'e hasoru ema ki'ik hotu, tantu labarik ki'ik, klosan, to'o ba ferik ho katus. Violénsia hasoru ema maibé mós hasoru valór sosiál ema Uatu-Karbau nian hanesan lisan.

Uatu-Karbau fó ona paisajen istória husi violénsia estadu modernu liu husi reorganiza espasu territoriál ba kontrolu, domina no esplora nian hanesan kampo konsentrasaun no harii vila-foun. Reorganiza espasu ba moris, maibé nakonu ho susarno mate. Reorganiza moris foun iha kampo konsentrasaun no vila-foun tanba Indonézia promesa orden, estabilidade no progresu, maibé moris fila ba kotuk.

Ita hein katak, analiza badak ba istória Uatu-Karbau, kona-ba prosesu moris iha kampo konsentrasaun ho vila-foun nia laran, oinsá fatin sira ne'e serve interese político-militár estadu Indonézia nian ne'e serve nu'udar lisaun foun, no ponte ba ita hotu hodi komprende krítiku liu oinsá moris iha dominasaun, kontrolu no represaun nia okos, durante okupasaun político-militár husi estadu Indonézia ba ema Timor.

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# 'IF NOT US, THEN WHO?': NATION-BUILDING IN THE CLANDESTINE RESISTANCE

Michael Leach

The problem of Timor is that it was isolated ... much of the population thought Indonesia had already won...“Better to become a civil servant, live in peace, Indonesia has won”. We would try to reignite their spirit. .... We used the slogan “If not now, when? If not us, then who?” to encourage people to come together and do something for their country.

(Gregorio Saldanha, interview with author, 2010)

In a useful periodisation, Carey (2003: 28) describes the three phases of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor as the period of conquest from 1975-79; of partial consolidation from 1979-89, leading to the ‘opening’ of the territory in January 1989; and thereafter, the rapid unraveling of Jakarta’s authority. The final decade saw the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1989, the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta in 1996. Alongside geopolitical developments, which undermined international support for Indonesia’s forced integration of East Timor, one clear factor was the failure to convert the younger generation, or Gerasaun Foun, to the cause of integration. The rise of the civilian clandestine organisations in the late-1980s, and their early successes, would lead to a major change in resistance strategy, emphasising clandestine civilian activity in the towns.

Reflecting these changes, the clandestine movements were placed under joint command of CNRM Executive Committee of the Clandestine Front by June 1990, under Secretary Constancio Pinto, and CNRM / Commander-in-chief of FALINTIL, Xanana Gusmao (CAVR 2013). Major clandestine organisations included OJETIL, RENETIL, the Popular Organisation of Timorese Youth Lorikeet Warriors – OPJLATIL,

the Clandestine Student Front of Timor-Leste – FECLETIL, the Always United Front of Timor (Frente Iha Timor Unidos Nafatin – FITUN, literally ‘star’ in Tetun), the East Timor Student Solidarity Council (ETSSC) and others. Several formed in the wake of an important communiqué from Xanana Gusmão on 20 May 1986, which directly addressed younger East Timorese. ‘A History that beats in the Maubere Soul: A message to Catholic youth in East Timor and students in Indonesia’ emphasized three themes: the need for national unity, East Timor’s cultural and historical differences to Indonesia, and the need for ‘active nationalism’ among youth (2000 [1986]: 86; See Leach 2017, 84-87).

This paper examines the promotion of nationalist ideas in the youth-dominated clandestine front, and specifically, on ideas and practices of building political unity and promoting a national identity in three clandestine groups: FITUN, OJETIL and RENETIL, each formed between 1986 and 1990. It draws on interviews with one of FITUN’s leadership group, Elizario Ferreira, along with OJETIL leader Gregorio Saldanha, and RENETIL leader Jose Neves.

## Origins: The Experience of Education in Occupied East Timor

As memoirs of other young Timorese educated during the occupation suggest (e.g. Rei 2007), formal education was a divisive experience, which tended to reinforce ethnic divisions between East Timorese and transmigrant children. Such divisions were reinforced by popular terms such as ‘rai-nain’ (owners of the land) and ‘emaliur’ (outside or strangers) (Babo-Soares 2003: 274). FITUN started with a group of 49 students at junior high school, originally known as SAFARI, an Indonesian acronym for Saya Anak FRETILIN Anti-Republik Indonesia (I Am a Child of FRETILIN Against the Republic of Indonesia). One member of SAFARI was Elizario Ferreira, who would later become a FITUN leader. The group in Dili at first was ‘more like a gang.... We didn’t like the children of Indonesians. Every day we would pick fights

with Indonesian kids. Eventually, this information reached Kablaki [mountains]...’ (Interview with author 2010).

A critical moment in SAFARI’s political development came through an intervention from the very top of the resistance hierarchy: Xanana Gusmão heard news of a student group in Kuluhun who opposed the Indonesian occupation. In December 1986, several members of SAFARI met with Gusmão (Ferreira, interview with author 2010):

Seven of us went. We are all alive today. When we got there, people were talking politics – we didn’t understand a thing about politics! We just sat staring at each other... Katuas [Gusmão] said to us: “*Politics, nationalism, has to come from you, it must start with your small group. Not everybody can know about it. One or two people can come and see me, not a crowd.*”.

According to Ferreira, not even their parents knew what they were doing: ‘we were not yet part of the resistance, just people at the top knew what we did’ (interview with author 2010).

## The Role of Political Education

For a group of young East Timorese with little political education, the personal meetings with Gusmão were electrifying. But these were irregular, and a more fundamental role in political education was played by other clandestine operatives, particularly from the Externato São José such as Gregorio Saldanha, the OJETIL leader who would later be the main organizer of the Santa Cruz protests. Formed in 1986 (CAVR 2013: 258), though tracing its history to earlier student organisations (Nicholson 2001), OJETIL was the largest clandestine youth organisation in the territory.

As Saldanha explains (interview 2010) one method of developing national consciousness among new clandestine members was through the inversion of Indonesia’s own nationalist propaganda: ‘In the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution it says that independence is a universal

right, which cannot be denied. So we would talk people loyal to Indonesia, and say; "If the Indonesians say this, then Timorese also have the right". RENETIL was founded in Bali in June 1988, though Neves (interview with author 2010) suggests discussions had taken place in Denpasar as early as 1986. A clandestine organisation for East Timorese students in Indonesia, its founders understood Indonesia's elite education strategy as one of cooptation, and sought to subvert it. As one member recalled (Carey 2003: 43), the Indonesian strategy of sending the 'best and brightest' East Timorese to Java and Bali sought to inculcate a sense of cultural and educational affinity with Indonesia: 'We saw straight through this, but decided that we would go to Java and Bali anyway to turn the Indonesian strategy on its head...'. Their role outside the territory made RENETIL critical to the transmission of resistance information (Barreto-Soares 2010: 125).

### Tasi Tolu

One of the earliest clandestine actions was the protest organised for the visit of Pope John Paul II in October 1989. A critical moment for the resistance, this was also a signal event for the Indonesian administration, as a successful visit would suggest great progress toward integration, shortly after the 'opening' of the territory in late 1988. The presence of foreign media heightened the significance.

The Commando da Luta issued instructions for a demonstration to highlight the continuing struggle for self-determination. At this time Ferreira and other members of SAFARI were part of a keamanan (security group) in Becora parish, an organisation similar to the scouts. Taking advantage of their role as extra security for the Pope's visit, and with meticulous preparation, the group were able to covertly organise a protest after the mass.

Xanana came down from Kablaki and stayed in Dili about a week. When the day came, the Indonesian military LAPISAN had tight security. That week at Tasi Tolu... only those of us in charge of security wearing blue uniforms didn't have to show what we were wearing ... the Indonesian's

didn't open our shirts... The banners for the demonstration were sewed inside our vests. Every day we practiced our role, from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup> ... (Ferreira, *interview with author, 2010*)

By some estimates 100,000 people attended the Mass, arriving from all over East Timor. The Indonesian military remained unaware the extra 'security' provided by the Church were planning a protest. Estimated at some 400 protestors and dominated by high school students from the Externato de São José, STM Fatumaca, and Catholic Scouts (escuteiros) of the Balide Church (CAVR 2013: 1586), they brought banners including 'Long Live East Timor', 'Free East Timor', and 'Indonesia, Get Out' (Pinto and Jardine 1999: 108-9). As planned, the protestors awaited the end of the Mass and the Pope's blessing before launching the protest. Ferreira recalls (*interview with author 2010*):

The place was full of high-level military. ...When the Mass was over everyone thought it had been a success, even the Indonesians. Once the final blessing was made we took the banners from under our shirts and jumped on the altar .... People were confused, they didn't understand what was going on ... People just began fighting until in the end they detained many people.

The symbolism of this protest on the world stage reverberated through the resistance hierarchy, effectively ending the media isolation of the territory and demonstrating civilian support for self-determination. Ferreira recalls that Gusmão then gave the group their name, meaning 'star' in Tetun, declaring: 'Your organisation is now called FITUN, Frente iha Timor Unidos Nafatin. Return to your members, may you become many like the stars in the sky and grains of sand at the shore'. For Ferreira, the success of this action marked not only the birth of FITUN, but the first sign of a change in strategy from the Commando da Luta. Gusmão congratulated the group, saying 'Younger brothers and sisters, the struggle is no longer in the bush. The struggle is now in the towns. You have started this struggle' (*interview with author 2010*).

## Recruitment and Membership Ceremonies

Political education was a cautious process, preceded by extensive cultivation of potential members to assess security risks. Clandestine groups established ‘kaixa’ systems of cells, reflecting their ‘semi-clandestine’ structure (FRS, 1990) – with a small, ultra-clandestine leadership and a wider mass membership contacted through smaller groups meeting in a process referred to as pendidikan berantai (chain of education). Recruitment targets created the expectation that each member would recruit at least one other into the clandestine network. Recruitment often occurred through school or Church networks.

Common selection practices were evident among clandestine groups. After initial discussion to identify potential members, tests would be set to see, for example, whether they had the courage to attend a political discussion on campus (Neves interview, 2010). If a student passed early tests, recruitment and political education would proceed carefully. One common strategy was to turn individual grievances into nationalist political consciousness, for example, by recruiting family members of those mistreated by Indonesian military. In this way, individual grievances could be politicised, and placed in a wider nationalist context. *Gregorio Saldanha* (interview with author 2010) explains the process:

We would try to convince people when they suffered the consequences of the Indonesian occupation. If their father lost their job, or had a problem with money or one member of the family was against Indonesia, the other members of the family would feel unsafe....In these cases we would try to win them over quickly, look for ways to help out the family, offering advice, encouragement. We won over many people this way.

As Neves recalls, harsher methods were sometimes employed by RENETIL, including deliberate social isolation of targeted individuals from the company of fellow East Timorese. In the context of studying away from Timor, this proved an effective recruitment measure, as the

target would eventually ‘feel bad and just come to the group. After that we would provide a bit of theoretical political education...’ (Neves, interview with author 2010).

Once selected, prospective clandestines went through membership rituals that drew on traditional East Timorese practices of juramento, and the symbols and practices of Catholicism. As Nicholson (2001: 21) notes, FITUN was formally established in the Kuluhun área of Dili on 20 April 1990 in a midnight juramento in Santa Cruz, which included a flag raising ceremony and a mixing of blood. Ferreira offers details on the ceremony (interview with author 2010):

The original group of 49, we took an oath [juramento] at Santa Cruz... late at night we prayed, wore rosaries ... then we cut our hands. At the time the best drink in Timor was called ‘Diplomat’. Fourteen of us let the blood run into the bottle of whiskey. Once it was mixed in, we drank and swore: “Live or die, we will fight for independence”. When new members came ... they had to draw their blood into original bottle. This blood-brother oath was firm: “If they arrest you, they arrest me, you die, I will die with you.” That’s the oath we took... We kept the same bottle right up until ’99 when it broke, destroyed in a house fire.

Similar ceremonies were adopted by RENETIL. As Jose Neves explained (interview with author 2010), the juramento was the final stage of becoming a ‘militant’. In the RENETIL juramento a cross was placed in water. Before witnesses, the new recruit kissed the cross, before all present drank from the same cup. These ceremonies symbolically reinforced an East Timorese identity while binding members to the group (see also Barreto-Soares 2010: 126).

RENETIL had three objectives in recruiting East Timorese students in Indonesia, each of which bore upon the task of nation-building. The first was to ‘isolate’ East Timorese students from the political, economic and cultural influences of the Indonesian military (see Mok 1996: 107). In this way, RENETIL operated as an alternative political community where nationalist ideas contested Indonesian propaganda. The second was

to prepare professionals for the future of East Timor: ‘We already looked ahead to the future, to when we achieve independence’ (Neves, interview with author 2010). The third required coordination of the student movements, with RENETIL members obliged to cooperate with OJETIL leadership when in the territory and vice-versa.

By 1998 RENETIL membership was estimated at 1,300 (Aditjondro 1999: 7), though Barreto-Soares estimates a significantly higher figure of 3,000 militants in 1999 (2010: 126). Its recruitment activities were so successful that RENETIL had completely subverted the official East Timor Students’ Association (Ikatan Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Timor Timur – IMPETTU); infiltrating it to such a degree that clandestine operative won all leadership positions. Ironically, this allowed RENETIL to contact many more East Timorese students than would otherwise have been possible, while attracting less surveillance. As Neves (interview 2010) states, ‘IMPETTU was tactically something set up by Indonesia, but strategically it was ours’. Inside East Timor, clandestine student cells in high schools successfully infiltrated authorised organisations including the Intra-School Students Organisation (Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah – OSIS) and the Catholic Scouts (CAVR 2013). Their successful infiltration by clandestine resistance cells greatly destabilised Indonesian plans for social control of East Timorese youth.

## Agitation and Propaganda

Aside from transmitting messages from the resistance leadership, the ‘agit-prop’ wings of the clandestine movements were involved in coordinating civil disobedience campaigns. ‘Agit-prop’ activity also sought to counter the Indonesian military strategy of setting East Timorese groups against one another. Ferreira explains (*interview with author 2010*):

The Indonesians were implementing a dual-strategy. One of the Indonesian policies was *ila kawin sila* [interracial marriage]. This was seen as a policy of Islamisation. The Indonesians sent women over to marry Timorese men, or would encourage young men or

women to become Muslim, to set up a situation where Muslims would fight Christians. The other Indonesian policy of ‘divide and conquer’ was to divide the youth into different groups so that they could be pitted against each other. SGI (Satuan Tugas Inteligen) sought to use the youth and were very dangerous at that time. This was a deliberate strategy of destabilisation.

In response, clandestine groups implemented counter-strategies. On the one hand, they sought to promote unity among East Timorese youth, and on the other, clandestine groups sought to disrupt the Indonesian administration and sow confusion. One of the most critical events in occupation history was in part of product of this counter strategy: ‘every day we would make pamphlets, we would make things up! For example.... the pamphlet we made which eventually led to the events of November 12 1991’ (Ferreira, interview with author 2010).

Despite their formal secularism, clandestine strategy used growing popular affiliations to the Catholic Church to destabilise the Indonesian administration. A key example is the prelude to the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. The cancellation of a scheduled visit by the Portuguese parliamentary delegation led to increased tensions between independence activists and Indonesian authorities. As part of a wider strategy to maximise disorder, OJETIL and FITUN activists spread word that an attack on nuns and convents was imminent. As Gregorio Saldanha put it, ‘sometimes we had to make false propaganda to achieve our objectives’. A pamphlet was circulated which proved influential in mobilising youth. Ferreira recalls:

We asked all young East Timorese to provide security for the churches, convents and priests’ houses, because the Indonesian military is planning to attack the priests and nuns. When we spread this word, many people went to provide security to the Church in October. [This] created a feeling of heightened tensions... then on the 28 October Sebastião was killed in Motaöl. And Sebastião’s death led to the events of the 12<sup>th</sup> November 1991. (*interview with author 2010*).

## After Santa Cruz

In the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, clandestine operations became difficult, with mass arrests of activists inside the territory and within Indonesia (Fernandes 2011: 101). On the other hand, the level of world engagement with East Timor increased dramatically after Max Stahl's footage made international headlines. By 1995, the East Timorese diaspora would claim that youth were now 'leading the struggle' (e.g. Freitas 1996). As dos Santos noted (1996: 71), Indonesian policies of taking scholastic elites outside East Timor were designed to 'accelerate the assimilation between East Timorese and Indonesians' but had a 'counter-effect' in practice. Over time, the spread of literacy and education would have its own national-integrative role, though not in the way Indonesia intended. In concert with other wings of the resistance, the clandestines fostered an alternative community for the expression of national identity among East Timorese youth. As Gregorio Saldanha recalls, the clandestine phrase, 'If not now, when? If not us, then who?', captured the determination to mobilise a national consciousness among the juventude, whose rejection of Indonesia's occupation struck at the heart of the project of forced integration.

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# DILI: HAFOIN SÉKULU-SIRA NO REVIZITA FALI '1975'

Fernando Ximenes<sup>6</sup>

We need history, but we need it differently from the spoiled lazy-bones in the garden of knowledge.

- Nietzsche, on the Use and Abuse of History for Life

I.....

Dili nu'udar Kapitál no sidade boot liu Timor-Leste nian. Nia iha postu-administrativu neen. Halo fronteira ho Aileu iha nia parte Súl, Likisa husi Oeste, Manatutu husi Leste no nia halo fronteira Norte ba rai-ketan Alor ho Wetar, Indonézia nian. Konstrusaun jeografia sósio-polítika Dili nian lao husi sékulu ba sékulu, hahú nu'udar área influensiasaun tradisionál husi reinu Likusaen (agora munisípiu Likisa) no reinu Hohulo (agora parte ba munisípiu Aileu) to'o ba administrasaun sentrál kolonializmu Portugéz no tinan 24 ho baner Kapitál Provinsiál Indonézia nia ukun. Husi nia hahú to'o ba ikus husi sékulu rua-nulu, Dili serve nu'udar sítiu ba administrasaun soberania ba kaduak eterojenu 'orden foun' fasista nian iha Lisboa ho Jakarta.

Tuir ai-knanoik balun, haktuir, área ne'e loke hikas hafoin funu mosu entre reinu Likusaen husi Oeste no Makoko (Hera) husi Leste – funu ne'e hakotu bainhira tesi-lia ho dame hala'o husi manu-talin reinu Hohulo husi Aileu.<sup>7</sup>

Dili harii hikas husi Portugéz hafoin sira transfere husi Lifau, Oecusse iha 1769. Durante funu mundiál daruak, Dili konsidera nu'udar vila perdidu – tan harahun husi okupasaun Japonéz no bombardeamento husi forsa Aliadu (Austrália; Inglaterra; no Olanda). Hafoin rekonstrusaun no rehabilitasaun ba Dili, rejime koloniál Portugéz buka hodi transforma no reenjenária Dili ba iha futuru sidade ho orientasaun-Europeu nian.

Hafoin konsolidasaun no integrasaun sosiál husi sosiedade Timorense-sira ba iha rejime koloniál Portugéz, Dili nu'udar postu koloniál nian, buras no sai espasu ne'ebé mak povu kolonizadu asimilia tiha, pasífika tiha maibé mós dividi, esklui no hanehan husi kolonizadór-sira – entre makna'in ho atan – ho bias eurosentriku ne'ebé dehan atu 'siviliza' tiha tradisionál beikten-sira ho hanoin-aas ideal-sira ne'ebé progresivu husi universalizmu religiozu ho étiko-kulturál Europeia nian.

Kuaze sékulu-sira, Dili mak fatin sentrál iha Timor ne'ebé halibur povu diferente ho otas la hanesan, tempu no espasu afiliadu – rasa, étniku, religiaun no konviksaun política la hanesan iha Timor – ho badak, entre opresór ho oprimidu. Maske nune'e, iha tempu agora mós, sidade-ihakonstrusaun ne'e mós nafatin sai zona konformidade ba dezunidade plurál, liului nia povu subalternu.



"Plano Geral de Urbanização de Dili"; João Aguiar, Gabinete de Urbanização do Ultramar, 1951.

<sup>6</sup> Artigu hakerek iha ne'e reprezenta perspetiva autór nian laos instituisaun autór afilia ba.

<sup>7</sup> Durante períodu pre-koloniál, ne'ebá hela ona grupu sosiedade ho dialetu Mambae no Lolei hanesan Bidau Manu-Mata husi Leste, Caicoli husi Sentrál no Karketu Mota-Ain husi Oeste.

## II.....

Iha sorin sorin seluk, Dili, espasu tropikál maran, riku iha istória no asume pozisaun sentrál iha política, ekonomia no istória Timoriana nian. Daudaun ne'e, Mari Alkatiri, jerasaun fundadór FRETILIN nian ne'ebé sei moris, no kuñese mós nu'udar jerasaun 1974/75 ne'ebé sei moris, konsidera Dili nu'udar ‘laboratóriu’ ba luta política modernu hasoru koloniálizmu Portugéz no kapitalista imperializmu iha Timor-Leste. Biar nune'e, política radikál mak folin no úniku tebes iha épokal-espasu ne'e (*Alkatiri 2019*).

Iha grau radikál nian, ema edukadu revoltozu barak, intelektuál-sira, no klase traballadór radikál sira ne'ebé ikus mai kuñese nu'udar autór dirijente ba movimento FRETILIN, mak hala'o estudu, servisu no moris iha Dili – sira nia konviksaun intelektuál no política hetan esperiénsia, harii no forma iha Dili.

Rezisténsia modernu hahú ho grupu diskusaun informál husi poeta-sira, no makerek ensaiu sira husi otas 1960 ho 1970 nian. Períodu ne'e marka ho ‘renasimentu intelektuál’ iha Timor-Leste, foku tebes iha Dili de’it – iha ne'ebé mak diskursu filozófiku ho política eskerda nasionálista to'o ba anti-koloniál nian sai nu'udar tópiku diskusaun. Foin-sa'e progresivu no radikál sira ne'e mak ikus mai sai nu'udar lider-sira FRETILIN nian hanesan Nicolau Lobato, Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, no Abílio Araújo, ne'ebé mak ativu tebes publika sira nia obra iha jornál tolu koloniál nian iha tempu ne'ebá mak hanesan buletin militár hirak bolu A voz de Timor, A provicia de Timor no mós jornál dioseze Katóliku nian bolu Seara.

Iha 1975, Dili sai espasu ne'ebé marka ho prosesu hahú ba konsiénsia modernu nasionálista-eskerda Timoriana nian, política radikál no rezisténsia. Nia introdús kalendáriu foun no destinu istorikál ba Timoriana sira. Asensaun FRETILIN; eskerda nasionálista nia moris buras no konsiénsia klase revolucionáriu; produsaun ba símbolu kontemporanu husi identidade istorikál ho polítikal iha Timor nu'udar mós rezultadu política husi foin-sa'e radikál no progresivu iha Dili.

Saida mak Alain Badiou (filózofu prinsipál Fransa nian) bolu ‘politiks/política’ loloos, nu'udar ida husi Badiou nia área haat jerál husi lia-loos, esperimenta ba dala-uluk iha Timor husi jerasaun Dili 1975 nian, liu husi FRETILIN (Badiou 2005). Política loloos/reál ne'e ho objetivu atu lori ba saida mak FRETILIN hare'e nu'udar ‘independénsia reál’ – ‘liberdade reál’ ka kuñese iha jerál nu'udar independénsia totál-kompleta (FRETILIN 1975).

Tan ne'e, Dili sai nu'udar sítiu ba eventu boot política, no mudansa-sira – entre kontra-revolusionáriu nomós revolusaun, entre represaun no rezisténsia. Husi ne'e mak, movimentu proklama-an revolucionáriu husi frenti anti-komunista lidera husi Uniaun Demokrátiku Timorense (UDT), liman-ain imperialista, lansa ataka preventiva ho objetivu hodi elimina FRETILIN – no hodi responde ba, kontra-ofensiva revolucionáriu hala'o husi FRETILIN iha Agosto 1975 konsegue lori ba vitória desisivu, no loke tempu istorikál foun ba Timoriana nia luta revolucionáriu ba iha libertasaun nasional.

Forsa Indonézia nia invazaun mai Timor iha 7 Dezembru<sup>8</sup> 1975 iha Dili, ita bele de’it imajina katak ne'e mak momentu ikus dame nian ba Timoriana sira. Nia loke fila hikas faze seluk ba Dili – espasu laboratóriu ba luta rekonstrui hikas husi rejime Indonézia nia forsa represivu ba fali tama iha atmosfera totál ba mate, tortura, ta'uk, hafuhu-malu, nonook no laran-taridu.

Durante okupasaun político-militar ba tinan 24, Dili, mak sidade ne'ebé marka ain-fatin sentrál husi soberania Indonézia nian ne'ebé harii liu husi represaun violentu, política bosok, propaganda, sinisismu, no fundamentál ida tebes mós mak diskriminasaun, teror, masakre sistemátiku ho mós esplotasaun ekonómiku.

Ba Timoriana sira ne'ebé rezisti integrasaun, Dili konstitui nu'udar pontu garantidu absoluta ba hahú luta política no rezisténsia iha Timor – husi saida mak ita hatene nu'udar levantamentu armada 10 Juñu 1980 to'o ba revolta estudante-sira iha 1987, protesta durante vizita Papa João Paulo II

<sup>8</sup> Loron ne'e agora komemora hikas husi estadu Timor nu'udar Loron ba Memória.



ihá 1989, nomós demonstrasaun pasífiwu iha 12 Novemburu 1991 ne’ebé rejime Indonézia responde ho masakre trájiku hasoru foin-sa’e Timoriana sira. Hirak ne’e nu’udar esplozaun husi levantamento silénsia no rezisténsia husi Timoroan hotu hasoru okupasaun no integrasaun. No ne’e hotu, mosu iha Dili.

III.....  
objetivu oin-seluk ba beibeik, iha ne’ebé, forma luta dominante foun iha Dili iha períodu okupasaun hatudu ka prezente hela ba absénsia política brasu-eskerda ne’ebé forti hanesan saida mak iha 1975 ba kotuk, iha ne’ebé mak, sujeitu revolucionáriu sai lakon tiha fali.

Maske nune’e, iha okupasaun okos, rezisténsia hahú funsiona no nia fali nu’udar sidade ba dame. Foin

daudauk iha tinan 2019, Dili deklaradu husi Governu Timor-Leste nu’udar ‘símbolu husi independénsia no dezenvolvimentu nasional’ Governu Konstitusional VIII 2019).<sup>9</sup>

Maske nunue’e, balun labele nega

<sup>9</sup> Selebrasau nee katak hodi glorifica história kolonial Portuges nia, nia prezensa no nee nu’udar mós pasu ida ba hamate história iha Timor ne’ebérelasiona ho história pasadu kona-ba violénsia kolonial no kapitalista nian iha Timor.

faktu katak, tinan barak hafoin independénsia, ne’ebé iha multiplisidade husi dezintegrasaun no fragmentasaun etre rezidente Dili sira, nia política-nain, eis aswa’in ba libertasaun – ho nia divizaun entre sira tuan ho foin-sa’e; literadu ho iliteradu sira; entre klase aas ho ki’ik sira; entre sentrál ho ninin sira; entre sira iha laran no iha liur sira husi Dili. Iha ne’ebé rasik mós, kapitalista nasional, autokrata no elite política sira sai unidu iha ideolojia ho orientasaun ba rendimentu no akumulasaun nian.

Husi sékulu ba sékulu, ho nia furak, roman, beleza Orientál, hakmaték tradisionál hakúr hamutuk ho krueldade koloniál, ho kondisaun moris taka-rabat rai hafoin kedes Portugál muda nia administraasaun koloniál husi Lifau ba Dili no durante Indonézia nia ukun barbariku. Períodu postu-independénsia marka konstantamente ho eskuzaun no divizaun – violénsia modernu. Saida mak bolu nu’udar progresu sosiál tuir kedes ho dizorden sosiál, dezigualdade ekonómiku no prosperidade sinikál.

Se ita hakarak hatene tansá Timor-Leste nafatin sai nasaun dependente atrazadu ne’ebé subjugadu durante sékulu-sira to’o agora, ita tenki

hare'e klean ho didi'ak ba forma-saun sosiál iha Dili, liliu mós ba 'klase estabilizadór' ki'ik-oan (hodi sita tuir Jean Claude-Milner nia konseitu) ne'ebé lokaliza iha Dili – sira mak servidór leal ba orden moderadu, konsensual no kapitalista liberal. Tan ne'e, husi espasu imajina la hetan husi Dili, ho Balibar husi Súl, Hera-Metinaro husi Leste to'o Metinaro husi Norte – husi mota maran-dekor Comoro no mota-foer Bidau to'o ba paraizu profane husi tasi



rai-henek-mutin – ita sei nafatin susar hodi distingi katak ita atu bolu Dili nu'udar sidade metropolitániu semi-urbana, ka sidade atrazadu? – ita bele hetan resposta temporáriu husi bispu Carlos Belo nia '*a cidade que não era*' (Belo 2014). Mas Dili nafatin assume figura tuan nu'udar sidade sub-dezenvolvidu' ka rurál ne'ebé manifesta konstantamente violensia modernu kapitalista nian hanesan dezempregu masivu, lakuna sósio-ekonómiku nst.

Dili (no povu husi Dili), ho/ha sira-nia pozisaun istorikál ne'ebé privaléjiu no '*infinidade espacial*' iha Timor nia política, ekonomia no istória, nafatin iha papeél fundametal hodi dudu mudansa radikál atu lori possibilidade foun ba iha sosiedade justu, demokrátiku no '*equalitário*' iha Timor-Leste hanesan fali de'it iha era '*política radikal* 1975' nian.

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# THE AUSTRALIAN AND JAPANESE STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN PORTUGUESE TIMOR: WORLD WAR TWO AND EAST TIMOR INDEPENDENCE

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Portuguese Timor has been a pivotal location for foreign power interests in Southeast Asia particularly, Australia and Japan who had at times conflicting interests. For these nations, Portuguese Timor played an important strategic role during two important moments in history. First, the Second World War that brought Australia and Japan into a conflict focused in the Southeast Asian region. Second, the negotiation, planning and implementation of the UN Popular Consultation in 1999 that led to East Timor's independence.

Both of these historic moments marked a new direction in the positions held by the Australian and Japanese governments towards the island nation and each other. Their historic interactions led to military confrontations in the territory during the years of 1942-1945 and diplomatic tensions during the 1999 Timor events. This paper highlights the importance of both these historic moments as an approach to understand the momentous role Timor has played in the evolution of Australia-Japan relations, as a reason for misunderstanding and conflict between these two nations.

These two historic moments have been chosen as they highlight crucial interactions between the three nations. Notwithstanding the traumatic



experience of the Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor in 1975, when both Australia and Japan followed a similar path to recognising Timor as part of Indonesia (albeit each country had particular perspectives).

## Australian and Japanese Interactions in Portuguese Timor during World War Two

The Pacific War that started with the Attack to Pearl Harbour in 1941 and ended with Japan's surrender in 1945 was the culmination of a confrontation between European colonial powers, along with Australia and the United States against Japan, for the control of the region's resources and political influence. It is under these circumstances that Australia and Japan chanced upon each other in Portuguese Timor's territory, setting a stage for confrontation.

Japan's strategy in Southeast Asia included strong economic investment along with a specific political campaign designed to alter the status quo of the colonial powers in the region. It portrayed itself as a liberator from foreign exploitative European colonialism. Local pro-independence movements that started to surface in the region, would welcome this "anti-colonial" approach, and were more likely to cooperate with Japanese forces in the event of a possible outbreak of war. The increasing influence of Japan in Southeast Asia was a sign of concern for the Western powers and especially for Australia, whose geographical closeness made it a direct target of the Japanese southern advance.<sup>10</sup>

### Portuguese Timor pivotal position

The island of Timor lays in a strategic position towards Australia and the rest of the Pacific with up to that moment untouched oil deposits. Still, Portuguese Timor was an underdeveloped colony by the 1930's, with little production of commercial goods: coffee, cacao and other

<sup>10</sup> Henry P. Frei, *Japan's southward advance and Australia: from the sixteenth century to World War II* (Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1991), ix.

agricultural products were its main source of income. The colonial government in Dili survived from heavy taxes and free labour from the local population: 'It was customary for Timorese who couldn't pay to work off their taxes in road gangs'.<sup>11</sup>

This economic weakness made it possible for Japan to appeal to the Portuguese government for access to the island. The Nan'yo Kohatsu Kabushi Kaisha (South Seas Development Company), had invested by 1940, one million pounds in East Timor'.<sup>12</sup> This investment was made with the agreement of the Portuguese government, whose approval of the joint venture between 'Nan'yo Kohatsu' and the 'Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho (SAPT)' in 1937 accounted for 25 per cent of exports and 37 per cent of imports in Portuguese Timor during that year.<sup>13</sup>

For Japan it was necessary to appear as nothing more than an economic investor in Portuguese Timor, and conceal its strategic and military interests. A confidential memorandum from the Japanese navy in 1936 with instructions to Nanyō Kōhatsu regarding Portuguese Timor noted:

'...it is essential in view of the delicate situation (...) that a cautious first step must be taken (...) in particular the intentions of the navy in acquiring Nanyō Kōhatsu should not be divulged under any circumstances, its assistance to the company should be discreet and its effective influence in Timor should take the form of aid'.<sup>14</sup>

The European colonial powers and Australia saw increasing Japanese interest in Portuguese Timor with concern. A report from the British Consulate-General in Batavia, E.T. Lambert, on his visit to Portuguese Timor in 1937 gives a comprehensive account on the increasing presence of Japan in the Portuguese colony in agriculture, mining and shipping.

<sup>11</sup> Jill Jolliffe, *Portuguese Timor, World War II: thirteen years after decolonisation*, Lisbon archives yield their secrets (Australia, 1987), 19.

<sup>12</sup> Henry P. Frei, "Japan's reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor, 1 January 1942 □ 20 February 1942," *Australian historical studies* 27, no. 107 (10/1996): 283.

<sup>13</sup> Ken'ichi Gotō and Paul H. Kratoska, *Tensions of empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the colonial and postcolonial world* (Athens, Ohio; Singapore: Ohio University Press, 2003), 27.

<sup>14</sup> Gotō and Kratoska, *Tensions of empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the colonial and postcolonial world*, 25.

Lambert suggested the idea to establish a British-Australian consulate in the colony to counterbalance Japanese influence in the local government.<sup>15</sup> For Australia, it was important to counteract Japan's influence in Portuguese Timor; according Lambert's 1937 report "Japan's 'interest in a remote and poor island like Timor' invited speculation that the island was not seen by the Japanese 'as a terminal objective but as a stepping stone towards a goal further south' (to Darwin).<sup>16</sup>

During 1940-1941, Australia and Japan pressured the Portuguese government for equal access to its Southeast Asian colony. Whilst in December 1940, a Qantas Empire Airways, air service Darwin-Dili was approved by the Portuguese Government, the Japanese had already pushed to have their own Dainippon air service Palau-Dili, officially approved since April the same year. Japan signed an aviation agreement with Portugal until October 1941, and established a Consulate-general at around the same time. Whereas, David Ross Chief Flying Inspector of Australia's Department of Civil Aviation (and unofficial eyes to the British and Australians on Japanese activities in the island) arrived in February 1941, it was not until December of that year (two days after the Pacific War had started ) that he was finally recognised as the British Consul General.

Ross's September 1941 report to the Department of External Affairs about the impending arrival of the Japanese consul shows that Japan's intrusion in Portuguese Timor was unsurmountable, whether Portugal resisted or not.<sup>17</sup> The option of sending troops to both parts of the island was a question of prevention. Australian official correspondence in relation to Portuguese Timor proposed "...The United Kingdom, Australia and The Netherlands should agree beforehand on what preventive action is feasible".<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Steven Farram, *A short-lived enthusiasm: the Australian Consulate in Portuguese Timor* (Darwin, N.T: Charles Darwin University Press, 2010), 2.

<sup>16</sup> Farram, *A short-lived enthusiasm: the Australian Consulate in Portuguese Timor*, 4.

<sup>17</sup> Frei, *Japan's southward advance and Australia: from the sixteenth century to World War II*, 158; Frei, *Japan's southward advance and Australia: from the sixteenth century to World War II*.

<sup>18</sup> Nicholas Tarling, *Britain and Portuguese Timor* (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Publishing, 2013), 9.

## **Allied "Pre-emptive" Invasion of Portuguese Timor and the Japanese "unwilling" Occupation**

On 17 December 1941, Portuguese Timor was occupied by Australian and Dutch troops. Whereas the possibility of a military allied presence in Dutch Timor had been discussed among the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australian Governments during the Singapore talks in February 1941,<sup>19</sup> the Portuguese government kept itself out of the conversation. Portugal had not been ready to discuss the hypothesis of a Japanese attack, and still less to go beyond this and entrust the defence of Timor to outside parties'.<sup>20</sup>

Portugal's refusal to accept the possibility of a Japanese invasion required further negotiation. It was important that Lisbon would eventually accept Allied support to retain its colonies. This support was offered through the Britain-Portugal perpetual alliance signed in 1386 and reaffirmed in 1642. Britain would pursue the position that in the event of Tokyo's assault on Timor, the alliance would take effect, and Britain (in the shape of allied troops) would protect the Portuguese territory. Portugal's response was slow and convoluted. Only in November 1941 Lisbon opened dialogue with London on the possibility of establishing a joint plan of action if needed.<sup>21</sup>

The outbreak of the Pacific war on 7 December 1941, forced the allies to prioritise military movements around the region. A group of Australian and Dutch forces were sent to Kupang (the capital of Dutch Timor) on 10 December as a pre-emptive measure and required the Portuguese Government to 'facilitate the Task of the Dutch and Australian troops'. According to the British Ambassador, on 12 December the Portuguese government had accepted the British proposals and would instruct their Governor to invite or accept assistance accordingly.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Wartime Portuguese Timor: the Azores connection*, vol. no. 50. (Clayton, Vic: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 3.19

<sup>20</sup> Tarling, *Britain and Portuguese Timor*, 10.

<sup>21</sup> Tarling, *Britain and Portuguese Timor*, 15.

<sup>22</sup> Tarling, *Britain and Portuguese Timor*, 16-17.

When on 15 December the Governor General of the Dutch East Indies sent a cable to Europe stating that Japanese submarines were reportedly sighted off Timor,<sup>23</sup> Dutch and Australian troops were instructed to land in Portuguese Timor as a “pre-emptive” measure. The plan was that this would take place in the morning of 17 December and Australian and Dutch commanders would hold talks with the Portuguese Governor in order to coordinate the arrival of the forces. By the time, the commanders arrived in the morning of the 17 December; Lisbon had already instructed its Governor to only ask for help if Portuguese Timor was attacked. Portugal later sent a message that day requesting that allied troops not land.<sup>24</sup>

Additional to the straining diplomatic relations between Portugal and the Allied powers, this “pre-emptive” move also brought to Japanese attention the possibility of invading Portuguese Timor: ‘Japan occupied [Portuguese Timor] [...] not to incorporate the neutral territory into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere but to expel Australian troops who had occupied the colony [...] on the assumption that Japan would invade’.<sup>25</sup>

In contrast to Japanese intentions to invade the Netherlands East Indies including Dutch Timor, Japan had not planned an attack on the Portuguese side of that island nor did it need it to. For Japan, it was important to respect Portuguese neutrality, as this would give the Axis Powers access to diplomatic interests in Portugal. The Japanese minister resident in Portugal, Morishima Morito, ‘exercised great care to avoid a breach of diplomatic relations with Portugal because of its international position and the importance of Lisbon as a base for collecting information’.<sup>26</sup> It was the “sudden” Allied occupation of Portuguese Timor that enticed Tokyo to act. Also, Japanese economic investment in the island made the Portuguese government susceptible to acquiesce to their demands if necessary.

<sup>23</sup> Tarling, Britain and Portuguese Timor, 18-19.

<sup>24</sup> Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor, 1 January 1942 □ 20 February 1942,” 281.

<sup>25</sup> Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor, 1 January 1942 □ 20 February 1942.”

<sup>26</sup> Gotō and Kratoska, *Tensions of empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the colonial and postcolonial world*,

Tokyo tried to present its actions in Portuguese Timor in accordance with international law: ‘Portugal’s failure to prevent Australia and Holland from occupying the country gave Japan a legal basis to attack the eastern half of Timor’.<sup>27</sup> Also, the Japanese attempted to reassure the Portuguese government that their presence would only be “temporary” as Lisbon’s own sovereignty over the colony continued. Unlike other colonies, where the Japanese often supported indigenous independence movements, Portuguese Timor was not included in this.

In 19 February 1942 Japanese forces attacked both sides of the island of Timor. At the time, only Australian troops were in Portuguese Timor and they retreated towards the mountains in order to pursue a guerrilla-style campaign. Further on, assistance given to the Australians by the local population was significant, although it diminished towards the end of the war given the persecution many Timorese faced in the hands of the Japanese.<sup>28</sup> During the subsequent years of war until Japan’s surrender in 1945, Portuguese Timor suffered large human losses: around 50,000 people were killed during the occupation period.<sup>29</sup>

## Australia-Japan relations and East Timor’s Independence

After the restoration of Portuguese sovereignty over the territory in 1945, the colony was shattered from the war and remained an underdeveloped colony. Newly independent nation Indonesia appeared keen to incorporate the territory. In a cabinet Decision of February 1963, Australian External Affairs Minister Garfield Barwick believed that ‘no practicable alternative to eventual Indonesian sovereignty over Portuguese Timor presented itself’<sup>30</sup> and the colony was therefore vulnerable to an Indonesian takeover.

<sup>27</sup> Frei, “Japan’s reluctant decision to occupy Portuguese Timor, 1 January 1942 □ 20 February 1942.”

<sup>28</sup> Jolliffe, Portuguese Timor, World War II: thirteen years after decolonisation, Lisbon archives yield their secrets, 5-6.

<sup>29</sup> Defence Australia Parliament. Senate. Foreign Affairs and Committee Trade References, East Timor : final report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, ed. John Joseph Hogg (Canberra: The Committee, 2000). Accessed from <http://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn2257935>.

<sup>30</sup> Australia Parliament. Senate. Foreign Affairs and Trade References, East Timor : final report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee.

## ***Indonesia's occupation of East Timor***

In December 1975, Jakarta finally made its move. The window of opportunity came when in April 1974 the “carnation revolution” brought a change in the Portuguese government that would support independence for its African colonies. With the arrival of a new governor in Timor, Mario Lemós Pires in November that year, the colony started a politicization process. Between 1974 and 1975, the formation of political parties, among them FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for Independent Timor-Leste), UDT (Democratic Union of Timor) and APODETI (Timorese Popular Democratic Association) increased Timorese political life.<sup>31</sup>

A quasi civil war between the members of the main parties broke out during the second part of 1975. FRETILIN declared independence on 28 November 1975. Portuguese authorities decided to abandon their colony due to the instability and danger to civilians. Indonesia then arrived to the territory on 7 December and, after a brief period of local resistance, East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia.<sup>32</sup>

Although the United Nations Security Council opposed the invasion, neither Japan nor Australia directly expressed support for East Timor's self-determination. In fact, the invasion was supported and recognized de jure in 1979 by the Australian government. Canberra preferred to maintain harmonious relations with Jakarta, as the largest country in Southeast Asia and Australia's closest neighbour, rather than favour a small territory with no influence in the region. Similarly, conservative Japanese politicians and officials had long-term political and economic interests in Indonesia and had already developed a myriad of high-level contacts and connections from the period of Japanese occupation.<sup>33</sup> The establishment of boundaries between Indonesia and Australia played at the time, a central role. In 1971-1972, before East Timor's annexation,

Indonesia and Australia negotiated their maritime shelf boundary. Simultaneously, Canberra negotiated with Lisbon the boundary, known as “Timor Gap”. The informal consultations with Portugal brought no conclusive decisions. East Timor's annexation into Indonesian territory and Australian official recognition, open the door to negotiations over the Timor Gap. In 1989 an agreement was reached: Australia accomplished its pursuit of resources in the área and endorsed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.<sup>34</sup>

The economic relationship that Japan built with Southeast Asian nations, and in particular Indonesia, determined Japan's attitude towards East Timor. After World War II and the Japanese defeat, the United States played an important role in the economic and political reconstruction of the country. The reconstruction of Japanese economy was seen by the United States as a key element of their strategy to ‘stem the spread of communism in the region’.<sup>35</sup> The Peace Treaty with Japan placed it under the military protection of the United States through a Security Treaty.

Tokyo committed to the adoption of democratic and economic principles based on the free market reflected in the new constitution redacted under the American umbrella. This was called the “Yoshida Doctrine”: A Japanese obligation to democratic institutions, the values of free market economy and the non-militarization, that established the economic, political and social configuration of during the Cold War.<sup>36</sup> After Indonesia's military invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975, Japan decided to stay out of the situation between East Timor and Indonesia; It was Tokyo's belief Japanese interference could damage economic and political relations.

<sup>31</sup> Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Timor Loro Sae: 500 years* (Macau: Livros do Oriente, 1999), 266.

<sup>32</sup> Gunn, *Timor Loro Sae: 500 years*, 269-71.

<sup>33</sup> David Walton, “Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship,” *Japanese Studies* 24, no. 2 (2004/09/01 2004): 235.

<sup>34</sup> Australia's arguments for the establishment of the Maritime boundaries have their basis on the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and give legal right over all the resources contained within its continental shelf. However, in 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulated the growing accepted principle of equidistance or that the median line between two countries is the proper location for a seabed boundary, nonetheless this convention came into force in 1994, after the signature of the Australian-Indonesian boundaries agreement Joseph Nevins, “Contesting the Boundaries of International Justice: State Countermapping and Offshore Resource Struggles between East Timor and Australia,” *Economic Geography* 80, no. 1 (2004).

<sup>35</sup> Sue Thompson, “Leadership and Dependency: Indonesia's Regional and Global Role, 1945-75,” in *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership and the Regional Order*, ed. L. Sebastian C. Roberts, D. Habir (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 23.

<sup>36</sup> A. Román Zavala, “Japón en disyuntiva: fuerzas de pacificación o guerra preventiva,” in *Cooperación y conflicto en la Cuenca del Pacífico*, ed. J. León (Mexico: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2005), 242-43.

Japan as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, supported the Security Council's resolution 384 (22 December 1975), which called on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor without delay. However subsequently, chose to abstain or vote against proposals that criticised Indonesia. Japan subsequently abstained in the Security Council vote on resolution 389 on 22 April 1976. Moreover, Japan voted against General Assembly resolution 3485, which again requested Indonesia to withdraw its troops without delay, and the other seven General Assembly resolutions adopted each subsequent year until 1982.<sup>37</sup>

Japan considered the principle of non-interference that made Indonesia's invasion of East Timor 'none of its business'. It also signed agreements that implicitly supported Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, by containing clauses defining Indonesia as that territory deemed by laws of Indonesia to be subject to Indonesian sovereignty.<sup>38</sup>

## **Australia's policy change**

In 1997, after the Thai baht collapsed and the Asian financial bubble blew over, political turmoil followed in Indonesia. The country witnessed Suharto's demise, the organisation of democratic elections and radical changes in the economy. At the beginning, Australia continued to support Indonesian territorial integrity and self-determination causes continued being ignored. However, the increasing international awareness of violence in East Timor made its case all the more compelling.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, Jakarta started a transitional government towards democracy, which had to deal with the negative effects of the economic and political crisis. This was a considerable amount of pressure over the interim President Habibie. This historical moment was a turning point for Australian foreign policy. Prime Minister John Howard sent a hand-written letter to his Indonesian counterpart in December 1998, proposing consultation and eventual independence, similar to the terms established in the Matignon

<sup>37</sup> Walton, "Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship," 236.

<sup>38</sup> P. Gorjao, "Japan's foreign policy and East Timor, 1975-2002," *Asian Survey* XLII, no. 5 (2002): 757.

<sup>39</sup> Noam Chomsky, *A new generation draws the line: Kosovo, East Timor and the standards of the West* (London; New York: VERSO, 2000), pending.

Accords.<sup>40</sup> This was a shift in the Australian opportunistic foreign policy towards Jakarta, and in its regional engagement with Southeast Asia more generally.

Four reasons explain Australia's policy shift: the diplomatic assessment on the Indonesian capacity to deal with its democratic transition and the loss of East Timor at the same time; the Timorese leadership rejection of the status quo and a possible independence; Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's belief that Australian could play a historical role in the resolution of the conflict; and, in January 1999, the unexpected acceptance of Habibie's government that a rejection of his offer of autonomy, in a consultation vote, would effectively result in the separation of East Timor, going far beyond the proposition made by Howard in his above-mentioned letter.<sup>41</sup>

This last event more than promoting Australian regional activism, it completely forced its hand to adapt to the possibility of a new type of engagement with East Timor and Indonesia.<sup>42</sup> Australia's activist foreign policy manifested in 1999 through the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) and with the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET). Australian strategy towards the region became interventionist, but within a UN mandate and the Indonesian government's acquiescence.

Australian policy vis-à-vis Indonesia continued to look for amelioration and better terms. The Australian position in respect with West Papua did not change, as Canberra preferred not to affront Jakarta's sensitivity. East Timor was considered a delicate and specific situation with an adaptive approach, mixed with a humanitarian rhetoric and an activist multilateral diplomatic strategy.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> In 1988, France's Prime Minister and the two main political blocs in New Caledonia signed the Matignon Accords, which provided an interim settlement that concluded on a 1998 referendum on New Caledonia's constitutional future. Stephen Henningham, "The Uneasy Peace: New Caledonia's Matignon Accords at Mid-Term," *Pacific Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1993).

<sup>41</sup> Peter Chalk, *Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the wake of 1999/2000 East Timor intervention* (USA: RAND, 2001), 41.

<sup>42</sup> Chalk, *Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the wake of 1999/2000 East Timor intervention*, 41-42; Richard Leaver, "Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia," *The Pacific Review* 14, no. 1 (2001): 6-7.

<sup>43</sup> Derek McDougall, "'Intervening' in the Neighbourhood: Comparing Australia's Role in East Timor and the Southwest Pacific," *International Journal* 62, no. 4 (2007): 884-85.

## **Japan's reaction**

In 1997, the Asian economic crisis led to stagnation in the Japanese economy; Japanese investments decreased in Southeast Asia, which generated excess production capacity, rising unemployment, yen appreciation and increased fiscal deficit reduction in domestic demand and bank and corporate bankruptcies. However, Japan continued to maintain its status as an economic power in the region and the most important provider of international economic cooperation. From 1966 to 1998, Japan consistently maintained support for Suharto's regime. However, his clumsy management of the domestic impact of the Asian financial crisis soon became a liability. He became an obstacle to Tokyo's strategic interest in Indonesia, as the country became a destabilizing force in the region.<sup>44</sup>

Australia's shifting policy towards Indonesia during the Asian crisis was criticized in Japan. In Tokyo's view Australia did not fully appreciate the economic and political crisis that Indonesia was facing during the period 1997–1999. The Japanese had the pragmatic view that Indonesia was more important than East Timor for strategic and commercial reasons. This difference in opinion created tension amongst otherwise regional partners.<sup>45</sup>

When Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announced in January 1999 that Jakarta was prepared to accept immediate independence of East Timor if the East Timorese rejected the autonomy proposal, Japan's first public reaction was to welcome the decision and proclaim its hopes for a peaceful solution. Moreover, by September 1999 Japan considered the Timorese crisis could trigger regional insecurity, which had priority over the relationship with Indonesia. Within APEC's framework, Japan held bilateral dialogues with the US and South Korea in regards the situation in East Timor and considered the responsibility to rectify the 'unacceptable' situation.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Gorjao, "Japan's foreign policy and East Timor, 1975-2002," 759.

<sup>45</sup> Walton, "Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship," 243.

<sup>46</sup> Gorjao, "Japan's foreign policy and East Timor, 1975-2002," 760; MOFA, Press Conference by the Press Secretary 17 September, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999).

## **Australia-Japan Interactions Regarding the 1999 Timor Crisis**

Australia was already deeply involved in East Timor's crisis and began a concerted campaign to enlist support from within the international community, especially from 'allies' and 'friends' such as Japan. Pressure in the form of requests were made in international forums (APEC 1999) and bilaterally for Japan to make a sizeable financial contribution to support the INTERFET operation.

Australia's active role in the UN and other diplomatic arenas brought tensions with Tokyo. The lack of sufficient consultation between both countries, led to a strained situation. Also, there are clear differences in policy. Whereas the Australian government faced internal awareness and pressure to change policy on East Timor, Japan's view was that Australia was changing its pro-Asian stance. It considered Canberra a source of instability with its aggressive role in INTERFET, an unwelcome source of pressure on Japan to assist financially, and a total misperception of the financial and political crisis depth in Indonesia.<sup>47</sup>

Before September 1999 Japan attempted to maintain a low profile in the crisis so as not to destabilize and worsen the situation, and not to pressure Jakarta's government, but to support it. Reluctance in Tokyo to make a financial contribution was based on the experience of the 'cheque-book diplomacy'. There was considerable sensitivity in Tokyo about these criticisms and a firm resolve that Japan would play a more active and multi-dimensional role in any future crisis situation.<sup>48</sup>

By the time INTERFET was deployed Australia was the only viable source of immediate military assistance. Although Canberra supported the Timorese consultation, it feared Indonesia would treat any forcible intervention as an act of war. Finally, in early September, the Security Council sent a diplomatic mission to Jakarta and East Timor, and

<sup>47</sup> Walton, "Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship," 242.

<sup>48</sup> Walton, "Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship," 243-44.

persuaded President Habibie to invite an Australian peacekeeping force to restore order.<sup>49</sup>

Japan decided to wait up to support East Timor. In December 1999 was a main contributor to UNAMET with US\$100 million. Japan's actions helped to protect stability in the region whilst preserving good relations with Indonesia. Japanese attempts to demand the Indonesian government to stop the bloodshed had been done privately. Moreover, it never attempted to pressure Indonesia with withdrawing Economic Assistance of which Japan supplied 60%.<sup>50</sup>

In the case of Australia, the UN provided a significant stage to express and define Canberra's position regarding East Timor. When violence was unleashed after the consultation results were announced, Australia's strategy was to encourage other countries, friends and neighbours to a multinational peace enforcement operation, the INTERFET, under the Chapter Seven mandate from the UN Security Council.<sup>51</sup> This represented a pivot in Australian foreign policy and its regional engagement.

## Conclusions

The two historical moments analysed in this paper have argued East Timor has at times represented a challenge in the Australia-Japan strategic relation. East Timor's strategic location has challenged both these countries' search for regional stability and appealed to their economic interests through its natural resources. During Second World War, Australia considered the island of Timor as part of its security sphere and the Portuguese colony a strategic location. Although, Japan was not prepared to invade the Eastern half of Timor, it still appreciated the value it represented as a naval base and a natural resource-rich territory.

<sup>49</sup> R. Wedgwood, "East Timor and the United Nations," Columbia International Affairs Online Curriculum Modules (2001). [mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/.../doc\\_6852\\_290\\_en.pdf](http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/.../doc_6852_290_en.pdf).

<sup>50</sup> Walton, "Japan and East Timor: Implications for the Australia-Japan relationship," 240-42.

<sup>51</sup> Leaver, "Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia."

In the post-war era, Indonesia's interest over Portuguese Timor became evident. From 1975 to 1998 Australia and Japan's interest in regional stability reflected a practical support to East Timor's annexation to Indonesia. Nevertheless, the East Timor crisis in 1999 triggered a difference in political positions towards the region. An early lack of consultation of Australia's intentions towards the region and a Japanese "low profile" position were the main ingredients for disagreement.

Japanese regional leadership in Asia Pacific is derived from the economic sphere and particularly international economic cooperation is seen as an instrument of soft power in the region and as a way to exert control and satisfaction to national interests, which are above all commercial.

In contrast, Australia's foreign policy is mainly pragmatic. Australia's turn towards East Timor during the 1999 crisis, brought the political community and the public opinion to a consensus, enhancing Australia's regional role as a sheriff with internal political benefits, but a very polemical image outside Australia as an imperialist and interventionist middle power.<sup>52</sup> In the end, it was Japan and Australia's pursuit of stability on the region what precipitated a coordination of efforts towards the establishment of a UN Mission to respond the humanitarian crisis following the results of the 30 August popular consultation.

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<sup>52</sup> María Cristina Rosas González, *Australia y Canadá: ¿potencias medias o hegemomías frustradas? Una visión desde México* (México: UNAM y Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 2002).

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# REKONSILIA PASADU NO HARI BELUN BA FUTURU: PAPÉL KOMISAUN BA LIA-LOOS NO AMIZADE (CVA)

Fidelis da Costa

## Introdusaun

Agriasaun no okupasaun brutál husi Indonézia ba Timor nia efeitu klean tebes ba iha sosiedade no política iha Timor-Laran hafoin hetan nia independénsia. Ne'e afeta tebes prosesu harii-hikas nasaun no estadu. Indonézia hola parte sentrál iha istória luta Timor nian ba independénsia, maibé mós hafoin hetan nia ukun-rasik-an. La'ós buat foun ona, tan Indonézia iha nia interese territoriál, estratéjiku, ekonómiku no político ba Timor-Leste durante períodu ikus koloniál Portugéz. Dezde tinan 1972-1973, Ajénsia Badan Intelijent Negara (BAKIN) avalia implikasaun independénsia ba Timor-Leste. BAKIN iha rejime Suharto hanoin hahú ho mahusuk sentrál nune'e: saida los mak natureza ba problema seguransa husi dekolonizaun Timor nian<sup>53</sup>

Hafoin infiltrasaun dudu ho interese oioin, lori Indonézia mai infiltra no interven liuhusi apoiu forsa UDT hodi halo golpe hasoru FRETILIN iha fulan Agostu 1975. Hafoin kontra-golpe husi FRETILIN no konsege kontrolu teritoriu Timor, maka Indonézia hahú involve no interven direta, liu-liu ba nia intensaun hodi inkorpora Timor ba nia soberania territoriál. Indonézia halo invazaun mai Timor ho forma sekretu no eskala ki'ik iha Outubru 1975, no ofisiál lansa nia invazaun eskala boot iha 7 Dezembru 1975. Husi invazaun ne'e maka hahú loke dalan ba Indonézia nia okupasaun no aneksasaun político-militár ba Timor durante tinan 24 nia laran. Iha okupasaun ilegal ne'e, marka ho jenosidade, masakre,

<sup>53</sup> Jones 2012, p.60.

torturamentu, violasaun seksuál, kontrolu, no teror mak domina hasoru Timoroan sira. Iha sorin seluk, Timoroan, luta no rezisti to'o hetan nia independénsia, liu husi dalan referendu iha 30 Agostu 1999.

Iha artigu ne'e atu esplika no analiza ba oinsá papél Comissão Verdade e Amizade (CVA) hodi fó fini no baze foun hodi harii dame ba belun entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia no oinsá CVA bele tulun hodi rezolve pasadu ne'ebé moruk no manas. Maibé artigu ne'e mós analiza parte di'ak noaat husi CVA, no nota katak, papél CVA importante tebes hodi hadi'ak no hametin relasaun rai rua ne'e, maibé artigu ne'e hetan katak, dame ne'ebé rai-rua ne'e halo, domina liu ho forma elitisismu.

## Rekonsiliaisaun: Fila ba 'Tempu Rai Di'ak'

Rekonsiliaisaun mosu tanba akontese problema entre sosiedade ida ho sosiedade seluk, iha ne'ebé mak sira nia relasaun pasadu marka ho konflitu no funu-balun. Tan ne'e, rekonsiliaisaun mak atu lori fali prosesu hodi sai belun fila fali. Hanesan mós Timor-Leste ho Indonézia, iha ne'e, prosesu rekonsiliaisaun nia objetivu mak atu nakfila inimigu ba amigu. Tuir Bloomfield (2006) haktuir:

*Reconciliation is the process of rebuilding damaged relations, without which society will not function properly again in any of its dimensions: politics, social interaction, justice, economy, education everything.<sup>54</sup>*

Iha similiaridade ba dimensaun sosial iha fenomena rekonsiliaisaun hodi rekonstrui sosial ba dezenvolvimentu sosial ne'ebé sempre pertinente ba povu sobrevivu sira husi ema lokál to'o nasional ne'ebé labele halerik ba justisa no pás iha prosesu dezenvolvimentu nasional. No mós Galtung's (2001) haktuir rekonsiliaisaun nu'udar:

*"process of healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after the violence, providing a closure of the bad relation. The process prepares the parties for relations with justice and peace."<sup>55</sup>*

<sup>54</sup> Bloomfield,d,Expert Opinion,Sita husi website:<http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosrjhss/papers/Vol.%20201%20Issue5/Version-6/I0215067986.pdf>. Iha fulan juñu 2018.

<sup>55</sup> Johan Galtung, "After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects," in Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, ed. Moham med Abu-Nimer (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001).

Ne'e katak, rekonsiliaisaun mak oinsá atu husik relasaun aat sira no moris iha hakmatek, ho natureza dame no iha justisa sosial. Rekonsiliaisaun, ne'ebé mak iha komprensaun konvensionál hirak ne'e, fahe similaridade ho nasau ne'ebé Timoroan sira hare'e núdar 'tempu rai di'ak'. Tuir konsesaun ba moris di'ak ne'e, hanesan Babo (2003) haktuir: Tempu rai-di'ak hatene nu'udar mós tempu bei'ala (the time of the ancestors).<sup>56</sup> No tempu rai di'ak, tuir antropologu Trindade (2012) haktuir: "*The tranquil time was when there was peace, no shortage of food, war or violence*".<sup>57</sup>

Tempu rai di'ak hanesan iha matak malirin, ida ne'ebé reprezenta hanoin metaforika ba dame, prosperiedade, isin di'ak, no salva husi moris aat no tristeza iha moris nia laran. Iha hanoin ne'e, "Matak" reprezenta hanoin hanesan, relasaun di'ak no aumenta buras, no "Malirin" reprezenta hanoin ne'ebé pás no hakmatek ba iha sosiedade<sup>58</sup>.

Rekonsiliaisaun aprosimasaun "nahe biti boot" atu túr hamutuk hodi rona husi parte hotu-hotu nain aspirasaun ba lia-loos no lolos, hodi hetan Matak malirin, ne'ebé sai hanesan mekanizmu ba rezolusaun konflitu, tanba matak malirin, katak halo fali relasaun aat ba di'ak, funu-baluk ba belun, ba dame, ho ida ne'e, kada konflitu bele rezolve. Autór aserta katak, rekonsiliaisaun tenke refletta no orienta ba prinsípiu moris tempu rai di'ak ne'ebé nakonu ho matak malirin – iha ne'ebé, sosiedade bele moris duni iha dame, no agrikultura buras, la falta ba hahan, no la iha violénsia no halerik ba susar no terus iha moris lor-loron.

## Jenealojia Rekonsiliaisaun iha Timor-Leste

Wainhira mudansa iha Indonézia, iha Maiu 1998 nia laran, rejime Soeharto monu, hodi troka fali ho presidente Habibie. La kleur iha 1999 fó opsaun ba Timor oan atu hili independénsia no autonomia liuhusi dalan Referedu – husi referendu ne'e, Timor-oan desidi ukun-an rasik. Hafoin prosesu eleisaun ho apoiu husi UNTAET, ne'e mak Timor kontinua ho prosesu formasaun estadu

<sup>56</sup> Babo-Soares, Dionisio 2003, Branching from the Trunk: East Timorese Perceptions of Nationalism in Transition, PhD Thesis, Australian National University.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid p, 57

<sup>58</sup> Trindade, Josh 2012, 'Lulik: The Core of Timorese Values', Paper presented at 3rd TLSA Conference, 15 July 2011, Liceu Campus, Universidade Nasional Timor-Leste. P, 55

foun, harii dame no mantein estabilidade-siguransa iha misaun UNTAET nia okos.<sup>59</sup>

No antes fó opsaun política ba Timor, iha interasaun política ba rekonsiliaсаun iha tinan 1998 (AIETD) diálogo iha Dili, entre pro integrasaun no pro independénsia inklui papél internasional hanesan nasoens unidas<sup>60</sup> ida ne'ebé atu asegura konsensus no kompromisiу entre parte rua ne'e, molok Timor hetan referendu hodi harii nasaun foun.

Hafoin referedu ne'e, iha tinan 2000 Timor-Leste hetan vizita husi eis presidente Indonézia Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur) hodi koalia asuntu importânsia kona-ba política, ekonomia no rekonsiliaсаun, hodi Indonézia bele ajuda iha prosesu harii nasaun no iha dezenvolvimentu nasional.<sup>61</sup> Maibé ne'e oinsá Timor-Leste atu haree ba futuru atu enfatiza harii nasaun ne'e iha pás no estabilidade?

Rekonsiliaсаun sai ona fini ba komunikasaun política ba pás, estabilidade iha Timor, maibé mós oinsá atu haree fila fali ba trajedia iha pasadu entre rai rua ne'e, no kontinua haree nafatin ba futuru. Hafoin sosiedade sivil ho CNRT hodi propoin forma Komisaun Rekonsiliaсаun Nasional, iha tinan 2001 UNTAET establese “Komisaun Simu-Malu Lia-Loos no Rekonsiliaсаun” ho badak CAVR.<sup>62</sup> Ho nune'e desizaun husi ita nia lídersira atu haree ba pasadu liuhusi prosesu CAVR, ne'e mós hetan suporta maka'as husi komunidade tomak, no Timor-oan sira identifika sira nia-an ho prinsípiu no prosesu CAVR maka dalan ne'ebé di'ak ba haree futuru ne'ebé metin no livre husi violénsia hanesan ne'ebé mak akontese ona iha pasadu.<sup>63</sup>

Maibé iha paradigma mekanizmu rekonsiliaсаun ne'e governasaun Indonézia la haree hetan similaridade política iha kestaun CAVR, nu'udar (mekanizmu rekonsiliaсаun nasional) maibé, la iha mekanizmu bilaterál hodi harii hamutuk rekonsiliaсаun ho amizade ba futuru, hafoin iha tinan 2005 Timor-Leste ho Indonézia ho vontade rasik atu harii nasaun rua nia relasaun liuhusi servisu política hodi forma Comissão Verdade e Amizade (CVA) entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia nu'udar (mekanizmu rekonsiliaсаun bilaterál)<sup>64</sup>.

Dala barak rekonsiliaсаun ne'e mosu iha rai postu konflitu, (inklui Timor-Leste). Sira nia preokupasaun maka, justisa tranzitória relasiona ho sira-nia pasadu violentu. Iha justisa tranzitória, iha síklu haat (4) hanesan<sup>65</sup>: dahuluk, nu'udar estadu iha direitu tenke hatene, tanbasá mosu konflitu, hanesanemamatenobaraklakon, no iha violasaunoioinduranteihaperódune'e. Daruak, iha direitu ba justisa katak, akontesimentu hirak ne'e tenke iha justisa. Datoluk, iha direitu ba “reparasaun” karik ema hetan difisiente, no moris iha traumátku, tanba hetan torturasaun iha periódum ne'e, ema ezize ba estadu atu hetan reparasaun. Dahaat, iha determinasaun ida ne'ebé maka violasaun hirak ne'e, labele akontese no repe tan. Iha ekuadramentu rekonsiliaсаun ne'e povu Timor hakarak hatene nia pasadu ho lia-loos, ne'ebé ho mekanizmu rekonsiliaсаun nomós amizade, atu buka hatene sé maka halo ba sé, tanbasá, no horibainhira.

Rekonsiliaсаun tenke sai kestaun komunal ba sidadaun hotu-hotu, hodi pertenente iha unidade nasional. No Gusmão (2002) ho livru Um Povo Uma Patria, haktuir: Reconciliação é Unidade Nacional<sup>66</sup> ne'ebé konsolida forsa ho hanoin hotu-hotu ba prinsípiu rekonsiliaсаun iha unidade nasional maka oinsá atu servisu hamutuk hodi rezolve pasadu no haree ba futuru, futuru ba dame no hakmatek iha unidade la hafahe sosiedade nia hanoin ba belun, iha interesse nasional atu hetan moris di'ak.

59 Komisi penerimaan, kebenaran, dan rekonsiliasi (CAVR) Volume I-II, 2010, kepustakaan populer gramedia, Jakarta, Indonesia

60 Hill H, dan Saldanha, J. M (2005), Mambangan negara Baru Timor lorosa'e, publika, Perpustakan Nasional dalam Terbitan (KDT) hal,126

61 Ibid, P, 126.

62 Ajar,edisaun II, 2017, Justisa Tranzitoria: Estudu kazu Timor-Leste, P, 4

63 Chega!Relatório husi Komisaun Lia Lo's, Simu Malu noRekonsiliaсаun ihaTimor-Leste (CAVR) Sumariu Exekutivu, 2005, Dili Timor-Leste

64 Report of CTF, (2008), Per Memoriam ad Spem, Final Report Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia – Timor-Leste.

65 Sita husi seminariu kona-ba” Esperitu CVA hodi hametin relasaun bilateral entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia”, Aprezenta husi Director ezukativu CNC, Sr. Hugo M. Fernandes, fatin FCS, Peace Center-UNTL, dia, 03/05/2019. Ors tl

66 Gusmão, Xanana 2002, Um Povo Uma Patria, Conselho Nasional Resistência Maubere, P, 209

## Papél CVA

Papél CVA inísia husi boa vontade governu rua ne'e rasik, ne'ebé hamosu enkontru iha Bali iha loron 14 Dezembru 2004, hodi iha komitmentu hamutuk ba deklarasaun konsensu bilateral iha nível estadu atu hala'o hamutuk hodi rezolve pasadu, no iha fulan Agostu 2005 iha Jakarta, asina akordu (Terms of Reference) entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia hodi harii Comissão Verdade e Amizade Timor-Leste ho Repúblika Indonézia CVA – TL-RI.

Komisáriu kompostu husi parte rua atu servisu hamutuk entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia. Iha papél ne'e, oinsá rai rua ne'e atu hetan lia-loos ikus no konluzivu kona-ba violasaun direitu umanu, ne'ebé foka liu iha kazu 1999, no rezolve kazu reziduál sira ne'ebé CAVR la konsege rezolve<sup>67</sup>. No importante tebes maka oinsá rekonsiliaun tenke klaru entre rai rua ne'e, no labele mosu tan instabilidade, hanesan asidente konfrontasaun iha fronteira iha Oecusse, Maliana depois Timor restaura independénsia, ne'ebé sai prekupa iha kestaun seguransa ba Timor nia relasaun viziñu ho Indonézia. No razaun ne'e. Polítika CVA hamriik hanesan prinsípiu rekonsiliaun bilateralmente, no buka atu asegura Timor nia interesse nasional hodi hakat ba oin hanesan estadu foin harii.

Tan ne'e papél CVA konklui ba violasaun ba direitu umanu iha relatório CVA hanesan “institutional responsibility”<sup>68</sup> no haktuir husi ANTI katak, “The CTF report assigns Institutional responsibility, not individual responsibility, for crimes against humanity”<sup>69</sup> kazu ba krimi violasaun direitu umanu CVA haree hanesan responsabilidade instituisaun la’os individuál. Nune'e mós CVA iha standar justisa, iha mandatu komisaun haree liubá “justisa restorativu” duke “justisa formál”<sup>70</sup>. Fó perdua maibé la julga suspeitu ba pena, maibé prefere liu restorativu ho intensaun oinsá atu rekopera fali relasaun istória pasadu ne'ebé ho nesesáriu atu buka relasaun politika entre nasaun ho nasaun nu’udar viziñu maibé, la’os ho intervensaun justisa formál.

<sup>67</sup> Report of CTF, (2008), Per Memoriam ad Spem, Final Report Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia – Timor-Leste, p, 8-19

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p, 25.

<sup>69</sup> Dukumentu ANTI, 2008, estitmentu kritiku ba relatório CVA, Secretariat : NGO Forum Timor Leste.

<sup>70</sup> CTF, Loc, Cit, p, 20

Maibé mós CVA forma prinsípiu, oinsá atu lori progresu rekonsiliaun no amizade hodi hare ba futuru ho metodu “inklusivu” atu neutraliza ba parte rua ne'e nia interesse, hodi labele halo diferensiasaun política ba relasaun estadu nian, no seluk, oinsá rekomendasau foti tuir ho modelu “reparasaun kolektividade”<sup>71</sup> Atu nune'e parte rua ne'e sente hanesan ‘benefisiu hanesan iha pratika CVA’. Hatuir ho komisáriu CVA Sr Jacinto Alves katak:

*Geografikamente, Indonézia NASAUN VIZIÑU, NO VIZIÑU NAFATIN VIZIÑU NE'EBÉ ITA LABELE MUDA SES GEOGRAFIA, TAN NE'E HARI CVA OINSÁ RAI RUA NE'E HARE HAMUTUK PASADU LABELE SAI OBSTAKLU BA FUTURU.*

Husi argumentu ne'e, nota katak, fator geopolítica husi papél Indonézia mai seguransa nasional Timor ne'ebé dudu mós CVA hodi implemneta relasaun bilateral ne'ebé orienta ba política boa viziñu . Tanba ne'e maka papél CVA sai baze hodi rezolve pasadu hodi harii amizade entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia<sup>72</sup>. Hare husi papél CVA iha komitmentu hamutuk hodi aprende fator agresaun sira iha pasadu hodi hari belun ho baze ne'ebé forti no metin ba rekonsiliaun, amizade, no harmonizasaun entre governu Indonézia ho governu Timor-Leste.

Iha espiritu CVA konsege hamosu kooperasaun bilateral, ne'ebé maka buat balun antes ne'e estadu implementa ona iha kompletamente ba tempu badak no tempu naruk hanesan, iha konjuntu seguransa iha fronteira, atividade importasaun ba nesesidades baziku mai Timor-Leste, tratamentu saúde iha ospitál Indonézia, no atendementu finanseiru estudante Timor oan iha Indonézia ho standar nasional, free viza ba fronteira, hari Pusat Kebudyan Republik Indonesia, (PKRI) iha Timor-Leste ho eventu desportu no sst.<sup>73</sup>

Maibé política públiku, iha planu dezenvolvimentu nasional la konsege hare hetan maibé, praticamente governu implementa tuir esperitu iha CVA nian, ne'ebé maka haktuir ona iha papél CVA nian tuir relatório hanaran,

<sup>71</sup> CTF, Loc, Cit, P, 294

<sup>72</sup> Alves, Jacinto. Entrevista hanesan Eis Komisariu CVA, iha loron 19/01/2018, iha nia rezidensia

<sup>73</sup> Sita husi seminario ba aniversariu Chega, koalia kona-ba implementasaun tuir esperitu Chega no CVA iha planu assaun do governu. Iha salaun CNC, balidi, 2018

*Per Memoriam Ad Spem/husi memoria ba esperansa. Ne'ebé iha memoria atu hare hamutuk ba futuru sem ameasa iha kualker situasaun husi nasaun viziñu.*

## CVA: Dame iha Elitismu

Dame ne'ebé harii entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia, depois mandatu CVA remata iha marsu 2008, husi Sosiedade Sivil hare hahú prosesu mandatu CVA to remata la konkorda política CVA. Razaun ida katak, “la iha liña konsultasaun ho família vítima no sofrevivensia”<sup>74</sup>. No mós iha parlamentu nacionál la hetan apresiasaun ba relatório CVA tanba, iha ‘konfusaun’ ba relatório ikus ne’e. Hafoin iha governasaun dala nen (6) nian, iha tinan 2016 Centro Nacional Chega (CNC) hamrik iha governu hanesan instituisaun autonomu superviziona husi primeiru ministru, estabelese ho dekretu Lei nu: 48/2016 ne'ebémaka sai kuidadu ba estadu no governu hodi asegura rekomendasau CAVR no CVA<sup>75</sup>. Depois hakerek nain halo avaliasaun ba rekonsilasaun ba dame husi esperitu CVA ba kontestu iha Timor-Leste ba dezenvolvimentu nacionál, dame no dezenvolvimentu seidauk buras iha sosiedade nia le’et, maibé dame iha elite sira.

Hanesan implikasaun CVA nian, iha momentu akontesimentu iha tinan 2009 hetan apoio político ne'ebé hanesan kazu ‘Maternus Bere’ núdar milisia ne'ebé komete abuzu no violasaun direitu umanus iha igreja Suai, depois polisia nacionál Timor-Leste kaptura tiha, maibé Indonézia liu husi politika nia Ministéru Estranjeiru husu estadu Timor-Leste hodi liberta nia.<sup>76</sup> Tan ne'e dame CVA hanesan dame reprezentativu iha estadu, ne'ebé entre lider político sira halo komunika ba malu, no la iha dame direitamente entre autor krime sira ho vítima no sobrevivente sira. Dame ne'ebé CVA halo, núdar forma ‘dame leten-ba-kraik (top-down)’ ne'ebé praktikamnete sentru iha estadu, no fokus ba estruktural dame iha instituisaun estadu atu hari dame ba futuru.

<sup>74</sup> Sita husi dokumentu ANTI, 2008, estitmentu kritiku ba relatório CVA, Secretariat : NGO Forum Timor Leste.

<sup>75</sup> Modul Instituisaun Centro Nasional Chega (CNC), 2017, Da Memoria A Esperanca.

<sup>76</sup> Sita iha link: <https://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2009/10/impaktu-kazu-maternus-bere -ba-sistema.html>

Dame elitismu hahú kadas desde prosesu harii estadu husi poder ONU, ka UNTAET nian. Timor-Leste iha prosesu harii estadu, hahú ho ONU, liu husi UNTAET nian, hamosu fali poder autoritarian foun. ONU envolve direta iha prosesu hadi’ak relasaun no harii dame entre Timor-Leste ho Indonézia, ho kondisaun ne'ebé, ONU kontrola poder forte tomak. Dame elitismu mosu tan efeitu husi misaun harii dame-liberal ne'ebé ONU aspira hodi hamosu iha Timor. Ne'ebé hanesan Brendan enfaze:

*In fact, a series of UN neotrusteeship missions with “neo-authoritarian” traits aimed to install a foundation of liberal democracy in Timor-Leste.<sup>77</sup>*

Iha arku ne'e, ‘liberal democracy’ hamosu dame ho paradigma ne'ebé maka hodi asegura kultura no ordem elitismu sira, hanesan iha poder político no poder ekonomia iha autoritariam foun hodi asegura eletismu sira hanesan, balun komete ba krimi kontra umanidade kuaze mai husi pozisaun iha kareira altu nian ne'ebé kuaze iha nível Letnan, Kolenel no Bupati, ne'ebé kompostu husi Komandante Militar ho Polísia, no governador Indonézia balun, ne'ebé inklui identifika núdar suspeitu<sup>78</sup>. No ne'e dame la to'o iha povu ki'ik, no la iha dame koletivu - ‘ iha de’it mak progresau eletismu hodi sai pratika iha desizaun política sira. No eletismu haktuir husi Mosca no Pareto:

*“defined elites as a small group that ‘either exercised directly or were in a position to influence very strongly the exercise political power.’”<sup>79</sup>*

Ho nune'e, CVA hare husi pozisaun política estadu. Maibé, influensiamente, CVA hanesan ezersiusi husi forsa política sira, ne'ebé hamosu dame mós iha influensia eletismu ba salvasaun poder boot sira, iha projetu dezenvolvimentu, ne'ebé iha desijaun elite político foka ba pratika ekonomia, hanesan iha indikador benefisiu ba ellitisimu política balun ne'ebé orientasaun ba seitor privadu nacionál no internasional sira hodi hari ba individualismu no kapitalismu husi nasaun liur mai, no barak liu sei

<sup>77</sup> Howe, Brendam 2018, National Security, Statecentricity, and Governance in East Asia, Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>78</sup> Robinson, G ,Timor Timur 1999, Kejahanan Terhadap Umat Manusia, , 2003, Perkumpulan HAK T.B. Bottomore, Elites and society (London: Penguin Books, 1964), p 9.

fó benefisiu ba sidadaun Indonézia hodi hetan rendimentu ba atividade ekonomia iha Timor-Leste, maibé implikasaun hafraku ekonomia nasional.

No hare efeitu husi rekonsiliaun iha elite política sira maka dominante ba desizaun política hodi kontrola ba prosesu tomak ba rekonsiliaun ba dame iha independénsia, ne’ebé hare husi aspektu política ba rekonsiliaun, Tuir Timothy Garton, katak, “*the reconciliation of all with all is a deeply illiberal idea*<sup>80</sup>”. Hanesan iha Timor-Leste rekonsiliaun ho idea ileberal, No iha nesesariu ba eletismu balun ne’ebé iha poder política no poder ekonomia, hodi implika tiha lian ki’ik sira nian, iha lia lo’os ba justisa no iha amizade ba dezenvolvimentu nasional.

Ho nune’e ema povu ki’ik sira nafatin sai dilematiku hodi halerik no nafatin kestiona oinsá ho modelu rekonsiliaun ba harii dame ba belum ne’ebé iha benefisiu hanesan. Hanesan hatuir husi amu Bispo Belo (2009) katak, rekonsiliaun ne’ebé maka dala barak hanesan ajenda política de’it, mas laiha realidade ne’ebé maka konkretu iha sosiedade ida nia le’et.<sup>81</sup>

## Konkluzau

Timor-Leste hanesan iha situasaun “estadu postu konflitu no estadu postu autoratiriam” ne’ebé mosu husi administrasaun kolonializasaun portugues no invazaun Indonézia, ne’ebé husi luta iha konflitu durante 24 anos foin hetan idepedensia. Timor-Lest ne’ebé foin kore aan husi konflitu, no iha prosesu hari estadu Timor-Leste mosu autoritariam foun ne’ebé hetan kontrulu husi nasoins unidas kona-ba ‘international peace building’ harii dame ba iha estadu frazil sira ka iha nasaun sub-dezenvolvidu, maibé dame ne’e sei iha konfuyaun ba sosiedade opremidiu sira ne’ebé sei koninua halerik ba lia los no loloos ba justisa sosial. Maibé Autor hare katak, dame ho ordem eletismu no instituisaun entre instituisaun. La’ós dame iha ‘grass roots’ ga iha povu bain-bain.

80 Brounéus,(2003), Reconciliation Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation, by sida, p, 25  
81 Sita husi:JP,finanl/No1/Agostu2009,Internet,<https://www1.parlamento.tl/docs/Publicasaun/Jornal/EDIS-AUN%20l.pdf>

Povu sira sei kontinua iha mental konflitu, ho sentementu ofendidu, tan ne’e hodi dezafia prosesu rekonsiliaun no amizade atu importante liu maka tenki komprende realidae iha lokál no nasional hodi simu hanoin ema lokál sira to iha nasional ho prinsípiu’ koletividade populár’ hodi práтика rekonsiliaun hodi hatúr entre rai rua ne’e, tenke rona ba povu nia lian laek sira, liu-liu vítima ho família sobrevivente-sira ne’ebé pasadu sai vítima ba prosesu ba luta independénsia Timor-Leste.

Iha pasadu entre rai rua ne’e maka, importânsia tebes oinsá atu rekonsilia pasadu no harii belun ba futuru husi Espíritu CVA ne’ebé ho koperasaun bilaterál ho aspetu hotu-hotu, maibé mós sei iha sosiedade balun sei kestiona lia-loos ba rekonsiliaun no lia-loos ba amizade, iha prosesu rekonstrui sosiál, tanba relasaun triángula haree ba lia lo’os ba rekonsiliaun lia lo’os ba amizade maibé lia-loos ba justisa ita iha interogativu hela<sup>82</sup>. Tanba ne’e justisa nafatin kontinua sai hanesan prekupasaun komunitáriu, ba ema hotu-hotu. Tanba justisa sai fatór influensia ida ba ema nia espíritu ba rekonsiliaun no amizade ne’ebé maka ita rasik hatúr no hakarak ba buka lia-loos ho loloos.

Rekonsilia pasadu no harii belun ba futuru, iha papél CVA nu’udar kesi relasaun entre estadu ho estadu atu hadia hamutuk pasadu no haree ba futuru, CVA mós nu’udar dalan atu diskuti no defende ida-idak nia interesse ba hametin boa viziñu. Enkuantu servisu hamutuk hanesan CVA buka atu dezenvolve política, ekonomia, no seguransa nasaun ninian, atu nune’e nasaun viziñu labele sai ameasa ba nia viziñu rasik.

82 Da Silva, Benedito Antero, Entrevista hanesan Director Institutu Peace Center-UNTL, dia, 03/05/2019.



## EKONOMIA MORÁL NO TROKA PREZENTI: ERNESTO NIA HISTÓRIA

Fernando Ximenes

**I**ndividu no família barak mak desterra ba iha illa Atauro la lori sasan no doit rohan ruma ba ho sira. La iha osan, rai laiha, uma laiha, fonte ba produsaun ai-han no ekonomia laiha. Desterradu sira hamutuk, saida los mak ita atu deskreve kona-ba ne'e, sé la'os sosiedade ida ho ekonomia arkaiku, sub-sisténsia no demonetáriu.

Ernesto da Silva “Degului”, eis tropa Portugéz ne’ebé dedika-an nu’udar FALINTIL durante tinan tolu iha ai-laran. Nia desterra ba iha Atauro no refuijadu de’it durante tinan-tolu iha Atauro. Hafoin ne'e, transfere hikas ba komarka Cailaco no prezú durante tinan-tolu. Nia hetan kastigu ho razaun tan deskonfia nia involvimentu iha atividade klandestina ho FRETILIN-FALINTIL hasoru okupasaun Indonézia nian.

Iha inisíu periódú ba rende, povu ne’ebé tun mai hela fatin la’os katak moris livre ona, maibé submete ba iha kontrolu, survelénsia, supresaun no sai atan ba iha militár Indonézia. Hafoin rende seidauk iha matadalan ba nesesidade lolos, tan seidauk bele halo rekuperasaun didi’ak atu nune'e bele fila-rai ba to’os ruma ka buat seluk ruma atu tulun hatutan moris. Tamba invazaun no funu-malu, hahan menus los ba populasaun sira durante tinan lima dahuluk hafoin invazaun. No ida ne'e, kauza mate tan hamlaha mós barak tebes – periódú ne'e hatene husi ema Timor nu’udar ‘tempu rai hamlaha’.

### Detein

Iha loron 6 Fulan-Novembru tinan 1980, oras tuku sanulu kalan, bapa tama ba fanu nonok Ernesto hanesan mate ne’ebé mai la iha lisensa, no kaer kedas Ernesto ne’ebé sei toba hela iha kama laran ida foru ho bebak. Fanu no basa ba kotuk laran, bapa sira hakilar hodi obriga nia la'o tuir sira.

Fanu duni kedes nia iha kama laran ne'ebé uza hanesan kuartu kazadu nian ne'e, maka bapa sira dehan tuir sira atu ba hein pos penjagaan – maske nune'e, iha Ernesto rasik hatene katak Timor oan asu-lear balun mak hein hela. Tan ne'e, iha nia neon heteten katak, bapa sira iha intensaun seluk ona ba nia.

Maske nune'e, to'o iha dalan, la'os Ernesto de'it, maibé bapa mós kaer ema nain sanulu-resin-tolu seluk ho forma ne'ebé hanesan. Entre sira, idade ki'ik liu mak mane-oan ida naran Mateus, ne'ebé ho laran tauk, halerik no tanis beibeik hodi husu ba Ernesto katak “bapa sira atu lori los ita ba ne'ebé mak ne'e maun?”.

Iha tuku sanulu-resin rua kalan, trek marka Toyota ho bak ne'ebé aas mai tula sai sira nain sanulu-resin-tolu sai husi fatin ida bolu Balai Pertemuan. Tan de'it bak aas, iha dalan sira hateke los de'it ba leten no la hatene bapa tula atu lori sira ba ne'ebé. Hafoin tun, hateke ba, sira iha tiha ona Flamboyan nia oin no bapa mós hatún ida-idak no hatama kedes sira ba iha kuartu nakukun ki'ik-oan ida, iha Flamboyan.

Iha ne'ebá, Ernesto hetan detensaun no interogasaun iha kalan-kalan durante semana ida iha Otél Flamboyan tan de'it deskonfia nia halo kontaktu ho FALINTIL sira iha ai-laran.

Hanesan iha interogasaun, bapa husu dehan, “*Lekirauk, bapa fó ona uma, ba kontaktu bebeik ai-laran atu ba buka saida?*”, Ernesto hatan ba bapa, “*ami nia kontaktu la signifika ami atu funu hasoru Indonézia. La'os ida ne'e bapa. Hanesan bapa dehan, fó ona uma ho kalen, ne'e di'ak, ne'e loos.*” Nia koalia akompaña ho perguntá ba bapa dehan, “*se uma ne'e hela iha nia okos, maibé bapa nafatin kontrola – lorloron han saida, aban hahan sei iha ga lae? Ami! estadu fó ona uma, maibé hahan ne'ebé ami atu han lorloron ne'e atu mai husi ne'ebé? Mai husi Kumbili ho Maek. Agora, Kumbili ho Maek iha FRETILIN nia área kontrolu. Ami hakru'uk ba sira, tan de'it atu ba ke'e Kumbili ho Maek. So ke'e, nesesidade uma-laran nian hanesan matabixu, han meiudia no kalan nian mak obriga ha'u tenki ba ke'e duni Kumbili ho Maek.*” Bapa kontinua husu “hetan nusa la mai dehan” ba ami.



Ernesto hateten  
fila-fali dehan,  
“*bapa! bainhira*  
*ida ne'e akontese*  
*mai ha'u, maka*  
*ha'u iha inimigu rua.*  
*Ha'u kesar*  
*ona entaun ha'u*  
*labele ba ke'e tan*  
*Kumbili ona. Se ha'u*  
*ba entaun*  
*nia [FALINTIL]*  
*oho ona ha'u. Hamlaha*  
*mak sei oho ha'u iha*  
*fatin.”*

Sai duni 'bibi-metan' ne'ebé atu tun ladi'ak, sa'e mós ladi'ak, iha klaran mós nafatin ladi'ak. Ernesto hanesan mós ho sira seluk, tenki fahe-an ba rua, no ulun tenki rua hodi bele satan-an husi ajar ba nia moris.

Hafoin liu semana ida, iha dadersan tuku sanulu nune'e, bapa tula mai hatún mós nia kaben, Antonia. Nafatin, Ernesto ho nia fen mós kontinua hetan detensaun hamutuk ba semana ida nia laran tan.

## Desterra ba Atauro

Hafoin inkéritu hotu, sira-rua asina kedas rezultadu deklarasaun inkéritu nian. Hahú aban kedas, Ernesto ho fen, hamutuk ho ema liu atus-ida husi família rua-nulu-resin, barak mak uma-kain foun, sa'e kedas trek Hino kuaze sanulu, no lori kedas ba iha diresaun Laga nian.

Tula sai husi Flamboyan atu ba Laga, maibé Ernesto seidauk hatene loloos sira atu ba ne'ebé. Ernesto ho nia ferik-oan, ne'ebé isin rua grave hela ho fulan ualu, la lori buat rohan ida. Úniku riku-soin ne'ebé iha mak nia oan-mane ida ho tinan lima ne'ebé durante detensaun, hela mesak de'it iha uma. Ernesto nia viziñu ida naran Ernesto mós mak lori nia oan ne'e tutuir hotu sira rua ba iha Laga.

Ernesto laiha buat ida, durante detensaun iha Flamboyan ne'e, niakolega ida naran Metabou, traballadór konstrusaun ne'ebé servisu ba hadia projeto loke dalan dahuluk nian iha Baucau. Metabou mak lor-loron fó batar-da'an bebe'ik ba nia iha Flamboyan. La'os ne'e de'it, Metabou mós fó osan hamutuk seribu rupiah, agora karik vale ba sentavu sanulu.

Iha osan ne'e rasik mak uza hodi sosa paun ba nia fen han atu bele tahan netik kabun durante detensaun semana ida ne'e. Ba to'o iha Laga, hela de'it ona osan tahan mean rua, signifika dua-ratus rupiah ka sentavu rua. Iha tiha Laga mós, uza tan tiha seratus rupiah, hodi sosa paun atu fó han ba nia ferik-oan no oan.

Deskansa tiha oituan, Ernesto, fen no oan, iha Sesta kalan, oras tuku Ualu ho balun, Fulan-Dezembru tinan 1981, husi Laga hakur liu estreitu *Wetar*, ba kedas iha Atauro ho roo seroja 502. Sira to'o iha ne'ebá madrugada tuku lima ho balun, no to'o tiha mak Ernesto foin hatene loloos katak sira mai desterra iha illa Atauro.

Iha loron tuir mai Domingo mak ikus ba osan ne'ebé nia belun Metabou fó hafoin uza osan restu ikus, seratus rupiah ne'e hodi sosa netik Aifarina isin tolu.

Iha loron ida, Igreja Motaél ne'ebé kobre mós Atauro, manda roupa hodi fahe ba desterradu sira. Iha ne'ebá, roupa fahe husi mestri no katekista Marcos ema Ainaro oan ida. Tan nia naran bolu ikus liu, maka roupa la to'o ona ba Ernesto. Hela roupa rua de'it maibé iha fali kalsa feto nian ne'ebé naruk no luan los. Se tau karik bele dasa hela netik rai. Iha mós ho kamiza riska-riska liman naruk ne'ebé luan. Bele de'it faru ho kalsa ne'e uza husi ema isin-boot no ain-as balun ne'ebé fó doasaun roupa mai Timor.

Maske nune'e, Ernesto sinti hamnasa, maibé triste mós. Ho nia laran todan ba sasan ne'ebé vale tebes iha tempu ne'ebá ne'e, Ernesto dehan ba Marcos katak, "to'o ona mestri" – ho korajen, mestri fila hodi husu fali, Ernesto "tesi tiha hodi halo fali ba servisu bele ka lae?" – Ho laran todan, Ernesto simu de'it ona roupa rua ne'e, no lori kedas ba hela fatin.

Hanesan desterradu-sira seluk ne'ebé simu tiha roupa depois troka fali ho Atauro rai-nain sira ho ai-han hanesan ai-farina, nuu, no ai-han selseluk tan. Maibé, roupa ne'ebé Ernesto simu, nia la hatene katak sei iha valór ida boot ba tempu seluk.

Hafoin liu loron lima depois simu roupa ne'e, tranzaksau morál iha espírito ba troka prezenti ne'ebé mak moris buras iha sosiedade antigua sira ne'e akontese tebes duni.

## Dada-lia no Ekonomia Solidáriu

Iha dadersan de'it, Ernesto nia kolega di'ak ida naran António Carmo dehan ba nia atu sa'e ba fohó hodi buka tok tali-dikin ruma atu lori mai homan to'ok biti. Sira la'o sa'e ba fohó ho diresaun suku Makili nian.

To'o iha laletek oan ida, sira rua haree hetan katuas oan ida suku hela fahi-luhan ida. Maibé, António la'o ba área seluk, Ernesto mós tesik tama ona ba katuas ne'e, ho intensaun keta bele troka ho roupa boot rua ne'ebé nia simu ne'e karik.

Ernesto komprimenta hodi dehan «Boa Tarde señor»

Katuas ho laran kontente hanesan babain ema Timor simu bainaka foun mai uma, “Mai, Mai, Mai!” bolu Ernesto dala lima ida hanesan ne'e. António iha hela rai tetuk liu ba, hamutuk ho ferik Atauro oan ida, no komesa daudaun husu ferik ne'e atu nia bele ta'a hela tali-tahan balun.

Iha sorin leten oituan, katuas ne'ebé Ernesto ba hasoru ne'e nia naran Retikeli, katekista Protestante ida. Iha ne'ebá, nia konvida tiha Ernesto túr, no direta kellas haruka nia ferik-oan prepara hela batar-sona funan ba sira atu serve iha meza konversa nian. Tau iha bikan, lori mai hatuur ba meza leten, Ernesto senti ladun di'ak, entaun nia «*rekuza tiha*»

Katuas dehan, “*Han!*” – la hatán buat ida, nonook de’it. Maibé ho kuriozu hodi buka hatene tansá Ernesto rekuza batar-sona ne'e, katuas husu kellas dehan, “*irmaun mai horibainhira? - mai uluk liu ona ka, mai ho roo horibainhira liu ne'e?*”, tanba desterradu sira mai bebeik. Fila, Ernesto hatan, “*mai ho roo horibainhira liu ba ne'e.*” Hanesan umanain no idade boot oitoan, katuas husu nafatin dehan, “*mai mesak ga mai ho família?*” Ernesto hatan dehan “*mai ho família, ho fen no oan ida. Agora hela iha vila ka,*” katuas ne'e husu. Ernesto dehan, “*sim.*”

Katuas hetan ona saida mak nia buka. Retikeli dehan, “*Loos! Ha'u hatene hela ita nia sentimentu ne'e. Ita kompara ona katak, ha'u ema la'o-rai, mai ho fen no oan, ha'u ba bainaka ema, maibé ha'u han tiha, inan ho oan iha ne'ebá han fali saida.*” Katuas kontinua koalia, “*sé ita hanoin ida ne'e karik, Atauro laiha buat di'ak ida, mas ha'u sei fó ho mós batar-fulin oituan tuir ba. Ne'ebé, han! Ita bele han!*” Katuas konvense nafatin Ernesto, la'o-rai oan ne'e atu han.

Ho dada iis boot, nafatin laran-todan, «matan-been atu tun maibé la sai. Tanbasá mak ha'u mane ida ha'u tenki tanis» Ernesto husu iha nia laran.

Entaun, han hotu tiha batar-sona ne'e, sira komesa taa ona tali-dikin haat. Katuas nafatin husu, “*irmaun mai mesak ga ho maluk ruma? Ha'u nia maluk ida iha hela foh leten ne'ebá,*” Ernesto hatan hodi hateke hela ba António ne'ebé la'o sa'e husi tetuk ba liu ona iha leten ne'ebá. Entaun, katekista fuan boot ne'e prepara ona bote boot rua hodi ense daudaun batar-fulin ne'ebé loke ona. Tau nakonu tena, depois katuas salin tama tan ho fore-talin kilo ida ba bote laran.

Liu ida ne'e, Ernesto hare'e ba hetan fali fahi naton oan ida toba hela iha akudesan nia laran. Ernesto husu, “*entaun mestri, fahi oan ne'e bele fó ha'u hakiak ga?*” Katuas dehan, “*aíi subriñu!*” La'os rejeita maibé katuas dehan fali, “*sé iha pasiensia entaun lori ba.*” Entaun, Ernesto foti kellas fahi-aman naton ne'e, hatama mós ba iha kellas bote laran. Fahi book an netik mós laiha, nonook no hakmatek loos iha bote laran de’it.

Ernesto hiit nia bote, no ba kellas nia maluk António, dehan ba nia atu ba simu nia batar-fulin ne'ebé Retikeli fó ne'e. Fila, António mós dehan, “*ohin ferik ne'e mós fó bote rua, ida o nian, ida ha'u nian.*”

Sorti di'ak duni ba ema desterradu no la'o rai rua ne'e. Sira rua hetan bote rua ne'ebé nakonu ho batar-fulin hodi bele sustenta maluk seluk no fahi aman naton ida ba Ernesto hodi hakiak no buka netik bukae ba família nurak, hafoin troka ho roupa rua ne'ebé la vale ba nia.

La kotu to'o ba iha ne'e de’it. Iha Atauro, Ernesto ho família ki'ik hela besik iha Brimob ho Koramil nia fatin. Tamba hela fatin klot, hahan oituan, Ernesto husik hela de’it fahi aman ne'e, ida-idak la'o buka nia hahan, no dalaruma tama to'o ba han etu-foer husi forsa no polisia Indonézia sira nian. Foin to'o de’it semana rua, fahi-oan ne'e nia kabun komesa tek liu ona. Liu fulan rua hanesan ne'e tan, nia hasan kabosu, no kabun mós tabele loos ona. Kala fahi ne'e han batar-fulin ne'ebé mak halo desterradu sira han mós senti-an hanesan fahi ne'e. Maibé, fahi

ne'e matenek loos, bainhira Ernesto basa de'it liman hodi bolu nia, hanesan asu maka fahi ne'e halai makas ba sadere no hamaus-an kedes ba Ernesto nia isin lolon sira.

Hafoin Nai fó bensaun tan ho kosok-oan ida ba Ernesto ho Antonia. Husi ne'e ba oin nesesidade família mós aumenta. Iha loron ida, Ernesto ba fali ona katuas Gabriel Retikeli nia uma. Katuas ne'e iha nia bero ki'ik oan ida ne'ebé kada fulan ida sempre ba fa'an no sosa sasan iha Dili, no Ernesto hakarak lori fahi ne'e tuir roo ne'e ba fa'an iha Dili.

To'o iha ne'ebá, Ernesto husu, “*Mestri, bainhira ba Dili karik, ba foti ho fahi, ba fa'an ba mak fó netik hela osan oituan mai ha'u?*”

Retikeli dada-iis makaas loos tamba kontenti ho rezultadu ne'ebé mak iha. Hotu nia dehan ba Ernesto, “*Subriño! Ha'u, o nia tiu Gabriel, katuas ona, Baucau iha ne'ebé ha'u labele hatene. Ha'u iha oan mane rua de'it. O nia alin João ho António, aban bainrua sei hatene o nia rai ne'e iha ne'ebé, rai-mutin ka rai-mean, sira mak sei hatene. Basta sira husu tuir, ka mosu tan iha o nia uma karik, la presiza foó osan-mean ka osan-mutin, naran katak o nia bee malirin kopu ida, iha ona nia valoór hanesan osan-mean, osan-mutin. Ne'e fó ba sira ba, bainhira sira liuhusi o nia uma sorin.*”

Retikeli kontinua, “ne'ebé, fahi ne'e o fó tuir Atauro oan seluk de'it. Ne'e labele liuhusi o nia tiu Gabriel. Oituan ka barak, ne'e ha'u labele hatene.” Rona tiha liafuan sira ne'e, Ernesto nia matan-laran nakonu ho bee-matan ne'ebé hein atu nakfera sai tan de'it bele hetan ema ida hanesan Retikeli iha momentu ne'ebé, nia labele haknaar an tomak hodi hatudu ba nia feen no oan nu'udar aman ne'ebé bele fó han nia família ho di'ak liu tan.

Fahi aman ne'e fa'an duni iha Dili kona hamutuk 40 ribu rupiah, vale ba agora karik bele to'o juta lima nune'e. Husi osan ne'e, mak nia uza hodi sustenta fali nia família ki'ik ne'e ba tempu naruk tebes.

Iha Atauro, laiha mata-dalan lolos eseptu fila-rai no servisu ba ema. Tamba kada fulan ida Barkasa ba mai dala-rua husi Dili ho Atauro. To'o barkasa mai, Ernesto sempre ba besik iha ne'ebá, keta halo ema ruma manda buat ruma tuir ba nia, karta husi família ka sasan ruma hodi tulun malu netik. Afinál, la iha ema ida mak manda ba. Ernesto nia karta ne'ebé haruka tuir Igreja Motaél ba iha nia inan de'it mós la lee tiha ona, tampa nia inan lee hateñe no tauk hatudu surat ba ema seluk atu lee.

Laiha kontaktu no ajuda ruma husi família, to'o iha loron ida, Ernesto mós baruk mai ona no la ba tan ona hein durante fulan rua tutuir malu. Derepenti iha loron ida, Retikeli haruka ema ida ba bolu Ernesto, no haruka atu sira rua hasoru malu iha Igreja. To'o iha ne'ebá, nia hatudu ona kaixa supermie ida ba Ernesto, tan iha kaixa nia lolon ne'e hakerek hela naran Ernesto da Silva. Loke ba, roupa lubun hirak kedes. Ernesto mós lori kedes ba uma. Iha ne'ebá nia hasai no fila tun sa'e roupa ne'e, pás lolo liman tama ba kalsa bolsu, lamas ba hetan loos osan sepuluh ribu rupiah ne'ebé fó husi Antonia nia bin.

## Lia-menon Sosiál

Roupa no sasan sira, Amu Locatelli mak lori husi Baucau mai iha Padre Monteiro ne'ebé responsável ba Atauro hodi manda tuir ba nia. Buat hirak ne'e maske ki'ik maibé folin boot tebes iha tempu ida ne'ebá hodi tulun Ernesto iha tempu susar nia laran ho nia família. Biar nia osan aumenta daudaun, maibé Ernesto hanesan sorte laiha beibeik tanba lakon ona oan hamutuk na'in tolu. Nia bebé oan ne'ebé ko'us tutuir husi Baucau to'o ba moris iha Atauro ne'e ikus mai moris ho idade to'o de'it fulan haat, tan moras ne'ebé lori to'o ba nia mate. Oan ne'ebé la'o ho nia inan, sofre violentu espíritu tenke moris iha fatin maran, aat no di'ak iha kabun-laran no hafoin matan loke bosok hodi hateke loron-matan, bebé oan ne'e labele fó fila hikas domin, hamnasa no dame ne'ebé bele hasai todan iha nia inan nia kabas, no selu hikas ba nia domin durante fulan sia ko'us, no fulan haat ko'us nia moris.

Ikus liu, troka prezenti ne'e belit metin iha Ernesto nia fuan to'o tiha de'it agora. Nia sei bele haree katekista ne'e nia oin ida momós tebes iha nia matan laran. Jornada badak Ernesto nian iha funu laran, hasoru nia amigo Metabou, Retikeli, Amu Padre Locatelli no selseluk tan, apresenta oinsá norma ida troka prezenti no estilu interasaun ekonomia morál ne'ebé mosu kedes dezde Époka Fatuk ne'e moris no buras iha tempu no kondisaun ida funu laran. Iha to'os-nain barak tebes mak fila-rai hodi kuda ai-han, hodi nune'e FALINTIL sira liu hetan karik, bele foti ba han de'it. Ne'e kontribuisaun boot tebes atu sustenta luta ba libertasaun nasional. Tan ne'e, Ernesto halo parte iha norma sosiedade ida ne'ebé tranzaksaun ekonomia ida la'o bazeia ba orientasaun morál, solidariedade, non-merkadu, maibé mós oinsá bele halo sosiedade ne'e koezisti no koerente. ‘Troka prezenti’ iha illa Ataura hatudu ona relasaun resiprokál ida morna, ne'ebé mosu tan konsiensia épiku husi relasaun belun, família, kompanñeiru, no kamarada ne'ebé lafasil atu naben iha ema Timoroan barak durante luta no funu la'o.

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# TEMA ANUÁL: RETROSPEKTIVA PASADU INDONÉZIU NE'EBÉ INVOLVE IHA **REZISTÉNSIA TIMOROAN HASORU REJIME** **OKUPASIONISTA INDONÉZIA**

Comité Orientador 25

**P**adre Andre Hama, moris iha 2 Janeiru 1954, iha Flores, Indonézia no Benediktus Benula ‘Selebias Podiak’ emanain-ruamoris iha arkipelagu Sundano illaboot Sulawesi, fahe istóriah o Timoroansirai hasira-nialuta ba independénsia. Nain-ruane’ emaihusiantes edente sosiál no kulturál la hanesan. Profisaun no konviksaun la hanesan, maske serve umanidade mós, Andre Hama sai padre, no dedika nu’udar bibi-atan ne’e to’o agora no Benediktus Benula, nu’udar enfermeiru ne’ebé hala’o knaar iha Timor dezde tinan 1981 to’o de’it agora. Nain-rua, ema la’o rai, ema husi Indonézia, viziñu Timor, mai tan política estadu ne’ebé halo invazaun, aneksaun no okupasaun ilegal ba Timor durante tinan 24 nia laran, maibé agora, hafoin estadu Indonézia hakat-sai husi Timor, maka sira rua nafatin moris hodi servisu nu’udar povu Timor, liuliu Fatuberliu oan sira to’o de’it tempu independénsia. Ida serve liu ba bem-estar espirituál no ida seluk, mós haree ba saúde fiziku no mentál Timor nian.

Padre Andre Hama mai iha Timor iha tinan 1988, tanba ‘ansiozu’ ne’ebé Igreja katólika iha Timor nomós Indonézia rasik preokupa tanba lei tantu mós diskursu política dominante hatuur katak, ema hotu tenke iha relijiaun ofisiál. Relijiaun animizmu la’os ofisiál, la rejistradu no piór, propaganda no diskursu dominante dehan katak, ema sé de’it mak laiha relijiaun maka konsidera nu’udar komunista – propaganda ne’ebé dehan komunista la fiar Maromak, infidel, ka jintiu, no deskreve ema komunista iha sensu negativu.



**Pe. Andre Hamma**

Paroku Parokia S. Francisco Assis, Fatuberliu

Sorin seluk, transmigrasaun Indonéziu mai Timor, la'o kedes ho tendénsia prosesu ba atividade Islamizasaun ba Timoroan. Dezde 1987 ba leten, Igreja foti iniciativa barak tebes hodi asegura katak, Timoroan la tama ba Musulmanu, esforsu hanesan sarani masál, ka peregrinasaun ba Foho Matebian iha 1987 no Foho Ramelau iha 1997. Ne'e hotu nu'udar prosesu harii NASAUN, identifikasiasaun nasional hasoru poténsia identidade li'ur/seluk ne'ebé autoridade político-militar utiliza nu'udar mekanizmu ba integrasaun kulturál no kontrolu sosiál. Husi ne'e, número sarani iha Timor aumenta drastiku, no Padre Hama mai Timor ho kontextu misaun ne'e lori mós Padre Indonéziu ne'e involve iha rezisténsia ne'ebé mak reafirma Igreja sai sítiu ba protesaun no rezisténsia Timoroan nian.

Nia to'o mai Timor, iha iklima inísiu Timor hahú nakloke. Mai no, dezcola ba Manufahi, no tuur iha Fatuberliu, iha ne'ebé, nia ajuda hodi funda no adopsaun naran eskola katólika Santo Francisco Assis, ne'ebé ho nia misaun, alende hodi tulun Igreja ho dioseze nia misaun ba vida espirituál, maibé mós tulun fó formasaun ba foin-sa'e Timor. Iha kontextu ne'e, Igreja nia esforsu ba halo Timoroan sai nu'udar sarani katóliku liuhusi meius edukasaun. Kondisaun rua ne'ebé, espresaun nesesidade no kontinjénsia husi ajente sira. Balun dehan, Timoroan sai sarani aumenta rápido tanba presaun no koersaun político estadu Indonézia, maibé sorin seluk, balun dehan, ne'e hotu nu'udar esforsu brillante Padre-sira hotu iha Timor.

Nu'udar Padre, nu'udar bibi-atan iha sarani ne'ebé hetan hanehan, hafuhu, ta'uk, la tahan atu revolta, Padre Hama hola papél ativu iha harii hikas vida komunidade, harii konfiansa no kbiit komunidade liu husi igreja no fiar. Dezde to'o, Padre Hama halo kontaktu ho FALINTIL liuhusi rede klandestina ne'ebé eziste nanis iha Fatuberliu, no husi ne'e, nia mós fasilita prosesu klandestina, sai mediadór bainhira konfrontasaun akontese entre forsa rezisténsia no okupante-sira. Ikus liu iha 1998, bainhira forsa FALINTIL halo ataka Koramil Alas, Manufahi, ne'ebé hakanek soldadu TNI na'in-tolu no FALINTIL hadau kilat 35 lori ba ai-laran – asaltu ne'e lidera husi Komandanti Cornelio Gama 'L7'. Ho ne'e, Manufahi laran, liuliu área sira hanesan Same, Alas ho Fatuberliu, nu'udar



fatin ne'ebé 'manas tebes' – terror, persegisaun, violasaun seksuál ba foto no ameasa total ba vida ema nian, liuliu foin-sa'e mane sira maka'as tebes – iha Alas, militár konsege oho ema nain-haat, detein, tortura no estraga ema nia uma barak. Hodi kontribui ba hadi'ak situasaun instabilidade liuliu prevene forsa okupante atu halo asaun brutál hasoru komunidade sivil, maka, Padre Hama hetan konfiansa husi Bispu Dioseze hodi sai manu-talin husi Igreja ba FALINTIL ho rejime okupante, no nia foti pozisaun ativu hodi halo komunikasaun entre parte rua.

Alende, involve iha klandestina no sai mediadór ba konfrontasaun armada entre forsa rezisténsia Timoroan nian ho TNI, dezde inísiu sira to'o de'it Indonézia sai, Amu Andre Hama lori esforsu non-violentu nu'udar dalan atu asegura prosesu rezolusaun problema okupasaun Indonézia mai Timor. Padre Hama, nu'udar figura sentrál Kristaun iha área Fatuberliu, kria dalan ba diálogu, uza prinsípiu manorin ho morál Kristaun nian hodi konstrui fiar-malu no harri konsiénsia ema iha autoridade rua ne'e nian.

Hodi asegura espasu públiku, ba rezisténsia no konvivénsia populár, Padre Hama, hanesan mós iha fatin barak, esforsu bebeik hodi uza dalan fiar Katóliku ho 'lulik' hodi konstrui forsa populár. Rezisténsia kulturál, liuhusi serimónia sosiál públiku ka liturjia sira to'o ba reza tama sai bairu, suku ka munisípiu, nu'udar dalan atu fasilita klandestina, hanesan troka ideia ba malu, harri konfiansa entre Timoroan ka favorese servisu klandestina direitu atu la'o. Hodi hala'o, Padre Hama fiar duni katak, konvivénsia kulturál entre fiar Kristianizmu ho lisan-lulik iha Timor eziste, nu'udar modu ne'ebé sai sítiu ba rezisténsia, no luta ne'ebé dezde iha ne'ebá, modu konvivénsia no koezisténsia mosu la fó fatin ba tendénsia kontradisaun nakloke – ne'e tan mós, troka no integrasaun valór pozitiva sira entre fiar pratikál rua ba dezenvolvimentu sosiál ema Timoroan nian, liuliu durante luta ba ninia independénsia. Sai Amu, iha fiar públiku boot, maibé la'os katak bele livre husi koersaun ka represaun. Amu Hama hetan persegisaun, intimidauna ka terór, no tama ba lista mean nu'udar ema ne'ebé tarjetu ba oho husi milísia ne'ebé organiza husi rejime okupante sira iha tinan 1998-1999.

Iha sorin seluk, ita iha Benediktus Benula ho kódigu klandestina '*Selebias Podiak*'. Benula moris iha 19 Agostu 1957 ho naturalidade Makassar Súl, povu ne'ebé, molok periódus koloniál, iha ona kontaktu kulturál no komérssiu ho povu nativu ativu iha Timor. Oan-mane husi Besok Masih no Maria Madalena Bano ne'e, nu'udar enfermeiru koñesidu iha Fatuberliu, ne'e hotu, tan nia dedikasaun ba hamutuk hodi moris no luta ho povu Timor kontra nia estadu rasik, iha área okupasaun ne'ebé nakonu ho terór no represaun.

Nia hola parte mós ho grupu enfermeiru-parteira na'in 265, ne'ebé Jakarta hili bazeia ba nesesidade okupante nian hodi mai iha Timor, área ne'ebé emerjénsia, no funu nakloke entre forsa FRETILIN ho forsa okupante la'o namanas hela iha foho (fora Dili). To'o iha Dili, Agostu 1981, simu husi governadór Timor-Timur, ba hela iha Ospitál Wira Husada, Lahane, no iha periódus ne'ebé Indonézia foin atu termina nia operasaun ne'ebé koñese ho 'Operasaun Seguransa'. Ba Timoroan sira ne'ebé relembra hikas ba eventu ne'e, hanaran '*gerakan Aitana*'. Operasaun ne'ebé, forsa Indonézia lori populasaun kapturadu ho rendidu sira durante iha baze apoiu, husi idade 14 to'o katuas, hodi halo sírkulu no lutu hodi ba serku, kaptura no destroi rezisténsia Timoroan nian ne'ebé sei konsentra barak tebes hela iha ai-laran.

Sira to'o iha periódus manas ne'e, periódus ne'ebé kontinua de'it krize umanitária husi 1979 no oho povu Timor ne'ebé reziste iha fatin-fatin la'o namanas hela. Benediktus, hamutuk ho enfermeiru-sira ne'e, koloka ba besik zona mean, área konflitu sira ne'e, hodi fó asisténsia medikál ba populasaun ne'ebé mobilizadu husi forsa Indonesia, maibé nafatin, asisténsia medikál ne'e hodi tulun operasaun forsa militár Indonézia. Hafoin muda husi Dili ba Viqueque, Benediktus hela iha fatin ne'ebé preparadu husi Koramil Viqueque, no kada loron, entre tuku 9 dadeer to'o tuku 4 lokraik, sempre ba zona konflitu, entre Dilar no Aitana, hodi fó tratamentu ba populasaun-sira ne'ebé tuir operasaun seguransa, ka baibain mós bolu Operasi Kikis.

Mai iha Timor, zona funu, Benediktu lokaliza iha kontradisaun boot, ne'ebé determina nia neon. Benediktus, hafoin to'o iha Dili, no fulan klaran Agostu nian, dezloka kedas ba Baucau no Viqueque. No iha

tentativa asaltu husi FALINTIL ne'ebé, konsege atu hakotu vida Benediktus entre área Ossu atu ba Viqueque. Asaltu ne'ebé, FALINTIL, hanesan nanis, halo serku de'it hodi hadau ai-moruk no sasán medikál nian, maibé la'ós ho intensaun hodi oho povu sivíl. Iha tempu ne'e, Benediktus ho doutór no enfermeiru polísia nian ne'ebé mai iha faze primeiru, iha faze krize umanitária boot iha Timor, 1979. Akontesimentu ne'e la'ós de'it, atu hamate Benediktus, maibé koloka Benediktus iha kontradisaun sosiál nia laran liután. Nia hetan presaun tanba ai-moruk ne'ebé lori hetan hadau husi FALINTIL, no ne'e, krítiku tan Timor iha periódu emerjénsia la'os de'it funu, hamlaha, maibé mós emerjénsia saúde nasional. Sorin seluk, esperiénsia ne'e, nu'udar hahú todan, neineik, transforma no hasa'e nia neon, hodi neneik, involve no kontribui ba kauza povu oprimidu Timor nian. Servisu fulan rua, durante emerjénsia saúde nasional tanba konflitu entre forsa FALINTIL ho tropa Indonézia, konsege atu lori nia vida. Nia fila mai Dili iha Novembru 1981, no kontinua dezloka ba Same. Hafoin fulan rua, no iha inísiu tinan 1982, dezloka ba Fatuberliu, no servisu metin de'it to'o hamutuk ho povu Fatuberliu, hodi hahú luta ba Timor nia independénsia.

Benediktus, nu'udar traballadór Indonéziu ne'ebé sofre mós kontradisaun iha rejime okupante laran, entre sivil ho militár, ne'ebé mak halibur klase sosiál ne'ebé iha interesse soke malu. Nia esperiénsia, hanesan esperiénsia seluk, hatudu mós possibilidade ne'ebé hakúr limitasaun etnisidade ka loialidade nasionalizmu katak, ema Indonéziu ne'ebé rejime autoritáriu Suharto mak hili hodi manda mai hala'o misaun servisu saúde iha Timor, iha pre-1989 nu'udar periódu ne'ebé Timor sei sai área ne'ebé 'totalitáriu' liu iha mundu maibé, nia 'fila-an' hodi luta ho Timor iha nia lokalidade rasik – maka ne'e, hatudu nia esperiénsia husi kondisaun materiál ezistente ne'ebé mak determina tebes tanba Benediktus simpatia no involve iha rezisténsia Timoroan nian hasoru rejime okupante esterna, nia estadu rasik.

Nia involvimentu hahú bainhira, iha tinan 1982, hafoin transfere fali husi Same ba Fatuberliu, área ne'e mós mizeravel tebes tan efeitu husi funu no operasaun militár Indonézia nian oioin iha Timor laran. Konsekuénsia funu ne'ebé kontinua lori ba kondisaun setór saúde nia

inzistente, maka ospitál iha Fatuberliu, nia servisu ba, la iha médiku ka parteira ruma, hodi Benediktus bele servisu atende ba populasaun entre rihun 5 resin (tuir maioria memoria populasaun, número ne'e tun husi populasaun pre-invazaun hamutuk rihun 13.000 liu) ne'ebé sofre malnutrisaun, no moras króniku selseluk hafoin sofre mós tempu hamlaha dezde 1979. Hodi tulun nia, Benediktu hala'o aprosimasaun ho autoridade sivil no militár nível munisipál hodi transfere mós Maria Fernandes, ne'ebé ikus mai sai nia fen-kaben, iha luta hamutuk, no to'o agora. Maria, mós nu'udar dadur político, ne'ebé iha nia otas ne'ebá, maske servisu ba ospitál iha munisípiu Same maibé tenke kumpre prizaun preventiva, no sujeitu ba surveleánsia konstante husi militár Indonézia. Hodi transfere prizoneiru político ne'e ba Fatuberliu, nu'udar mós salvasaun ba Maria, hodi dook husi surveleánsia Indonézia nian, ne'e mós tan papél Benediktus.

Dezde kabem ho eis-memburu Organizasaun Popular Mulher Timor (OPMT) ne'e, hahú lori liu tan mós Benediktus, hodi imersu ba forsa sosiál subjugadu ne'ebé rezisti podér estadu Indonézia iha Timor. Husi ne'e ba oin, Benediktus, enfermeiru Sulawesi ne'ebé ko-eziste no konvivu ho ema rezisténsia iha Fatuberliu, apoiu servisu informasaun, lojístiku iha vila-laran, to'o ba apoiu materiál ka fó tratamentu ba membru FALINTIL sira ne'ebé móvel iha área Fatuberliu, no presiza simu tratamentu medikál. Situasaun hanesan baibain, ezize ema nia desizaun, no Benediktus hili hodi fahe luta ho Timoroan ba kauza libertasaun nasional nian.

Tan ne'e, istória Benediktus nu'udar ema Indonézia ne'ebé mai iha Timor dezde 1981 no hela to'o agora, nafatin serve ba misaun saúde estadu Timor nian iha Fatuberliu – dezde okupasaun Indonézia, harri família, no sai sidadaun Timoroan hafoin Timor hetan hikas nia independénsia, maka nu'udar mós istória ba momentu 'konversaun' ema nian, individu nia possibilidade atu sai ema foun, hodi kontra lei estadu nian. Nia istória, mós hatudu paixaun, lori ema ida hakúr liu bareira etnisidade, rasa ka nasionalizmu, paixaun ba ema subjugadu ne'ebé la-ho fronteira, la-ho fidelidade ba estadu.



Istória badak rua ne'e hotu, uza biografia badak ne'ebé hodi fó nia mensajen sosiál ba peskiza sosiál sira tuir mai, sei eleva no fó alternativa foun ba oinsá haree ba konflitu afeta husi okupasaun Indonézia mai Timor. Tan ne'e, istória rua liu ba ne'e mós atu konta sai 'rezisténsia loron-loron' iha zona ne'ebé podér dominante hanehan ema kbiit-laek, obriga ema hakru'uk ba sistema ukun ne'ebé hanehan no hamoe povu oprimidu ida. Ne'e la'os istória, la'os mós memória, la'os mós memoir, maibé vizaun retrospectiva atu bele hetan lisaun istória ne'ebé serve ba ita nia haree hikas ba pasadu. Hodi uza faktu no esperiénsia istóriku ne'e nu'udar objetu ba ita hodi refleta no haree fila hikas ba ita nia pasadu. Pergunta simples mak ne'e, tansá Padre Hama no Enfermeiru Benediktus, ema Indonéziu, bele kontribui, bele konvivu no koezisti ho Timoroan sira hodi luta ba Timoroan nia independénsia?

Ne'e hotu hodi fó de'it perspetiva balun, no bele mós alternativu hodi bele tulun ita haree ita nia luta, katak, ita tenke haree violénsia ne'ebé Indonézia organiza no operasionaliza iha Timor la'o sistemátiku, no atu rezolve istória pasadu tenke haree ba oinsá sistema dominante organiza moris sosiál. Tan nune'e mós, iha analiza istória badak ne'e, hakarak de'it lori sani-na'in sira hodi hatene oinsá ema Indonéziu involve-an iha kontradisaun sistema laran, oinsá Indoneziu hirak ne'e hamutuk ho Timoroan kontra sistema ne'ebé hanehan. No ne'e atu informa mai ita katak, inimigu la'os povu ho povu. Ba inísiu luta, inimigu povu Timor nian mak rejime Suharto iha Indonézia ne'ebé apoiu husi país Osidentál, no ne'e katak, governu Indonéziu nu'udar sistema ho rejime ukun ida mak sai inimigu Timor.

Reflesaun badak ne'e atu dehan katak, ema Indonéziu mós vítima ba rejime Suharto nian no podér Osidentál ne'ebé ukun ba nia. Ema Indonézia mós reziste no luta hasoru rejime ukun ne'e. Tan dala barak, ema mout iha liña patriótiku ne'ebé haree ema Indonézia nu'udar perpetuadu rejime Indonézia. Dala barak mós, ema haree katak, sira hirak ne'ebé servisu iha autoridade sivil no militár ne'e nu'udar kolaborasionista no traidór ba povu. Maibé, husi ne'e, husu atu nafatin lori ita haree ba forsa no presaun sosiál hamosu husi sistema polítiku-ideoloójiku.

Funu Timor kria kompleksidade. Hamosu traisaun, hamosu deskonfia, hamosu kontradisaun no antagonizmu iha Timoroan barak nia an rasik. Saida mak Indonézia esforsu hodi halo 'Timorizasaun' konflitu iha Timor laran, ka koloka Timoroan assume pozisaun estrata médiu-baixu iha autoridade sivil -militár manifesta esforsu Indonézia hodi kria Timorizasaun konflitu – kontradisaun ne'e mak sei lori to'o ba saida mak Douglas Kammen diskute kona-ba traidór nasionalista, oportunista, opremidu<sup>83</sup> ka 'mauhu', ulun-rua nst – kondisaun sosiál husi dominasaun mak favorese divizaun no kontradisaun entre Timoroan estrata baixu-médiu sira ho sira nia maluk Timoroan rezisténsia sira. Tan ne'e, mákina opresaun ho dominasaun Indonézia nian halo ema xoke konviksaun no neon ema nian rasik. No ne'e la'ós de'it ba Timoroan sira, maibé mós ba Indonézia sira, tantu ne'ebé mak iha sivil no militár, hanesan istória Padre Hama ho enfermeiru Benediktus nian haktuir mai ita hotu.

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<sup>83</sup> Douglas Kammen (2003) 'Master-Slave, Traitor-Nationalist, Opportunist-Oppressed: Political Metaphors in East Timor,' Indonesia, No. 76, pp.69-85

# Kolesaun Foto Atividade CO25



Comité Orientadór 25 (CO25) realiza Konferénsia Nasional dahuluk ho tema “*Os Factos da História Consolidam a Memória E Germinam Nova Consciência*” iha Sentru Konvensaun Dili.

Konferénsia loron rua 8-9 Dezembru 2019 ne’e, lansa mós Coffee Table Book (CTB) no Revista Istória II. Biban ne’e Prezidente Comité Orientadór 25 agradese ba apoiu husi governu. Prezidente CO25, Constâncio Pinto “Terus” hateten mos, “tamba impase política iha tinan rua nia laran, CO25 foin hahú nia peskiza história tinan 2019. Maske nune’e, CO25 halo ona intervista ba autór prinsipál-sira no rekolla ona dokumentu lubuk ida husi rai laran nomoos rai liur”.


Konferénsia Nasional dahuluk ne’e loke husi Xefe Estadu-Maior Jenerál F-FDTL, Lere Anan Timur.



Iha nia intervensaun, hateten “husi konferénsia-sira hanesan ne’e atu fanu timor-oan nia konsiênsia nasionalizmu no patriotizmu”.

Lere Anan Timur mós hateten tan “ita ne’ebé hili ukun-an tenke responsabiliza ba ita nia opsaun, liu-liu joven no katuas-sira katak, hili opsaun ida sempre iha risku, risku mak balu tenke mate iha luta tamba opsaun hakarak ukun rasik-an, agora ukun-an ona risku mak kuandu lahatene jere independénsia ita sei lori konsekuénsia todan”.

Molok remata, Xefe Estadu-Maior Jenerál F-FDTL, Lere Anan Timur mós husu “joven no intelektuais-sira atu hatún uluk arogânsia, tenke hatene rona no aprende ho ema seluk”.



Oradór ba Konferénsia Nasional Dahuluk:  
**Dr. Marí Alkatiri**, Lider nasional. **Dr. José Luis Guterres**, Polítika-nain no diplomata.  
**Pe. Domingos Soares “Maubere”**, Relijiozu ida ne’ebé brani defende Povu Maubere.

Iha mós bainaka husi rai-liur mak hanesan:  
**Dr. Marcus Bussey** Dosente Senior, Istória no Futurizmu. Universidade Sunshin Coast. Área manorin iha istória mundiál, neo-umanizmu, estudu ba futuru, kultura, edukasaun, postu-estruturalizmu no mós postu-kolonializmu. Hanesan eruditu, nia área peskiza mak makro-istória, históriografia, istória múzika, pedadojia transformativu, mudansa sosiál, hejemonia, sivilizasaun, práтика espiritualidade no selseluk tan. Nudar ativizmu neo-humanista, Bussey iha komitmentu aas ba istória no nia efeitu ba sosiedade.



**Dr. Max Lane** Dosente bainaka/vizitante iha fakuldade Siensia Sosiál no Polítika, Universidade Gajah Mada no bainaka/vizitante senior ba Institutu ba Estudu Sudueste Aziátku – Institutu Yusof Ishak

Nu’udar hakerek-nain no manorin-nain iha Indonézia nia política, história, no literatura no asuntu Sudueste Aziátku. Autór ba livru no artigu oinoin, inklui tradusaun livru no artigu literatura. Hanesan ativista ne’ebé servisu ba Timor nia kazu ba independénsia durante okupasaun liur nian.

Konferénsia loron rua ne’e partisipa másimu husi entidades estadu nian, embasadór balu, veteranu-sira, estudante universitáriu no bainaka sira besik 300.

Foto | Media Comité Orientador 25



# KONFERÉNSIA MUNISIPÁL

Iha fulan ikus tinan 2019, Comité Orientador 25 realiza Konferénsia Munisipál iha munisípiu sanulu-resin-rua (12) inklui RAEOA hodi sosializa papél CO25-nian ne’ebé Konsellu Ministru atribui liu husi rezolusaun (Nú.1/2017, 9 de Janeiro) mak atu hakerek História Rezisténsia Timor-nian.

Konferénsia Munisipál ne’e hetan partisipasaun diak tebes husi Veteranu-sira iha munisípiu hotu. Sira agradese no haksolok hodi kontribui ba CO25 nia peskiza ba hakerek história rezisténsia Timor-nian.



**Prezidente Comité Orientadór 25** hateten “Konferénsia Munisipál ne’ebé CO25 realiza iha munisípiu-sira inklui RAEOA atu rekolla Istória husi autór no sasin-sira, nune’e bele hakerek livru história rezisténsia ne’ebé loos ba futuru”. **Constâncio Pinto “Terus”** hato’o lia hirak ne’e iha Konferensia Munisipál ne’ebé CO25 realiza iha salaun administrasaun munisípiu Suai, 5 Dezembru 2019.

Iha Konferénsia Baucau, Vise Prezidente II CO25-nian, **José Manuel Fernandes “Nakfilak”** hatete ba Konferensista-sira “história hanesan fatór importante, povu ida atu asegura nia rai, atu asegura nia klamar”. Nakfilak mos dehan “Konferénsia ne’e mai ho nia objetivu mai ho nia natureza, atu apresenta nia vizaun no misaun. Livru ne’ebé CO25 hakerek laos livru individu ida nian ka ema ida nian, laos partidu ida nian maibe livru ida ne’ebé povu-nian no reprezentativu”.

Iha abertura ofisiál Konferénsia Munisipál CO25-nian, reprezentatnte presidente munisípiu Baucau, **Maria Viegas** hateten katak, “história munisípiu Baucau la hanesan ho munisípiu seluk, hakerek história ho loloos atu nune’e juventude sira bele la’o tuir”. Nia mós agradese tebes ba CO25 nia prezensa hodi realiza konferénsia iha munisípiu Baucau. Alende ne’e, Prezidente Konsellu Veteranu munisípiu Baucau, **Fernando Gusmão “Bere-Du”** iha nia intervensaun “husu ba vetera-nu-sira atu konta istória ho loloos”.

**Foto** | Media Comité Orientador 25



### **Veteranu-sira husi Munisípiu Prontu Koopera hodi fó sai dadus Históriku ba CO25**

Konsellu Veteranu hamutuk ho Organizasaun Juvenil no Estudantil sira iha Munisípiu hotu inklui RAEOA haksolok no prontu fó sira nia memória Luta Libertasaun-nian ba CO25 hodi hakerek livru história ba jerasaun tuir mai.

Husi Ainaro, Sekretáriu Konsellu Veteranu, **Moises Sarmento da Costa** dehan “Konsellu Veteranu ho Autór ba luta libertasaun nasional iha munisípiu Ainaro prontu hamriik hamutuk ho CO25 hodi salva guarda faktu histórico sira ba jerasaun foun sira tuir mai”. Nia sente Orgullu no haksolok bele hasoru organizasaun rezisténsia ne'ebé halibur iha CO25 ho Vizaun no objetivu di'ak atu hakerek história ida ne'ebé loos.

Nia rekomenda ba CO25 atu kontinua ba to'o iha baze sira hodi nafatin haklaken misaun no vizaun CO25 nian atu nune'e autór no sasin ba luta sira bele koopera hodi kontribui ba servisu CO25 iha prosesu peskiza ho hakerek livru história rezisténsia.



Representante Organizasaun Rezisténsia "FITUN" **Osório Bianco Ximenes de Araujo** haksolok no dehan "sei firme no la fó espasu ba lia falsu sira, prontu kontribui, katak CO25 ninia servisu tenke sai ho rezultadu ne'ebé di'ak. Prinsipál liu sei la fó espasu ba lia falsu ka lia bosok balun tama iha servisu CO25 nian".

**Osório Bianco Ximenes de Araujo** iha esperansa katak ho ezisténsia Comité Orientadór 25 sei hatúr história rezisténsia Timoroan sira nian ho verdade no Justu liu husi produsaun livru história rezisténsia-nian hodi sai hanesan bukae ba jerasaun foun sira hatene hun no rohan luta libertasaun nasional.

**Foto** | Media Comité Orientador 25

# AUDIÉNSIA-SIRA

## PREZIDENTE REPÚBLIKA APRESIA SERBISU COMITÉ ORIENTADÓR 25

Palásiu Prezidensiál Nicolau Lobato, Díli, 20 Janeiru 2020. Presidente Repúblika, Francisco Guterres Lú Olo, iha audiénsia ho Prezidente Comité Orientador 25 ho ekipa, apresia serbisu organizasaun hodi halo peskiza no hakerek kona-ba partisipasaun juventude iha Frente Urbana, Frente Klandenstina hasoru okupasaun Indonézia.

Prezidente Repúblika husu ba Comité Orientador 25 (CO25) atu “hakerek história rezisténsia Timor-Leste ninian, liuli iha luta Frente Urbana halo análise klean hodi koloka konseitu sira tanba luta evolui, hahú husi pensamentu lider sira nian hanesan orientadór no husi ne'e mosu asaun sira atu atinji estratéjia ba ukun rasik an.

Prezidente CO25 apresenta serbisu peskiza no revista rua ne'ebé publiqua tiha ona. CO25 sei hakerek livru ne'ebé ko'alia kona-ba luta juventude ninian. Ba oin, iha planu atu transforma CO25 ba institutu ida ne'ebé sei halo peskiza no hakerek livru história rezisténsia ninian hodi uza iha prosesu aprendizajen iha eskola.



Ekipa Konsellu diretivu hato'o mos progresu servisu CO25-nian hahú husi nia ezisténsia durante tinan tolu ba peskiza história luta Timor-nian.

Konsellu Diretivu Comité Orientador 25-nian ne'ebe marka iha audiénsia mak Prezidente CO25, Sr. Constâncio Pinto “Terus”, I Vise-Prezidente Sr. Jacinto Alves, II Vise-Prezidente Interinu Sr. José Manuel Fernandes “Nakfilak”, Adjunta SekJer Sra. Maria Dadi Soares Magno ho Diretora Ezekutiva Sra. Eugénia Correia.

**Editór | Media Comité Orientador 25**



## KONSELLU DIRETIVU HO MEMBRU-SIRA CO25-NIAN AUDIÉNSIA HO PRIMEIRU MINISTRU TAUR MATAN RUAK IHA ÁMBITU BUKA SOLUSAUN BA IMPASE POLÍTIKA 2020

Comité Orientadór 25 (CO25) kompostu hosi líder organizasaun rezisténsia-sira halo audiénsia ho Primeiru Ministru S.E. Sr. Taur Matan Ruak, iha Palásiu Governu. Prezidente CO25 Constâncio Pinto “Terus” hateten “CO25 ne’ebé kompostu husi líder organizasaun rezisténsia mai komprimenta Primeiru Ministru S.E. Sr. Taur Matan Ruak no espresa mós hanoin rumा kona-ba situasaun política iha rai laran.

Audiénsia ne’e nu’udar dalan ida hodi buka solusaun ne’ebé mak viavél, aseitavél ba nasaun ida, ba povu no entre líder-sira hotu. Comité Orientadór 25 ne’ebé mak kompostu husi organizasaun rezisténsia liuliu iha Frente Klandestina hamutuk sanulu resin neen, iha responsabilidade atu espresa preokupasaun ho situasaun política hanesan mós sidadaun seluk.

Prezidente CO25, Constâncio Pinto “Terus” mós husu atu líder nasionál-sira tur hamutuk hodi rezolve situasaun política ne’ebé lao dadaun .

Comité Orientadór 25 nia haree buat ne’ebé mak ema koalia kona-ba eleisaun antesipada, ba ami ne’e últimu rekursu ona, buat hotu ita utiliza, métodu hot-hotu ita utiliza atu hetan solusaun ne’ebé mak diak, karik la konsege ona mak ba eleisaun antesipada.

Comité hanoin katak ne’e tempu oportunu ona ba líder partidu politiku hot-hotu liuliu líder nasionál-sira atu bele tur hamutuk hodi koalia fó solusaun ba situasaun poítika ne’e. **Dili, 5 Fevereiro 2020.**

**Editór | Media Comité Orientador 25**



Iha 27 Setembru 2019. Presidente Comité Orientadór 25, Constâncio Pinto “Terus” ho Adjunta CO25-nian, Maria Dadi Soares Magno halo reuniun ho Ministra Edukasaun, Sra. Dulce de Jesus Soares hodi hato’o progresu servisu CO25 iha peskiza istória rezisténsia no oinsa servisu hamutuk iha futuru hodi prodús livru istória ba estudante-sira iha nível ensinu hotu-hotu.

Ministra Edukasaun, Sra. Dulce de Jesus Soares haksolok ho responsabilidade CO25 atu bele prodús informasaun importante, dadus história importante ne’ebé bele utilja iha prosesu aprendizajen iha nível ensinu hot-hotu. Nia parte agradese ho knaar importante CO25-nian no prontu fó apoiu tomak ba servisu CO25-nian hadi hakerek história rezisténsia ne’ebé sei tulun Ministériu Edukasaun iha aprendizajen.



Iha Loron 20 Janeiru 2021 Konsellu Diretivu CO25 akompanha husi Diretora Ezekutiva CO25-nian audiénsia ho Ministru Edukasaun no Sekretáriu Estadu Juventude no Desportu. Iha biban ne’e, Konsellu Diretivu CO25 na-fatin apresenta progresu peskiza no planu programa ba tinan 2021.

Konsellu Diretivu apresenta mos durante tinan tolu hahú tinan 2017 CO25 harii foin hala’o knar ho efetivu iha área peskiza-nian iha 2019, ho razaun tamba situasaun político rai laran ne’ebé afeta ba fundus peskiza-nian, pandemia COVID-19, espasu permanente ba CO25 sai impaktu ba prosesu peskiza.



## **KONSELLU DIRETIVU HO MEMBRU CO25-NIAN AUDIÉNSIA HO VISE MINISTRA FINANSAS SARA LOBO BRITES HODI KOALIA KONA-BA EZISTÉNSIA CO25 NO POLÍTIKA EZEKUSAUN ORSAMENTU NE'EBÉ ALOKA BA CO25.**

**Iha Ioron 13 fulan-Janeiru 2020.** Comité Orientador 25 (CO25) halo enkontru ho Ministra Finansas Interina i Vise Ministra Finansas Sara Lobo Brites hodi ezisténsia CO25-nian no oinsa CO25 informadu kona-ba política ezekusaun osan ne'ebé aloka ba CO25. Enkontru ne'e hala'o iha Ministériu Finansas (MF) Pizu 10.

Iha enkontru ne'e, Minsitra Finansas Interina i Vise Ministra Finansas Sara Lobo Brites hateten hosi informasaun ne'ebé hato'o katak, CO25 halo ona

servisu ne'ebé di'ak lo'os no atu to'o ba finál ona. Liu-liu liga ba hakerek história ne'ebé iha valór tebes ba ita-nia nasaun. Entermus ezekusaun, CO25 nian la iha problema, liga ba progresu servisu ne'ebé Comité hala'o ona ne'e importante loos.

Iha enkontru CO25 entegra mós revista rua hanesan Timor Prizaun Nakloke Memória no Hakaran no Revista História da Resistencia.

Iha sorin seluk tuir Prezidente CO25, Costansio Pinto, hateten atu informa deit progresu servisu Comité Orientador 25

durante ne'e to'o ona iha nível as nian. Nomós introdus ezisténsia Comité nian servisu ne'ebé hala'o liu-liu ba peskiza história.

Comité simu kna'ar ida-ne'e husi VI Governu konstitusionál buka atu hala'o ninia kna'ar ho didi'ak hodi sosializa paradigma ida-ne'ebé mak Comité adopta Neo-umanizmu hodi gia peskiza história luta ba ukun-an rasik.

CO25 presiza mos halo traskripsaun ba dokumentasaun sira iha fatin seluk-seluk, liu-liu hosi Portugal, Australia, no Indonesia. Dokumentu sira ne'e sei iha hela observasaun hosi CO25 no halo dadaun ona traskripsaun ba intervista áudio visual (dijitál) nian.

Durante tinan ida-ne'e ho orsamentu ne'ebé maka iha CO25 konsege peskiza, kompleta ona konferénsia ba munisípiu sira hotu inklui RAEOA. Ho orsamentu ne'ebé CO25 iha, CO25 konsege rekolla dadus barak iha rai laran hosi munisípiu sira no halo ona nia traskripsaun,

Iha eventu konferénsia munisipál ne'e hetan atensisaun bo'ot tebes hosi munisípiu sira. Tanba antes ne'e, CO25 halo koordenasaun diak ho autoridade lokal nomós prezidenti konsellu veteranus sira iha munisípiu. Kkonferénsia ne'e hetan partisipasaun bo'ot tebes, to'o sira husu atu halo konferensia iha Postu-Administrativu sira. Tanba ema barak maka atu fó sira-nia testemuña ba história Timor-Leste nian.

# PROSESU PESKIZA CO25

Durante ezisténsia Comité Orientadór 25 hahú ona halo nia kna'ar peskiza iha rai laran no mós iha rai-liur hodi rekolla informasaun no dokumentu-sira husi autór-sira ne'ebé partisipa luta ba libertasaun nasionál.

CO25 halo ona intervista ba autór principál besik ema nain atus lima no rekolla ona dokumentu-sira hanesan karta no fotografia importante, liu rihun ida. Dokumentu-sira ne'e barak liu hetan iha Portugal no balun iha Timor no dadus-sira



ne'e arkiva hela iha CO25 atu peskizadór-sira halo análise nune'e bele hakerek livru.

Dokumentu barak konabá Luta Liberta-saun Nasional-nian iha mós rai seluk ne'ebé CO25 seidauk to'o ba, hanesan Indonezia, Australia, Kanadá, Estadus Unidus Amérika no seluk tan. Ida ne'e, CO25 mak iha kompeténsia sei lori dokumentu-sira ne'e mai.

Alende hakerek livru husi volume I to'o volume VI ne'ebé iha hela prosesu peskiza, Comité Orientadór 25 mós iha planu atu hakerek mós livru istória ba estudante ensinu básiku-sira nune'e bele tulun labarik-sira hatene istória Timor-nian.



Iha loron **10 Outubru 2019**, Ekipa peskizadór volume III Comité Orientador 25-nian halo vizita ba Pe. Elígio Locatelli, SDB iha ninia rezidénsia Koléjiu Fatumaka. Iha vizita ne'e, ekipa peskizadór mós intervista Pe. Elígio Locatelli, SDB hodi husu nia memória partisipasaun iha luta ba ukun-an. Pe. Elígio Locatelli, SDB hato'o ninia esperiénsia, história pasajen bainhira partisipa no akompaña luta ba ukun-an ho diak tebes.

Pe. Elígio Locatelli, SDB apoiu Comité Orientador 25 ninia servisu atu hakerek livru história rezisténsia-nian hodi fornese ba servisu edukasaun testu história-nian ne'ebé bele fó konsiénsia ba foin-sa'e-sira.

Iha loron **1 Dezembro 2021**, Iha entrevista ho Pe. Filomeno Jacob. Hafoin entrevista Pe. Filomeno Jacob fo mensajen furak tebes katak, ema ne'ebé matenek tebes duni mak bele lori mudansa ba ita nia rain “Juventude mak futuru, maibe futuru so bele garante bainhira joven-sira iha fuan atu hadomi povu i matenek teb-tebes, matenek teb-tebes atu ajuda povu. Tamba eskola deit la to'o, bele eskola bo'ot maibe matenek tebes duni. Se nia enjeñeiru, enjeñeiru ida matenek tebes duni. Tamba so matenek mak bele lori mudansa ba ita nia rain. Joven-sira tenke matenek tebes duni atu ajuda kaer lisuk ita nia rain”.

Iha loron **26 Outubru 2019**, Presidente Comité Orientadór 25, Sr. Constâncio Pinto “Terus” hamutuk ho ekipa peskizadór Volume III CO25-nian halo reunioun ho veteranu-sira iha munisípiu Baucau ne'ebé organiza husi veteranu Sr. António da Costa “Derok-Masin”.

Durante reunioun, Sr. António da Costa “Derok-Masin” hateten razaun halibur komandante sesaun, komandante pelutaun, OPMT no OMT-sira atu hato'o sira-nia história, memória durante luta ba ukun-an, nune'e CO25 bele hakerek iha livru istória rezisténsia.

Presidente CO25 hateten presiza intervista ema barak ne'ebé partisipa iha luta, rekolla dokumentu oi-oin ne'ebé relasiona ho luta ba independénsia nune'e bele hakerek história ne'e ho loloos.



# PROGRAMA CO25 SHOW

Departamentu servisu ba Mídia no Produsaun realiza inisiativa husi Konsellu Diretivu-CO25-nian hodi prodúz programa televizaunnune'e bele introduz dadaun ona Historia rezisténsia ba joven no liliu estudante sira atu aprende nune'e mos hatán ba nesesidade materia história iha eskola sira iha Timor-Leste.



Objetivu prinsipál ba programa “CO25 Show” mak hanesan:



- Atu fahe informasaun ba foin-sa'e no estudante sira atu hatene História Luta Libertasaun Nasional.
- Atu hametin espíritu Nasionalizmu no Patriotizmu.
- Sai meius informasaun ba edukadór-sira, peskizadór-sira no sosiedade tomak.
- Sai mos meius fonte no matéria virtual ba estudantesira.
- Nu'udar meius atu bele estimula partisipasaun no kontribuis-aun iha peskiza ne'ebe CO25 halo.

## SIMU SUBMISAUN ARTIGU

Comité Orientador 25 (CO25) iha komitmentu atu hariku no prodúz koñesimentu História Timor nian liuhusi produsaun semestrál “**Revista História da Resistência**” ne’ebé laos foku de’it ba história juventude no estudante iha luta Libertasaun Nasional maibé mós História Kontemporánu, Rezisténsia, Kultura, Filozofia, Estudu Memória no seluk-seluk tan konaba Timor.

Edisaun IV sei publika iha Dezembru 2022. Ne’e duni, CO25 loke submisaun Artigu Akadémiku ba estudu empíriku no teoréтиku-sira. CO25 enkoraja estudante ensinu superior, peskizadór, estudiozu no praktikante-sira ne’ebé maka iha interesse ho história Timor-nian bele submete artigu mai CO25.

Favor, bele manda artigu ba iha [nando@comiteorientador25.org](mailto:nando@comiteorientador25.org). Loron ikus ba hatama artigu mak **Loron 1 Jullu 2022 (11:59 Kalan OTL)**. No sei simu notifika-saun iha loron **30 Agostu 2022**. Artigu labele liu liafuan 7000, no inklui ona ho referénsia.



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